Deterring Extraterritorial Foreign Exploitation of Networks Damaging Intellectual Property (DEFEND IP) Act of 2026
- Sponsor
- Rep. Lofgren, Zoe [D-CA-18]
- Committees
- Judiciary Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Sep 24, 2026
Bottom line
The DEFEND IP Act creates a new court-ordered site-blocking mechanism in the United States, targeting foreign online copyright infringement by requiring U.S. internet service providers to restrict access to designated piracy sites.
What it actually does
This bill establishes a new judicial process allowing copyright holders to petition U.S. district courts to designate foreign online locations as "foreign digital piracy sites." Once designated, the bill permits courts to issue subsequent orders directing U.S. broadband and public domain name resolution service providers to take reasonable measures to prevent users in the United States from accessing these designated piracy sites. It also provides immunities for service providers complying with such orders.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that the bill provides a crucial and judicially supervised tool to combat rampant online piracy originating from outside U.S. jurisdiction, which currently causes significant economic harm to American creators and intellectual property industries. They contend that existing legal frameworks are insufficient to address this extraterritorial threat, and the bill offers a balanced approach with due process protections.
Opponents contend
Opponents contend that the bill could lead to internet censorship, interfere with the fundamental architecture of the internet, and potentially result in the blocking of legitimate content. They raise concerns about the burden on internet service providers, the potential for abuse of ex parte orders, and the effectiveness of such measures against determined infringers, arguing it could undermine the principles of an open internet.
The bill is relatively short, but its legal and technical provisions are complex, requiring careful reading to understand the new judicial processes, definitions, and obligations it creates for various stakeholders.
Section 2, adding Sec. 502A(a) to Title 17, U.S. Code
Definitions of Key Terms for Site Blocking
This provision defines critical terms, including 'broadband provider' (those with 50,000+ subscribers) and 'public domain name resolution services' (those with over $100 million in annual revenue), which together form the 'service provider' category subject to blocking orders. It also defines a 'foreign digital piracy site' as a foreign online location designated by a court order, and explicitly excludes encrypted DNS providers, VPN services, and premises operators (like coffee shops) from the 'service provider' definition.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that precise definitions are essential for clarity and to target specific entities capable of implementing blocking measures effectively, while strategically exempting smaller providers or those offering privacy services to mitigate broader internet freedom concerns.
Critics contend
Critics might argue that the revenue threshold for DNS providers is arbitrary, potentially exempting some significant players, and that the exclusions for VPNs and encrypted DNS could create loopholes that undermine the bill's overall effectiveness against piracy.
Tradeoffs
The bill balances the need to define responsible parties for implementing blocking with concerns about overreach, ensuring that privacy-focused services and small businesses are not unduly burdened, while potentially creating avenues for circumvention.
Section 2, adding Sec. 502A(b) to Title 17, U.S. Code
Judicial Designation of Foreign Digital Piracy Sites
This provision outlines the court process for a copyright owner to petition a U.S. district court to designate a foreign online location as a 'foreign digital piracy site.' The court must find a likely copyright violation, irreparable harm, reasonable notice attempts to the foreign operator, and inability to determine the operator's U.S. location. The site must also be primarily designed for infringement, have no significant commercial purpose other than infringement, or be marketed to promote infringement. Operators have 20 days to contest, but ex parte orders are possible. An order can be rescinded if the operator submits to U.S. jurisdiction, posts a bond, and ceases infringement.
Section 2, adding Sec. 502A(c) to Title 17, U.S. Code
Court Orders Directing Service Providers to Block Access
After a foreign online location is designated as a piracy site, this provision allows the copyright holder to seek a subsequent court order directing identified U.S. service providers to take "reasonable measures" to prevent U.S. users from accessing that site. The court must consider factors like the burden on service providers, harm to the petitioner, technical feasibility, potential interference with legitimate content, public interest, and availability of less burdensome means. Orders last one year, can be extended, and explicitly state service providers are not obligated to investigate the accuracy of information provided by the petitioner. Petitioners must use good-faith efforts to verify site information. Service providers can seek recovery for reasonable direct costs, excluding capital expenditures, infrastructure, overhead, and attorneys' fees.
Section 2, adding Sec. 502A(e) to Title 17, U.S. Code
Service Provider Immunities
This provision grants service providers immunity from liability for any injury alleged by various entities (users, petitioners, site operators, third parties, or governmental authorities) that occurs as a result of actions taken in good faith (or not taken) to implement a court order or based on information provided by the petitioner. It also specifically grants immunity from liability for any injury alleged by a foreign digital piracy site, even if that site was later determined to be inaccurately identified in the order or did not meet the designation requirements.
Section 2, adding Sec. 502A(f) and (g) to Title 17, U.S. Code
Judicial Review of Compliance and Amendment of Orders
This section establishes that measures taken by service providers are subject to court review, but providers are not deemed to have failed if they don't conduct affirmative investigations into the accuracy of information provided by the petitioner. Crucially, if a service provider inadvertently blocks a legitimate online location, the operator of that legitimate site can move the court to modify or rescind the order. Additionally, courts can amend existing orders if a designated piracy site moves to a new domain or IP address, or employs circumvention techniques that render the initial order ineffective.
The bill explicitly excludes entities providing DNS resolution *exclusively* through encrypted DNS protocols, entities *exclusively* providing virtual private network (VPN) services, and premises operators (such as coffee shops, libraries, universities) from the definition of 'service provider' that would be subject to court-ordered blocking mandates.
Sec. 502A(a)(6)(B)
Why it matters:While standard legislative practice to define scope precisely, these exclusions are strategically important. They address potential concerns from privacy advocates and small businesses, aiming to narrow the bill's impact to large-scale internet infrastructure providers rather than privacy-enhancing technologies or incidental Wi-Fi providers. This could be seen as an attempt to mitigate opposition.
Case for: Supporters argue these exclusions are vital to protect user privacy tools like VPNs and encrypted DNS, and to prevent undue burden on small businesses that offer internet access. This ensures the bill targets the primary conduits of piracy without inadvertently harming legitimate services or privacy.
Case against: Critics might contend that these exclusions create significant loopholes, allowing determined infringers to easily bypass blocking measures by using VPNs or encrypted DNS. This could undermine the bill's overall effectiveness, making it a less potent tool against sophisticated piracy operations.
Estimated impact: Significantly narrows the scope of entities directly obligated to implement blocking, potentially preserving privacy tools and reducing burden on small entities, but also creating avenues for circumvention by infringers.
While service providers subject to a blocking order may move to recover "reasonable costs" directly incurred to comply, the bill explicitly states that these recoverable costs "may not include costs for capital expenditures, infrastructure, overhead, or attorneys' fees."
Sec. 502A(c)(10)(B)
Why it matters:This detail significantly limits the financial relief available to service providers, potentially shifting substantial costs onto them despite the general 'cost recovery' provision. It's a key point for understanding the true financial burden on ISPs and DNS providers. Its placement could be seen as an attempt to minimize attention to this cost-shifting aspect.
Case for: Proponents might argue this prevents service providers from overcharging for compliance, ensuring that only direct, incremental costs are covered and not general business expenses. It also limits the financial burden on copyright holders seeking orders, making the enforcement mechanism more accessible.
Case against: Opponents, particularly internet service providers, would argue that excluding capital expenditures, infrastructure, overhead, and attorneys' fees means they will bear significant uncompensated costs for implementing and maintaining blocking infrastructure. This makes compliance a substantial financial burden, potentially leading to higher service fees for consumers.
Estimated impact: Could result in significant uncompensated costs for large service providers, potentially impacting their investment in infrastructure, leading to higher service fees for consumers, or affecting their profitability.