Technical corrections only. v2 updates the bill status from 'Introduced in House' to 'Engrossed in House,' removing introductory text and adding a 'Passed the House' attestation and a final summary block. No substantive policy changes were made to the bill's provisions.
PROOF Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Van Drew, Jefferson [R-NJ-2]
- Committees
- Judiciary Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Sep 17, 2026
This analysis was written for v1 (INTRODUCED IN HOUSE, Sep 10, 2026). ENGROSSED IN HOUSE changed too little to need its own, so it reuses that one rather than a rewrite. The differences between the two are summarized above. View v1
Bottom line
The PROOF Act aims to combat fraud in major federal programs by enhancing mandatory data sharing between states and federal law enforcement, while simultaneously requiring strict privacy and security protections for the shared data.
What it actually does
This bill, known as the PROOF Act, mandates that State agencies administering specific federal programs provide information to the Attorney General upon written request for the purpose of investigating and prosecuting alleged fraud. It also establishes privacy safeguards for the handling of this shared information by federal agencies, including compliance with existing privacy laws and security protocols.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that this legislation is crucial for protecting taxpayer dollars by significantly improving the federal government's ability to detect, investigate, and prosecute fraud in large-scale federal assistance programs, many of which have been identified as vulnerable to abuse. They emphasize that the included privacy safeguards demonstrate a responsible approach to balancing law enforcement needs with individual rights.
Opponents contend
Opponents might raise concerns about potential federal overreach into state administrative functions, particularly given the broad clauses allowing the Attorney General to designate additional programs and request 'any other information.' They may also argue that despite the stated safeguards, the increased centralization of sensitive data inherently elevates the risk of data breaches or misuse, potentially discouraging eligible individuals from participating in vital social programs.
The bill is concise and clearly structured, making its core provisions accessible for a quick read and easy comprehension by an informed reader.
Section 2(a)
Mandatory Information Provision to Attorney General
This section requires State agencies that administer certain federal programs to provide specific information to the Attorney General when a written request is made. The purpose of this information sharing is solely for investigating or prosecuting alleged fraud related to those federal programs. This makes data sharing mandatory, rather than voluntary, under the specified conditions.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that this mandatory sharing is essential for effective fraud detection and prosecution, as federal law enforcement often lacks direct access to the granular data held by state administrators, which can hinder investigations and allow fraud to persist.
Critics contend
Critics might contend that this provision represents an unfunded mandate on states, requiring them to dedicate resources to fulfill federal data requests without federal financial assistance, potentially diverting funds from program services.
Tradeoffs
This provision balances the federal government's need for comprehensive data to combat fraud against concerns about state autonomy and the administrative burden placed on state agencies.
Section 2(b)
Scope of Federal Programs Subject to Data Sharing
This section enumerates 12 specific federal programs for which information sharing is authorized, including major initiatives like Medicaid, SNAP, TANF, unemployment compensation, various COVID-19 relief funds (e.g., Coronavirus Relief Fund, Emergency Rental Assistance), broadband deployment, and FEMA disaster grants. Crucially, it also includes a broad clause allowing the Attorney General to designate 'any other program' receiving federal funds and identified as vulnerable to fraud.
Section 2(c)
Types of Information to be Shared
This section specifies the categories of information that states must provide to the Attorney General. These include identity verification records, benefit disbursement logs, provider billing statements, and demographic information directly related to an active fraud investigation. Additionally, it includes a broad clause allowing the Attorney General to request 'any other information' deemed appropriate for the purposes of investigating or prosecuting alleged fraud.
Section 3
Information Protection and Privacy Safeguards
This section mandates strict privacy and security protocols for all information obtained by the Attorney General under the Act. It requires handling data in accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974 and, where applicable, HIPAA regulations. Specific security protocols include encrypting data transfers, limiting access to authorized personnel, and destroying data upon the conclusion of relevant legal proceedings or investigations. Furthermore, it explicitly limits the use of this information to law enforcement purposes related to fraud, prohibiting disclosure for any unrelated administrative or commercial purposes.
This clause authorizes the Attorney General to request information for 'any other program pursuant to which funds are made available to States identified by the Attorney General as vulnerable to fraud.'
Section 2(b)(13)
Why it matters:This could be standard legislative practice to provide necessary flexibility for law enforcement to adapt to new fraud schemes and emerging vulnerabilities. However, it could also be seen as potentially evasive, allowing for a significant expansion of federal authority without explicit upfront debate on each potential program.
Case for: Supporters argue that this flexibility is essential for the Attorney General to respond effectively to evolving fraud threats and to ensure that new or currently unforeseen programs vulnerable to fraud can be brought under the Act's purview without requiring new legislation.
Case against: Critics contend that this clause grants overly broad and unchecked power to the Attorney General, allowing for the expansion of federal data collection and mandates on states without further congressional review or public debate on the merits of each new program designation.
Estimated impact: This provision has the potential to significantly expand the scope of the Act to an indefinite number of future or currently unlisted federal programs, thereby broadening federal data access and state obligations considerably beyond the initial explicit list.
This clause allows the Attorney General to request 'Any other information, as determined appropriate by the Attorney General for purposes of the investigation or prosecution of alleged fraud.'
Section 2(c)(5)
Why it matters:Similar to the 'any other program' clause, this provides flexibility for investigators to obtain all necessary information for complex fraud cases. However, it could also be seen as an attempt to avoid explicitly listing all potentially sensitive data types upfront, thereby sidestepping more detailed scrutiny.
Case for: Proponents argue that investigators need comprehensive flexibility to request all relevant data to effectively combat sophisticated fraud schemes, as the specific data points required can vary widely depending on the nature of the fraud and cannot be exhaustively listed in legislation.
Case against: Opponents worry that this clause could be interpreted to allow for requests of highly sensitive, aggregated, or tangentially related data, potentially infringing on individual privacy beyond what is strictly necessary and directly relevant for a specific fraud investigation.
Estimated impact: This provision could significantly broaden the types of data shared from state agencies to federal law enforcement, potentially including highly personal or aggregated data that is not explicitly categorized in the preceding clauses.