SAFE Platforms Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Foushee, Valerie P. [D-NC-4]
- Committees
- Energy and Commerce Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Sep 16, 2026
Bottom line
The bill significantly increases the legal and operational responsibilities of large online platforms to prevent and address fraudulent content and advertising, aiming to enhance consumer protection.
What it actually does
This bill prohibits covered online platforms from materially contributing to fraudulent content, establishing detailed requirements for fraud reporting mechanisms, default privacy settings, advertiser verification, and evasion prevention. It also creates new enforcement avenues for the Federal Trade Commission, state attorneys general, and private individuals through a private right of action.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that this legislation is crucial for safeguarding consumers from pervasive online fraud, holding powerful platforms accountable for the harms facilitated on their services, and fostering a more secure digital ecosystem. They emphasize the necessity for platforms to adopt proactive measures rather than merely reacting to reported fraudulent activities.
Opponents contend
Opponents might contend that the bill imposes overly burdensome and prescriptive requirements on online platforms, potentially stifling innovation, escalating operational costs, and leading to excessive censorship or removal of legitimate content. Concerns may also be raised regarding the broad definition of 'materially contribute' and the potential for an influx of frivolous lawsuits under the private right of action.
The bill is moderately detailed, requiring careful reading to understand its specific requirements and definitions, but is manageable for an informed reader within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 2(a)
Prohibition on Material Contribution to Fraud
This section directly prohibits large online platforms from actively helping to create or spread fraudulent content aimed at consumers. The term 'materially contribute' is broadly defined to include actions like encouraging, targeting, recommending, promoting, curating, or prioritizing such content, especially if the platform knows or has reason to know it is fraudulent.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this is a necessary step to hold platforms accountable for their role in amplifying fraudulent content, moving beyond passive hosting to active responsibility for the content they promote.
Critics contend
Critics may argue this provision is overly broad and could lead to platforms being held liable for content they did not create or directly endorse, potentially chilling free speech or leading to excessive content removal.
Tradeoffs
This provision balances platform responsibility for content amplification against concerns about over-regulation and potential impact on free speech or platform operations.
Section 2(b)(1)
User-Friendly Fraud Reporting and Counter-Notice System
Mandates that covered platforms provide an easily accessible mechanism for users to report suspected fraudulent content and for content creators to contest content removal. This includes a clearly visible 'Report Scam' button, a simplified reporting process, acknowledgment of reports within 30 days, notice to content creators, and a counter-notice process requiring sworn statements.
Section 2(b)(2)
Mandatory Privacy-Protective Default Settings
Requires covered platforms to configure default privacy settings to reduce fraud vulnerability. This includes not displaying account existence, media, direct messaging, user location, or connections to unconnected users by default, unless explicitly opted into. It also prohibits single settings that reduce all privacy protections at once and degrading service for users who maintain higher privacy settings.
Section 2(b)(3)
Anti-Evasion Measures for Repeat Offenders
Mandates that covered platforms implement reasonable measures to detect and prevent individuals from creating multiple accounts to evade enforcement actions related to fraudulent content. This includes identifying accounts created shortly after suspension, those exhibiting similar fraudulent behavior patterns, and coordinated networks of accounts promoting fraudulent schemes.
Section 2(e)
Mandatory Advertiser Verification and Transparency
Requires covered platforms to establish and maintain reasonable procedures to verify advertiser identities before allowing advertisements. This includes collecting legal name, physical address, contact information, tax ID, business registration, and industry type. Enhanced verification is required for 'high-risk' categories (e.g., financial services, health products, cryptocurrency). Platforms must also disclose basic advertiser information (legal name, jurisdiction, account age) to users and track repeat offenders.
Section 2(c)
Safe Harbor for Compliant Platforms
Establishes conditions under which a covered platform is deemed to meet the prohibition on materially contributing to fraud. These conditions include implementing reasonable steps to address fraudulent content, annual policy reviews, reviewing reported content within 48 hours, and initiating appropriate steps within 7 days (with possible extensions). It also allows platforms to refuse to process additional reports from users who submit three or more bad-faith reports within a 12-month period.
Section 3
Multi-Layered Enforcement Mechanisms
Designates violations of the Act as unfair or deceptive acts under the FTC Act, granting the FTC enforcement powers. It also allows State Attorneys General to bring civil actions (parens patriae) and establishes a private right of action for individuals injured by violations, allowing them to seek injunctions, actual damages, or statutory damages, plus attorney's fees for prevailing plaintiffs.
Defines 'materially contribute' as conduct that goes beyond providing neutral tools for the development or dissemination of fraudulent content, including encouraging, inducing, targeting, recommending, promoting, curating, or prioritizing fraudulent content that the covered platform knows or has reason to know is fraudulent. It also allows the Commission to determine other conduct as material contribution through regulations.
Section 5(10)
Why it matters:It is standard legislative practice to define key terms, but the breadth of this definition is highly consequential for platform liability, shaping the scope of the primary prohibition in Section 2(a).
Case for: Proponents argue this broad definition is necessary to capture the various ways platforms actively facilitate the spread of fraud, moving beyond a narrow 'publisher' vs. 'platform' debate.
Case against: Opponents might argue that this definition is too vague and expansive, potentially holding platforms liable for algorithmic recommendations or user-generated content that they did not directly create or endorse, leading to over-moderation.
Estimated impact: Significantly expands the scope of platform liability under Section 2(a), potentially requiring fundamental changes to how platforms manage and promote content.
Defines an 'unconnected user' as a user who is not verified by the covered platform AND does not share a mutual connection with the user whose content or account is at issue. 'Mutual connection' is further defined as a formal connection (friend/follow), excluding shared group participation. This definition is critical for the default privacy settings in Section 2(b)(2).
Section 5(14)
Why it matters:It is standard legislative practice for defining terms, but the specific criteria for 'unconnected' and 'mutual connection' are highly technical and consequential for user interaction and platform design.
Case for: Proponents argue this precise definition ensures that default privacy settings effectively protect users from unknown or unverified individuals, who are often the source of fraudulent outreach.
Case against: Platforms might argue that requiring verification for all 'connected' users to bypass default privacy settings is overly restrictive and could impede legitimate social interactions or business networking.
Estimated impact: Directly shapes the scope and effectiveness of the mandatory fraud-resistant default privacy settings, impacting user experience and platform functionality.
States that nothing in Section 230 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 230) may be construed to impair enforcement of this Act.
Section 4(b)
Why it matters:This provision explicitly states that the Act's provisions override Section 230's liability protections for covered platforms regarding fraudulent content. It is standard to address potential conflicts with existing law, but this is a highly significant legal change.
Case for: Proponents argue this is essential to ensure the Act's enforceability, as Section 230 has historically shielded platforms from liability for third-party content, including fraudulent content.
Case against: Opponents, particularly platforms and some free speech advocates, would argue that this provision significantly erodes Section 230 protections, potentially opening platforms to a flood of litigation and chilling legitimate content moderation efforts.
Estimated impact: Fundamentally alters the legal landscape for covered platforms regarding fraudulent content, removing a significant liability shield and increasing their legal exposure.