Problem Solvers Independent Commissions Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Fitzpatrick, Brian K. [R-PA-1]
- Committees
- Judiciary Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Sep 15, 2026
Bottom line
The bill seeks to remove partisan influence from Congressional redistricting by requiring states to use independent commissions or state supreme courts to draw electoral maps, effective for the 2030 census cycle.
What it actually does
This bill mandates that all U.S. states conduct Congressional redistricting through independent commissions, rather than state legislatures. It establishes detailed requirements for the composition, eligibility, selection, training, and removal of commission members, as well as strict criteria and public input processes for developing redistricting plans. If a commission fails to enact a plan, the state's highest court is empowered to appoint special masters to draw the maps.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that this bill will reduce partisan gerrymandering, increase electoral competition, and ensure that congressional districts more accurately reflect the demographic and political diversity of states. They contend that independent commissions foster fairer representation and enhance public trust in the redistricting process by taking map-drawing out of the hands of partisan politicians.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that this bill represents an overreach of federal power into a traditional state function, infringing on states' rights to determine their own electoral processes. They could also contend that 'independent' commissions are not truly non-partisan and may introduce new forms of bias or lack accountability to the electorate, potentially leading to unintended consequences or less responsive representation.
The bill is relatively concise and its language is accessible, allowing an informed reader to understand its core provisions within a reasonable timeframe, especially given the significant policy implications.
Section 2(a)
Mandatory Independent Redistricting
This section establishes the core requirement of the bill: all Congressional redistricting in a state must be conducted either by an independent redistricting commission or, if that fails, by the highest court in the state. This fundamentally alters the traditional role of state legislatures in drawing congressional maps.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that this provision is essential to combat partisan gerrymandering, which they believe distorts voter intent and entrenches incumbents. By shifting power away from partisan bodies, it aims to create more representative and competitive districts.
Critics contend
Critics may argue that this provision is an unconstitutional federal intrusion into state sovereignty, as the Constitution grants states the primary authority over election administration. They might also contend that it removes accountability from elected officials.
Tradeoffs
The provision balances the desire for non-partisan redistricting with concerns about federalism and the traditional roles of state governments. It aims to improve fairness but could be seen as centralizing power or creating new, unelected decision-makers.
Section 3(a)-(c)
Independent Commission Composition and Eligibility
This section details how independent redistricting commissions must be structured. Each commission must have an equal number of members from the two largest political parties in the state legislature, plus an equal number of members not affiliated with any party. Strict eligibility criteria are set, including requirements for voter registration history, prohibitions on recent political activity for members and their families, and a pledge not to run for office for three years after service. Commissions should also reflect the state's diversity.
Section 3(e)
Member Selection Process
The bill outlines a multi-step process for selecting commission members. It starts with an open application process, including random mailings to registered voters. An initial selection pool is randomly chosen, ensuring equal representation from each political category. State legislative leaders can then strike up to 20% of applicants from their respective partisan pools. Finally, the commission members are randomly selected from the remaining eligible applicants.
Section 4(a)
Redistricting Plan Criteria
This section sets forth five mandatory criteria for independent commissions to follow when developing redistricting plans: districts must have equal population, not be drawn to favor or disfavor any party or candidate, be contiguous, preserve pre-existing political subdivisions (like counties and municipalities) to the greatest extent practicable, and maintain compact districts to the greatest extent practicable.
Section 4(d)(3)
Enactment of Final Redistricting Plan
For a final redistricting plan to be enacted into law, it must be approved by at least two-thirds of the entire commission membership. Additionally, at least two-fifths of the members from each of the three political categories (largest party, second largest party, non-affiliated) must vote to approve the plan. This supermajority and cross-partisan approval mechanism is designed to ensure broad consensus.
Section 4(e)
Restriction on Outside Communication
This provision strictly prohibits members of the independent redistricting commission from engaging in private communications regarding proposed maps with any elected officials, political parties, lobbyists, or outside advocacy organizations. This is intended to shield the map-drawing process from external political pressure and influence.
This section makes a conforming amendment to existing federal law (2 U.S.C. 2a(c)), striking 'in the manner provided by the law thereof' and inserting 'in the manner provided by the Problem Solvers Independent Commissions Act'. This effectively makes the Act the new federal standard for how states must conduct congressional redistricting.
Section 2(b)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice for integrating new law with existing code, rather than an attempt to hide its effect.
Case for: Supporters would argue this amendment is necessary to ensure the new federal mandate for independent commissions is legally binding and supersedes any conflicting state laws, providing a clear and consistent framework.
Case against: Critics might view this as a subtle but significant federalization of a power traditionally reserved for states, further reinforcing the argument of federal overreach into state electoral processes.
Estimated impact: This amendment has a profound legal impact, establishing the federal supremacy of this Act over state redistricting methods.
Among the materials required to be published after a final redistricting plan is enacted, the commission must include 'An algorithmic bell curve of the average outcome of a fair redistricting process.' This suggests a data-driven, comparative assessment of the enacted map against theoretical fair outcomes.
Section 4(d)(4)(J)
Why it matters:It's a specific technical requirement within a list of transparency measures, likely intended to provide an objective metric for public scrutiny.
Case for: Proponents would argue this provides an objective, data-driven benchmark for evaluating the fairness of the enacted map, enhancing transparency and accountability by allowing the public to compare the commission's work against an idealized 'fair' outcome.
Case against: Critics might argue that defining an 'algorithmic bell curve of the average outcome of a fair redistricting process' is inherently subjective and open to manipulation, as the algorithms and assumptions used to define 'fairness' can vary widely and be politically charged.
Estimated impact: This provision could significantly influence public perception and judicial review of redistricting plans by providing a quantitative measure of fairness, though its interpretation could be contentious.