American Quantum Competitiveness Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Langworthy, Nicholas A. [R-NY-23]
- Committees
- Energy and Commerce Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Sep 16, 2026
Bottom line
The American Quantum Competitiveness Act aims to secure U.S. leadership in quantum technology and establish resilient supply chains free from adversarial influence by empowering the Secretary of Commerce.
What it actually does
This bill directs the Secretary of Commerce to serve as the principal advisor to the President on commercial quantum technology, critical component supply, and trusted quantum supply chains. It mandates actions to promote U.S. commercial leadership in quantum technology, including supporting manufacturing, promoting private investment, and establishing a national strategy. The bill also requires the Secretary to identify and address barriers to investment and risks related to critical components sourced from 'covered nations'.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that this bill is crucial for national security and economic competitiveness, ensuring the United States maintains a leading edge in the rapidly evolving field of quantum technology. They contend that establishing trusted supply chains for critical quantum components will reduce reliance on potentially hostile foreign nations, protect intellectual property, and foster domestic innovation and manufacturing, thereby safeguarding future economic prosperity and strategic advantage.
Opponents contend
Opponents, if any, might argue that the bill could lead to unnecessary government intervention in private markets, potentially stifling innovation through overly restrictive definitions of 'trusted' partners or components. Concerns could also be raised about the administrative burden on the Department of Commerce to effectively monitor global supply chains and the potential for unintended trade barriers or diplomatic friction with non-adversarial nations not explicitly designated as 'trusted foreign partners'.
The bill is concise and can be read quickly, allowing ample time for informed evaluation of its policy implications.
Section 2
Definitions of Key Terms
This section establishes critical definitions for terms used throughout the Act, including 'critical component,' 'quantum technology,' 'trusted foreign partner,' 'trusted quantum supply chain,' and 'trusted supplier.' Notably, 'covered nation' is defined by reference to existing law (10 U.S.C. 4872(f)), which typically refers to countries like China and Russia. These definitions are foundational for understanding the scope and intent of the bill's directives.
Supporters argue
Proponents argue that clear, precise definitions are essential for effective policy implementation, ensuring that the Secretary of Commerce has a consistent framework to identify risks and promote secure supply chains. They emphasize that defining 'trusted' partners and 'critical components' is necessary to focus efforts on strategic areas and prevent exploitation by adversarial nations.
Critics contend
Opponents might argue that overly broad or narrow definitions could inadvertently exclude beneficial partners or components, or create bureaucratic hurdles. Concerns could also be raised about the dynamic nature of technology and geopolitics, suggesting that fixed definitions might quickly become outdated or create unintended consequences.
Tradeoffs
The tension lies between providing clear guidance for policy and maintaining flexibility to adapt to rapid technological and geopolitical changes. Overly strict definitions could limit innovation or beneficial partnerships, while vague definitions could lead to inconsistent implementation.
Section 3(1)
Secretary of Commerce as Principal Advisor
This provision designates the Secretary of Commerce as the primary advisor to the President on policy related to the commercial aspects of quantum technology. This includes advising on manufacturing, deployment, use, scaling, the supply of critical components, and the establishment and resiliency of trusted quantum supply chains. This centralizes expertise and coordination within the Department of Commerce for this strategic technology.
Section 3(2)
Promoting U.S. Commercial Leadership and Investment
This section directs the Secretary of Commerce to take appropriate actions to support U.S. commercial leadership in quantum technology and critical components. These actions include supporting commercial manufacturing, establishment, deployment, use, or scaling of quantum technology, and promoting private sector investment in these areas within the United States. It also authorizes the Secretary to enter into agreements with trusted suppliers, trusted foreign partners, agencies, states, or other entities.
Section 4(a)(1)-(4)
Establishing and Maintaining Trusted Quantum Supply Chains
This provision directs the Secretary to actively promote the establishment, maintenance, and resiliency of trusted quantum supply chains using all available Department of Commerce authorities and programs. It specifically requires the Secretary to identify and address barriers to investment, establish methods to identify critical components and assess their availability (including those from covered nations), and manage risks associated with components from covered nations, in coordination with trusted foreign partners and suppliers.
Section 4(b)
National Strategy and Public Reporting
This section mandates the Secretary of Commerce to establish and publish a national strategy report every three years, starting two years after enactment. The report must describe actions taken under the Act, identify emerging risks and long-term trends related to U.S. economic competitiveness in quantum technology and supply chains, and outline a comprehensive strategy to advance U.S. commercial leadership and trusted supply chains. It also requires recommendations for further legislative or governmental action and public consultation during its development.
The term 'covered nation' is defined by reference to section 4872(f) of title 10, United States Code.
Section 2(2)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to avoid redundancy and ensure consistency with existing legal frameworks, particularly those related to national security and defense procurement.
Case for: Using existing definitions ensures legal consistency and leverages established frameworks for identifying nations of concern, streamlining the legislative process and avoiding conflicting interpretations.
Case against: For a casual reader, this cross-reference makes the bill less self-contained and requires additional research to fully grasp its implications, potentially obscuring the specific countries being targeted.
Estimated impact: This definition is foundational, impacting all provisions related to 'covered nations' and 'trusted foreign partners,' thereby shaping U.S. policy on quantum technology supply chains globally.
This rule of construction clarifies that nothing in the section requires a private sector entity to share information with the Secretary or implement any measure/recommendation, nor does it require the Secretary to disclose confidential business information or trade secrets.
Section 4(c)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to provide clarity on the scope and limitations of new authorities, often included at the end of a section to address potential concerns about government overreach or data privacy.
Case for: This provision is crucial for ensuring that the bill's directives do not impose undue burdens on private industry or compromise proprietary information, fostering cooperation by reassuring businesses that their data and autonomy will be respected.
Case against: Some might argue that by explicitly stating private entities are not required to share information, it could limit the Secretary's ability to gather comprehensive data necessary for effective supply chain assessment and risk management, potentially hindering the bill's overall goals.
Estimated impact: This provision significantly impacts the practical implementation of the Secretary's data collection and risk assessment efforts, relying on voluntary cooperation rather than mandatory reporting from the private sector.