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H.R. 10221·119th Congress·Introduced Sep 2, 2026

Flock-Off Act

IntroducedGovernment Operations and PoliticsMajor
View bill text
Sponsor
Rep. Massie, Thomas [R-KY-4]
Committees
Oversight and Government Reform Committee (primary)
Last action
Sep 2, 2026

Bottom line

The bill aims to restrict government use of automated license plate readers and biometric surveillance cameras by cutting off federal funding, with specific, narrowly defined exceptions.

What it actually does

This bill broadly prohibits federal funds from being used by any government agency or recipient (including state, local, or Tribal governments) to purchase, lease, operate, or financially support "covered camera systems" and their associated components. It mandates the decommissioning and removal of existing federally funded systems within 180 days and allows for the recovery of federal funds for violations. Exceptions are made for border security within one mile of the northern or southern border and for toll collection systems, both with strict data usage limitations.

Proponents argue

Supporters argue the bill is crucial for protecting privacy and civil liberties by preventing government agencies from using federal funds to deploy widespread surveillance technologies that can track individuals and vehicles without warrants. They emphasize the importance of limiting government overreach and the potential for misuse of sensitive data collected by these systems.

Opponents contend

Opponents might argue that the bill hinders law enforcement's ability to combat crime, track criminals, and ensure public safety, especially in areas beyond the border. They may contend that these technologies are valuable tools for investigations and that the bill's broad prohibition could compromise national security and local policing efforts.

The bill is concise and relatively easy to read, allowing a quick understanding of its core provisions and implications.

Section 2(a)(1)

Prohibition on New Federal Funding for Covered Camera Systems

prominently featuredstraightforward

This provision broadly forbids any federal agency, or any entity receiving federal funds (like state or local governments), from using those funds to buy, lease, install, operate, or even financially support "covered camera systems" or their related parts. This includes contracts for maintenance, data access, or any associated hardware or software.

GroupImpactMechanismScale
GroupFederal, State, Local, and Tribal GovernmentsImpactRestricted ability to acquire and operate certain surveillance technologies using federal funds.MechanismDirect prohibition on obligation or expenditure of federal funds.ScaleBroad, affecting all federal funding streams.
GroupManufacturers and vendors of covered camera systemsImpactLoss of federal contracts and revenue from government clients.MechanismElimination of federal funding for purchases.ScaleSignificant, impacting market for these technologies in the government sector.

Supporters argue

Supporters argue this is a crucial step to prevent the expansion of government surveillance funded by taxpayers, thereby protecting individual privacy and civil liberties from pervasive tracking.

Critics contend

Critics might contend that this provision ties the hands of law enforcement and other agencies, preventing them from utilizing effective modern tools to enhance public safety and national security, even when such tools could be used responsibly.

Tradeoffs

This provision balances privacy concerns against perceived public safety benefits and the operational efficiency of surveillance technologies.

Section 2(a)(2)(A) and (B)

Mandate for Decommissioning and Termination of Existing Systems

prominently featuredstraightforward

Within 180 days of the bill's enactment, federal agencies must decommission and remove any covered camera systems or associated components that were purchased or operated with federal funds. Similarly, state, local, and Tribal governments receiving federal funds must cease operating such systems and terminate related contracts as a condition of continuing to receive federal funding.

Section 2(a)(2)(C)

Enforcement Mechanism for Fund Misuse

mentioned in summarystraightforward

If a recipient or subrecipient of federal funds violates the prohibition by using federal money for covered camera systems, the federal agency that provided the funds must withhold further federal funds from that entity. This withholding continues until the entity reimburses the U.S. Treasury for the full amount of funds misused.

Section 2(b)(1)

Border Security Exception

prominently featuredstraightforward

The general prohibition does not apply to covered camera systems or associated components that are installed and operated within one mile of the northern or southern U.S. border. These systems must be owned or operated by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) or another federal/local law enforcement agency with a written agreement with CBP, and primarily used for border security, detection of unlawful entry, human/drug trafficking, alien smuggling, or transnational criminal activity.

Section 2(b)(2)

Tolling Exception

mentioned in summarystraightforward

Federal funds made available for highway construction (under 23 U.S.C. 104(b)) can still be used for covered camera systems if their *only* purpose is to collect, administer, or enforce tolls. Crucially, any data collected from such systems can *only* be used, accessed, retained, queried, disclosed, or shared for this specific tolling purpose.

FOUND

The definition of "covered camera system" is very broad, encompassing any fixed, mobile, or portable photographic, video, optical, infrared, biometric, or other electronic device that automatically captures and processes images/recordings of motor vehicles/license plates or individuals (to extract biometric data) using machine learning or automated image processing, and then transmits this data to a remote or cloud-based system for storage, analysis, retrieval, or sharing. This includes both Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) and facial recognition/biometric cameras.

Section 2(c)(3)

Why it matters:While standard legislative practice to define terms, the breadth of this definition is critical to the bill's impact and could be easily overlooked.

Case for: Supporters would argue that a broad definition is essential to prevent circumvention of the prohibition. By covering various types of automated surveillance and data processing, the bill ensures comprehensive protection against evolving technologies.

Case against: Critics might argue that the definition is overly broad, potentially capturing technologies that could have legitimate, non-surveillance uses or that are not the primary target of privacy concerns, leading to unintended restrictions.

Estimated impact: Significantly expands the scope of the prohibition beyond just specific brands like "Flock" to a wide array of automated surveillance technologies.

FOUND

The term "associated component" is defined broadly to include "any hardware, software, algorithm, database, communications network, cloud-based service, or data analysis platform of, or used in connection with," a covered camera system. This means the prohibition extends not just to the cameras themselves but to the entire ecosystem of data collection, storage, processing, and analysis.

Section 2(c)(1)

Why it matters:Standard legislative practice, but its comprehensive nature ensures the prohibition is robust and cannot be easily bypassed by funding only the "back-end" systems.

Case for: Proponents would argue that this broad definition is necessary to make the prohibition effective. Without it, agencies could simply fund the data processing and storage components separately, undermining the bill's intent to stop the entire surveillance chain.

Case against: Opponents might argue that this could inadvertently restrict funding for general-purpose cloud services or data analysis tools that are also used for other, permissible purposes, creating compliance complexities.

Estimated impact: Ensures the prohibition is comprehensive, preventing agencies from acquiring or maintaining the infrastructure necessary to operate covered camera systems, even if the cameras themselves are not federally funded.

About this analysis. AI-Generated from the official bill text and available committee reports. Gaps in available data are noted explicitly. Verify important details with the official Congress.gov record.

On this page

  • Executive summary
  • Key provisions
  • Buried treasure
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  • Critical analysis
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  • Implementation
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