Communications and Technology Transparency Act of 2026
- Sponsor
- Rep. Pallone, Frank [D-NJ-6]
- Committees
- Energy and Commerce Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Sep 16, 2026
Bottom line
The bill broadens federal authority to restrict potentially insecure foreign technology across U.S. information and communications networks, formalizes listing and delisting procedures, and imposes new prohibitions on entities deemed national security risks from holding FCC licenses.
What it actually does
This bill significantly expands the scope of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 by changing its focus from 'communications equipment or service' to the broader 'information and communications technology or services.' It streamlines the process for the FCC to add and remove technologies from a 'covered list' of prohibited items, mandating bi-annual updates and requiring congressional reporting for new additions. Crucially, it prohibits entities controlled by foreign adversaries from obtaining or holding FCC authorizations, licenses, or other grants of authority, with an exception for equipment authorizations granted before a technology is listed.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue this bill is essential for strengthening national security by closing critical loopholes that foreign adversaries could exploit to compromise U.S. information and communications infrastructure. They emphasize that the expanded scope addresses the evolving nature of cyber threats, ensuring the Act remains relevant. The streamlined processes and enhanced transparency through congressional reporting are presented as improvements to efficiency and accountability in protecting U.S. networks.
Opponents contend
Opponents might contend that expanding the scope to 'information and communications technology or services' is overly broad, potentially encompassing a vast array of technologies and stifling innovation. They could raise concerns that the new prohibitions on holding FCC licenses are overly punitive, could disrupt legitimate businesses, or negatively impact international trade relations. Some may also argue that the centralization of listing criteria could reduce comprehensive input from various national security agencies.
The bill is concise, and its core changes are clearly articulated, allowing an informed reader to grasp its main implications within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 2(a), (b)
Expansion of 'Covered Equipment' Definition
This section fundamentally alters the scope of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 by replacing 'communications equipment or service' with the broader term 'information and communications technology or service' throughout the original Act and related legislation. This means the Act's prohibitions and requirements now apply to a much wider array of technologies, as defined by existing federal regulations (15 CFR 791.2), significantly expanding the types of products and services subject to scrutiny.
Supporters argue
Supporters contend this expansion is crucial for national security, as foreign adversaries can exploit vulnerabilities in a wide array of information and communications technologies, not just traditional communications equipment. This update modernizes the Act to address current threat landscapes and ensure comprehensive protection of U.S. infrastructure.
Critics contend
Critics may argue that this broad expansion could create significant compliance burdens for businesses, potentially encompassing technologies not directly related to critical infrastructure, and could lead to overreach by regulatory agencies. They might also raise concerns about its impact on innovation and global trade.
Tradeoffs
The bill navigates the tension between achieving comprehensive national security against evolving cyber threats and minimizing potential economic impacts, regulatory burdens, and the scope of government oversight on the technology sector.
Section 3(a), (b)
Streamlined Listing Criteria for Covered Technologies
This section amends the criteria the FCC uses to place technologies on the 'covered list' of prohibited items. It removes reliance on certain prior determinations (e.g., by the Secretary of Defense or Director of National Intelligence) and instead primarily relies on determinations by the Secretary of Commerce under 15 CFR part 791 (which addresses ICTS transactions posing national security risks) and technologies mandated for inclusion by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025. This aims to centralize and streamline the basis for FCC listing decisions.
Section 4
Mandated Bi-Annual List Updates and Formal Removal Process
This section mandates that the FCC update the 'covered list' of prohibited technologies at least once every six months. It also establishes a formal process for removing technologies from the list. Removal can occur if the agency that originally provided the basis for inclusion reverses its determination, and no other basis for inclusion exists, provided the FCC, after public comment, independently determines the technology no longer poses an unacceptable national security risk.
Section 5 (adding new subsection (e) to Section 2 of the original Act)
Limitation on Additions and Congressional Reporting for New Listings
This section limits the FCC's ability to add new technologies to the covered list only to those produced or provided by an entity controlled by a 'foreign adversary,' as defined in 10 U.S.C. 4872(f)(2). It also requires the FCC and the relevant agency to submit a report to Congress at least 7 days before placing a technology on the list. This report must identify the technology and explain the specific national security concern, and must be unclassified but can include a classified annex.
Section 8 (adding new Section 10 to the original Act)
Prohibition on FCC Authorizations for Covered Entities
This section prohibits any authorization, license, or other grant of authority issued by the FCC from being obtained, held, or controlled by a 'covered entity.' A 'covered entity' is defined as one that produces or provides any covered information and communications technology or service, or an affiliate of such an entity. An important exception is made for equipment authorizations granted before the relevant equipment was placed on the covered list, meaning existing equipment authorizations are not retroactively revoked solely based on a new listing.
Defines 'information and communications technology or services' by referencing 'section 791.2 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations (or any successor regulation).' This external reference is crucial for understanding the expanded scope of the bill.
Section 2(a)(5)(D) and Section 9(7) of the amended Act
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to avoid reprinting lengthy regulatory definitions and to ensure consistency with existing federal definitions, leveraging expertise already embedded in the Department of Commerce's framework for ICTS transactions.
Case for: Supporters would argue that using an existing, established definition ensures consistency across federal regulations and leverages expertise already embedded in the Department of Commerce's framework for ICTS transactions, avoiding redundancy and potential conflicts.
Case against: Critics might argue that relying on an external regulation makes the bill less transparent and harder for the public and affected parties to understand without consulting additional legal texts. Changes to the referenced regulation could also alter the bill's scope without direct congressional action, reducing legislative control.
Estimated impact: Significantly broadens the types of technologies and services subject to the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act, impacting potentially thousands of companies and a vast array of products, from software to cloud services.
Adds 'The information and communications technology or service being required to be added to the list by section 1709 of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118-159)' as a basis for the FCC to place technology on the covered list.
Section 3(a)(4) (adding new paragraph (3) to Section 2(c) of the original Act)
Why it matters:Standard legislative practice for incorporating mandates from other acts without reprinting them, ensuring that critical national security directives from defense legislation are directly integrated into the FCC's regulatory framework.
Case for: Supporters would argue this ensures that critical national security mandates from defense legislation are directly incorporated into the FCC's covered list, streamlining the process and ensuring comprehensive protection aligned with broader national defense priorities.
Case against: Critics might argue that this further complicates the regulatory landscape by making the FCC's list dependent on provisions in unrelated defense bills, potentially leading to less coherent policy or making it harder for stakeholders to track all relevant legal bases for listing.
Estimated impact: Ensures specific technologies identified by defense legislation are automatically considered for the FCC's covered list, reinforcing national security objectives and potentially expanding the list based on military intelligence.
Defines 'foreign adversary' by referencing 'section 4872(f)(2) of title 10, United States Code.' This external reference is critical for understanding the limitation on future additions to the covered list.
Section 5 (adding new subsection (e)(3) to Section 2 of the original Act)
Why it matters:Standard legislative practice to avoid reprinting lengthy statutory definitions and to ensure consistency with existing federal definitions, particularly in national security contexts where a unified definition is desirable.
Case for: Supporters would argue that using an existing, established definition from defense law ensures consistency across federal national security policies and leverages expertise already embedded in the Department of Defense's framework for identifying adversarial nations.
Case against: Critics might argue that relying on an external statute makes the bill less transparent and harder for the public and affected parties to understand without consulting additional legal texts. Changes to the referenced statute could also alter the bill's scope without direct congressional action, potentially creating uncertainty.
Estimated impact: Limits the FCC's ability to add new technologies to the covered list to those originating from a specific set of nations already identified as national security threats, thereby focusing the scope of the Act and providing clarity on targets.