Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026
- Sponsor
- Rep. McCaul, Michael T. [R-TX-10]
- Committees
- Energy and Commerce Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Aug 10, 2026
Bottom line
The bill seeks to severely cripple Russia's economy and military capacity through a broad array of financial, trade, and energy sanctions, while also reinforcing existing sanctions against Iran.
What it actually does
This bill imposes extensive new sanctions on the Russian Federation, targeting its government officials, financial institutions, energy sector, and trade. It mandates duties on Russian imports and on goods from countries that continue to purchase Russian oil or gas or facilitate sanctions evasion. Additionally, the bill extends the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 until 2031.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that these comprehensive sanctions are a necessary and decisive step to punish the Russian Federation for its ongoing aggression, particularly against Ukraine, and to deter future hostile actions. They contend that cutting off Russia's revenue streams and access to critical goods will undermine its ability to wage war and force a peaceful resolution. The extension of Iran sanctions is seen as maintaining pressure on another adversarial regime.
Opponents contend
Critics might contend that such sweeping sanctions, especially those imposing duties on third-party countries, risk destabilizing global energy and commodity markets, potentially harming U.S. allies and consumers. Concerns could also be raised about the potential for unintended humanitarian consequences, the administrative burden on implementing agencies, and the risk of escalating geopolitical tensions without achieving the desired behavioral change from Russia.
The bill is moderately long and highly complex, requiring significant time to understand its intricate sanction mechanisms and broad implications. A thorough review would demand more than a casual read.
Sec. 102, Title I
Sanctions on Russian Government Officials and Supporters
This section mandates sanctions on a wide range of Russian government officials, including the President, Prime Minister, and various ministers and military commanders. It also targets foreign persons who knowingly support Russia's defense industrial base, conduct significant transactions with its armed forces, undermine Ukraine's military readiness or critical infrastructure, or are oligarchs benefiting from the Russian government. Additionally, it sanctions foreign vessels and their operators involved in circumventing Russian sanctions.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that targeting key officials, military enablers, and financial facilitators is crucial to directly impact the Russian government's ability to sustain its aggression and to hold accountable those who profit from or enable its actions. The focus on sanctions evasion mechanisms is intended to close loopholes.
Critics contend
Opponents might argue that such broad designations could lead to unintended consequences, complicate international trade, and potentially ensnare legitimate actors due to expansive definitions. The effectiveness of targeting individuals and vessels without broader international consensus could also be questioned.
Tradeoffs
This provision balances the desire for comprehensive accountability and deterrence against the risks of overreach, potential diplomatic friction with countries where sanctioned entities operate, and the administrative burden of enforcement.
Sec. 103, Title I
Sanctions on Russian Financial Institutions
This section mandates sanctions on the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, Sberbank, VTB Bank, Gazprombank, and other state-owned Russian financial institutions, along with their subsidiaries. It also requires sanctions on foreign financial institutions that engage in significant transactions with these sanctioned Russian entities. Sanctions include blocking property, applying CAATSA sanctions, and restricting correspondent and payable-through accounts.
Sec. 107, Title I
Prohibition on Investment by United States Persons in the Russian Federation
This section prohibits new investment in the Russian Federation by any United States person, regardless of their location. It also bans the export or supply of certain services (to be identified by the Treasury Secretary) from the U.S. or by U.S. persons to anyone in Russia. Furthermore, it prohibits U.S. persons from approving, financing, facilitating, or guaranteeing transactions by foreign persons if those transactions would be prohibited for a U.S. person.
Sec. 108, Title I
Prohibition on Energy Exports to and Investment in Russian Energy Sector
This section prohibits any new investment by U.S. persons in Russia's energy sector and bans the export or transfer of any U.S.-produced energy or energy product to Russia. It also mandates sanctions on foreign persons who knowingly facilitate the maintenance or expansion of Russia's production of oil, uranium, natural gas, or other energy products for use by sanctioned entities.
Sec. 111, Title I
Prohibition on Uranium Imports from the Russian Federation and Sanctions on Rosatom
This section requires the President to implement existing legal requirements prohibiting the importation of uranium from the Russian Federation, specifically targeting Rosatom State Atomic Energy Corporation and its affiliates. Furthermore, it mandates sanctions on the leaders, officials, and principal shareholders of Rosatom and its subsidiaries, effective after a specific date outlined in the USEC Privatization Act.
Sec. 112, Title I
Increase in Duties on Goods Imported from the Russian Federation
This section mandates that the President increase the rate of duty for all goods imported into the United States from the Russian Federation to a rate of up to 500 percent ad valorem. This increased duty applies to all goods, including oil, natural gas, and other energy products, and is in addition to any other existing duties or charges.
Sec. 113, Title I
Duties on Countries Purchasing Russian Oil/Gas or Facilitating Sanctions Evasion
This section mandates that the President impose duties of up to 100 percent ad valorem on all goods imported into the United States from countries that are among the top 5 largest importers of Russian crude oil or natural gas, or among the top 5 countries facilitating Russian oil sanctions evasion. These duties are subject to modification based on a country's actions to reduce or increase such imports/facilitation, with an exception for certain natural gas imports.
Sec. 117, Title I
Termination Conditions and Congressional Review
This section outlines the conditions under which the President may terminate sanctions or duties imposed by the Act. For Russian-related measures, termination requires a peace agreement accepted by Ukraine and cessation of hostilities. For other foreign persons/countries, it requires cessation of the sanctionable activity and reliable assurances against future engagement. Any termination is subject to a 30-day (or 60-day during summer) congressional review period, during which Congress can pass a joint resolution of disapproval to block the termination.
Sec. 201, Title II
Extension of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996
This section amends Section 13(b) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 to extend its termination date from 2026 to 2031. This effectively prolongs the statutory authority for imposing sanctions related to Iran's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and support for terrorism.
Expansive definition of 'Armed Forces of the Russian Federation' to include various military branches, intelligence services (FSB, SVR, GRU), cyber actors, and 'any successor entities or proxies'.
Sec. 101(4), Title I
Why it matters:Standard legislative practice to define terms upfront, but the breadth of this definition is highly consequential for the scope of sanctions.
Case for: Supporters would argue that this broad definition is necessary to ensure comprehensive targeting of all elements of Russia's state power, including its intelligence and cyber capabilities, which are integral to its aggression and sanctions evasion efforts.
Case against: Critics might contend that such an expansive definition could lead to overreach, potentially sanctioning entities or individuals with indirect or tenuous links, and could create ambiguity for compliance by foreign persons.
Estimated impact: Significantly broadens the scope of entities and individuals subject to sanctions under the Act, impacting a wide array of Russian state-affiliated actors.
Detailed definition of 'countries facilitating Russian oil sanctions evasion', including providing significant financial or other support for sanctioned oil purchases/shipments and engaging in transactions related to 'shadow fleet vessels'.
Sec. 113(i)(2), Title I
Why it matters:Standard legislative practice to define terms, but the detailed criteria for evasion are critical for understanding the scope of secondary duties.
Case for: Proponents would argue that this precise definition is essential to target sophisticated evasion tactics, ensuring that countries and entities actively undermining sanctions are held accountable and preventing the proliferation of shadow fleets.
Case against: Opponents might argue that the definition is complex and could be difficult to apply consistently, potentially leading to disputes over what constitutes 'significant support' or 'shadow fleet' involvement, and could inadvertently penalize legitimate maritime activities.
Estimated impact: Provides specific legal grounds for imposing duties on countries that enable Russia's oil trade, significantly expanding the enforcement mechanism beyond direct purchasers.
Rule of construction regarding the treatment of returns on immobilized Russian sovereign assets, stating that financial institutions are not required to return interest earned on these assets to the Russian Federation, and that sanctions do not apply to loans to Ukraine serviced by these proceeds.
Sec. 103(e), Title I
Why it matters:This clarifies the legal status of interest on frozen assets, a politically sensitive topic, without making it a headline provision. It also preemptively addresses potential legal challenges.
Case for: Supporters would argue this provision is crucial for ensuring that Russia does not benefit from its frozen assets while Ukraine is in need of reconstruction funds, and it provides a legal basis for utilizing these funds to support Ukraine.
Case against: Critics might argue that seizing or re-directing interest on sovereign assets, even frozen ones, sets a controversial international legal precedent that could undermine the sanctity of sovereign assets and potentially lead to retaliatory actions by other nations.
Estimated impact: Clarifies the legal framework for potentially billions in interest earnings on frozen Russian assets, enabling their use for Ukrainian support without direct return to Russia.