Big Tech Accountability Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. McGovern, James P. [D-MA-2]
- Committees
- Energy and Commerce Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Sep 4, 2026
Bottom line
The bill aims to fundamentally reshape the legal accountability of online platforms and digital advertisers by imposing new criminal and civil liabilities for harmful content and restricting data-driven business models.
What it actually does
This bill creates new criminal and civil liabilities for individuals and "publishing entities" (including online platforms) that knowingly disseminate fraudulent civic misinformation or amplify encouragement of violence. It significantly amends Section 230 of the Communications Act of 1934 to remove liability protections for interactive computer services that engage in targeted dissemination, act knowingly/recklessly/negligently in spreading harmful content, or profit from amplifying such content. Furthermore, it restricts targeted online advertising and directs the Federal Trade Commission to recommend legislation prohibiting the collection, aggregation, and sale of personal online information without genuine, informed consent.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that this legislation is crucial for protecting internet users, voters, and the broader community from the pervasive dangers of disinformation, incitement to violence, and the commercial exploitation of personal privacy. They contend it fosters much-needed accountability for powerful online platforms that currently enjoy broad immunity, thereby creating a safer and more trustworthy digital environment.
Opponents contend
Critics might argue that the bill's broad definitions of misinformation and encouragement of violence could lead to over-censorship, stifle legitimate speech, and impose undue burdens on online platforms, potentially harming free expression and innovation. Concerns may also be raised about the economic impact of restricting targeted advertising and data collection on the digital economy, particularly for smaller businesses and platforms.
The bill is relatively concise, allowing an informed reader to thoroughly review its provisions and understand its significant policy implications within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 3, amending Chapter 47 of title 18, United States Code
False Information about Essential Government Services or Processes (18 U.S.C. § 1041)
This provision establishes new criminal and civil penalties for knowingly conveying or disseminating "fraudulent civic misinformation" in interstate or foreign commerce, with the intent or reasonable expectation of causing others to rely on it. It also holds "publishing entities" (including online platforms) liable if they knowingly disseminate such misinformation or use "individualized targeting" to spread it. Fraudulent civic misinformation includes materially false information about public health, voting, elections, the census, civil rights, and education, or information falsely attributed to a government agency.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this provision is essential to combat the spread of dangerous misinformation that undermines public trust, endangers public health and safety, and interferes with democratic processes like elections. They contend that holding platforms accountable for targeted dissemination of such content is a necessary step to protect citizens.
Critics contend
Critics may argue that defining and prosecuting "fraudulent civic misinformation" could lead to subjective enforcement, chilling effects on legitimate speech, and government overreach. They might also raise concerns about the practical challenges for platforms in monitoring and verifying all content, especially when liability extends to "individualized targeting."
Tradeoffs
This provision balances the desire to protect the public from harmful misinformation against concerns about free speech, potential government censorship, and the practicalities of content moderation for online platforms.
Section 4, amending Chapter 13 of title 18, United States Code
Criminal Liability for Amplifying Encouragement of Violence (18 U.S.C. § 251)
This section creates new criminal and civil penalties for individuals who knowingly disseminate online communications that solicit, command, induce, encourage, or persuade others to commit kidnapping, cause death or serious bodily injury, or engage in felony offenses involving physical force, if such communication is calculated to reach 500 or more viewers. "Publishing entities" face liability if they disseminate such content, use individualized targeting, and cause it to be viewed 10,000 or more times within the U.S.
Section 5(a), amending Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Act of 1934
Amendment to Section 230(c)(1) - Treatment of Publisher or Speaker
This amendment significantly alters Section 230, which currently shields interactive computer services from liability as publishers or speakers of third-party content. The revised language states that such services will lose this immunity if they (i) engage in targeting the dissemination of content to an individual or specific group, (ii) act knowingly, recklessly, or negligently in encouraging or facilitating the spread of misinformation, disinformation, or violence, or (iii) intentionally receive a financial benefit from amplifying such harmful content.
Section 5(c)(1), adding new Section 232 to the Communications Act of 1934
Restrictions on Targeted Online Advertising
This new section prohibits "covered online platforms" (websites, apps, social networks, search engines, advertising networks) from targeting the dissemination of advertisements to individuals or specific groups based on any personal information. It defines targeting as using computational processes or allowing others to instruct the platform to display ads to a subset of users based on personal information, for which the platform receives a fee. It includes a private right of action for individuals, allowing them to sue for damages ranging from $100-$5,000 per violation, and invalidates pre-dispute arbitration agreements for such claims.
Section 5(c)(1), adding new Section 233 to the Communications Act of 1934
FTC Recommendations on Personal Information Collection, Aggregation, and Sale
This section directs the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to study and make recommendations to Congress for specific reforms and legislation restricting the collection, aggregation, or sale of online personal information. The core policy goal is to prohibit these activities without the "genuine, informed, and meaningful consent" of the individual. The recommendations must explicitly state that "blanket consent obtained as a condition to accessing information or services on the internet shall not be considered meaningful consent." The FTC is given 120 days to submit this report.
The definition of "individualized targeting" is crucial for determining liability for publishing entities under both the misinformation and violence amplification provisions. It includes computational processes (algorithms, machine learning, AI) designed to transmit or display content to a subset of users based on personal information, or allowing others to instruct the platform to do so. It explicitly excludes content displayed in direct response to user requests or search terms.
Section 3(c)(2) and Section 4(c), defining "Individualized targeting"
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice for defining key terms, but its technical nature means a casual reader might not fully grasp its broad implications for how platforms operate their content delivery systems.
Case for: Supporters argue this precise definition is necessary to target the algorithmic amplification practices of platforms that contribute to the spread of harmful content, without penalizing neutral search results or direct user requests.
Case against: Critics might argue that the definition is still broad enough to encompass many standard platform functionalities, potentially leading to platforms de-prioritizing or removing content to avoid liability, even if not directly harmful. The distinction between algorithmic display and direct search results can be nuanced in practice.
Estimated impact: Significantly impacts how online platforms design and operate their content recommendation and delivery algorithms, potentially requiring fundamental changes to their core functionalities.
The bill defines "personal information" as any information linked or reasonably linkable to a specific individual or device, including actual or perceived characteristics, demographics, internet browsing history, and even de-identified information. This broad definition is critical because it underpins the conditions for losing Section 230 immunity (targeting based on personal information) and the restrictions on targeted advertising.
Section 5(b), amending Section 230(f) of the Communications Act of 1934, defining "Personal information"
Why it matters:This is a standard legislative technique for establishing the scope of a bill's application, but its breadth is highly consequential and could be easily missed by a casual reader.
Case for: Proponents argue that a broad definition of personal information is necessary to prevent platforms from circumventing privacy protections through various data aggregation and de-identification techniques, ensuring comprehensive protection for individual data.
Case against: Opponents might contend that including "de-identified information" within the scope of "personal information" is overly restrictive, as de-identified data is often used for legitimate research, analytics, and service improvement without directly identifying individuals. This could impede data-driven innovation.
Estimated impact: Significantly expands the scope of data considered sensitive and subject to regulation, impacting nearly all data collection and processing activities by online platforms.