PRO–WORK Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Mrvan, Frank J. [D-IN-1]
- Committees
- Education and Workforce Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Sep 15, 2026
Bottom line
This bill aims to financially penalize employers who initiate lockouts by restricting their access to federal funds and tax credits.
What it actually does
This bill amends the National Labor Relations Act to prohibit employers engaged in a lockout from receiving federal funds during the lockout period and for an additional period afterward. It also amends the Internal Revenue Code to deny tax credits to corporations during lockout periods, with the denial extending for the entire taxable year if multiple lockouts occur. The aim is to financially penalize employers for initiating lockouts.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that this bill levels the playing field between employers and employees during labor disputes, preventing companies from using federal resources to subsidize their lockout actions. They contend it encourages fair collective bargaining by removing financial incentives for employers to prolong lockouts, thereby protecting workers and promoting stable labor relations.
Opponents contend
Opponents would likely argue that this bill interferes with legitimate business operations and management's right to manage its workforce, potentially forcing employers to concede to union demands under duress. They might contend it unfairly targets businesses, especially those facing economic challenges, and could lead to job losses or reduced competitiveness by limiting access to essential federal support and tax benefits.
The bill is short and relatively straightforward, making it accessible for a quick review by an informed reader.
Section 2
Prohibition on Federal Funds During Lock-Outs
This section amends the National Labor Relations Act to prohibit any federal funds from being made available to, obligated, or expended by an employer during a period when that employer is engaged in a lockout of employees. This prohibition begins on January 1, 2026, and extends for an additional period after the lockout ends. If it's the first lockout, the additional period equals the lockout's length; otherwise, it's a full year. Employers are also required to reimburse the federal government for any funds received in violation during a lockout occurring between January 1, 2026, and the bill's enactment date.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this provision ensures that taxpayer money is not used to support employers' lockout tactics, which can harm workers. They believe it creates a more equitable bargaining environment by removing a potential financial advantage for employers during labor disputes.
Critics contend
Critics would contend that this provision unfairly interferes with an employer's legal right to manage their business and respond to labor disputes. They might argue it could force employers into unfavorable agreements, potentially leading to business instability or closures, and that it represents government overreach into private sector labor relations.
Tradeoffs
The provision balances the desire to protect workers during labor disputes with concerns about government intervention in private business operations. It aims to deter lockouts but could also be seen as tilting the scales too heavily in favor of labor unions, potentially prolonging disputes or leading to unintended economic consequences for affected businesses.
Section 3
Denial of Tax Credits for Corporations Engaged in Lock-Out of Employees
This section amends the Internal Revenue Code to deny federal tax credits to corporations that are engaged in a lockout of employees. If a corporation has no prior lockout in the taxable year, credits are denied only for the portion allocable to the lockout period. However, if there has been a preceding lockout in the same taxable year, no credits are allowed for the entire taxable year. This denial does not apply to credits directly related to tax payments. An aggregation rule ensures that related entities are treated as a single corporation for these purposes. This provision applies to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2025.
Both sections define 'lock-out period' by referencing the existing National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
Section 2(c) and Section 3(b)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to avoid redundancy and ensure consistency with existing legal definitions. It's not necessarily evasive but requires external legal knowledge.
Case for: Supporters would argue that referencing the NLRA ensures that the bill's provisions are applied consistently with established labor law, leveraging existing legal frameworks and interpretations of what constitutes a lockout.
Case against: Critics might argue that relying on an external definition, especially one that can be subject to interpretation and legal challenges, introduces ambiguity and potential for disputes regarding the bill's applicability.
Estimated impact: The precise legal scope and application of the bill's penalties will depend heavily on the existing and future interpretations of 'lock-out' under the NLRA.
This subsection includes an 'Aggregation Rule' stating that all persons treated as a single employer under subsections (a) and (b) of section 52 of the Internal Revenue Code shall be treated as a single corporation for the purpose of denying tax credits.
Section 3(c)
Why it matters:This is standard practice in tax law to prevent businesses from circumventing rules by structuring themselves as multiple separate entities. It's a technical anti-avoidance measure.
Case for: Proponents would argue that this rule is essential to prevent corporations from reorganizing or creating subsidiaries to avoid the tax credit denial, ensuring the bill's intended impact on larger corporate structures.
Case against: Opponents might argue that such aggregation rules can inadvertently penalize otherwise separate entities within a corporate family for the actions of one part, potentially creating undue burden or complexity.
Estimated impact: Ensures that large corporate groups cannot easily bypass the tax credit denial by isolating the lockout to a specific subsidiary, thus broadening the effective reach of the penalty.