FLAFO Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Steube, W. Gregory [R-FL-17]
- Committees
- Judiciary Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Sep 24, 2026
Bottom line
The FLAFO Act aims to restrict the widespread use of networked ALPR surveillance by federal and federally-funded state/local entities, asserting a strong privacy protection against mass data collection, while carving out specific exceptions for critical government functions.
What it actually does
This bill prohibits federal agencies from purchasing, leasing, operating, or accessing certain networked automated license plate reader (ALPR) systems, or requesting information from them, without a warrant. It includes exceptions for specific national security, border security, and emergency situations, and imposes criminal and civil penalties for violations. Additionally, it requires state, local, and tribal governments to adopt substantially similar requirements to remain eligible for Department of Justice funds.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that this bill is essential to protect the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as First Amendment rights to peaceful assembly and free exercise of religion, which are threatened by pervasive ALPR surveillance. They contend that current ALPR systems collect sensitive location information without individualized suspicion, allowing for the reconstruction of individuals' movements and associations, thereby encroaching on civil liberties. The bill provides necessary safeguards against potential government overreach and abuse of technology.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that the bill severely hampers law enforcement and national security agencies' ability to track criminals, terrorists, and missing persons, thereby compromising public safety. They may assert that ALPR systems are critical tools for solving crimes, interdicting illicit activities at the border, and protecting national security facilities. They could also contend that the warrant requirement and broad prohibitions would create unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles and delays, making it harder to respond to time-sensitive threats and effectively perform their duties.
The bill is concise and relatively straightforward, allowing an informed reader to grasp its core provisions and implications within the time typically allotted for legislative review.
Section 3(a)
Prohibition on Federal Agency Use of Covered ALPR Systems
This section establishes a general prohibition on federal agencies from using or accessing 'covered systems,' which are defined as networked ALPR systems that store or transmit vehicle-location information in a centralized database, permit cross-jurisdictional searches, or use AI/machine learning to identify vehicles by characteristics other than license plates. This means federal agencies cannot buy, lease, operate, or request information from such systems, nor can they provide information to them.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that this broad prohibition is crucial for safeguarding civil liberties by preventing mass surveillance and the aggregation of sensitive location data without individualized suspicion, aligning with Fourth Amendment principles.
Critics contend
Critics may contend that this prohibition removes a valuable tool for law enforcement and national security, potentially hindering investigations and making it more difficult to identify and apprehend suspects or monitor threats.
Tradeoffs
This provision balances the public's right to privacy and freedom from pervasive surveillance against the government's interest in using advanced technology for law enforcement and national security purposes.
Section 3(b)
Warrant Requirement and Exceptions for Federal Agencies
While generally prohibiting federal agency access to covered ALPR systems, this section mandates that if access is permitted, it must be obtained via a warrant. However, it carves out specific exceptions where a warrant is not required: to locate a missing or endangered person, respond to an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, or conduct investigations related to terrorism, espionage, sabotage, or agents of a foreign power. These exceptions require a determination by the head of the agency that the information is 'reasonably necessary'.
Section 3(c)
Penalties and Private Right of Action for Federal Violations
This section establishes significant consequences for federal officers or employees who knowingly violate the prohibition on networked surveillance. It imposes criminal penalties of up to 5 years imprisonment and/or fines, and a civil penalty of up to $100,000. Crucially, it also creates a private right of action, allowing any aggrieved person to sue the offending officer/employee or the United States, and recover damages, attorney's fees, and injunctive relief. Sovereign immunity and qualified immunity are explicitly disallowed as defenses in such actions.
Section 3(d)
Exclusions for Specific Federal Agencies and Operations
The bill explicitly excludes certain federal agencies from its prohibitions when conducting specific activities. These include the Secret Service for protective duties, U.S. Customs and Border Protection for border security, immigration/customs enforcement, port operations, and cross-border criminal activity, and the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and Energy for operations related to military, Coast Guard, nuclear, or national security facilities (e.g., installation access, force protection, counterterrorism). Information sharing between these exempted agencies for these purposes is also permitted.
Section 5
Limitation on Federal Funds for State, Local, and Tribal Governments
This section mandates that for a state, unit of local government, or Indian Tribe to be eligible for federal funds from the Department of Justice, they must establish and implement requirements for their own agencies that are 'substantially similar' to the prohibitions and requirements outlined in this Act for federal agencies. The Attorney General is tasked with annually certifying compliance.
The definition of 'covered system' is critical, as it narrowly defines which ALPR systems are subject to the bill's prohibitions. It specifies systems that (A) store or transmit vehicle-location information in a centralized, networked, or multi- or cross-jurisdictional database; (B) permit users to search historical vehicle-location information across jurisdictions; or (C) use artificial intelligence or machine learning to identify, classify, track, or search for vehicles based on characteristics other than a complete or partial license plate number.
Section 6(2)
Why it matters:Defining key terms in a dedicated section is standard legislative practice to ensure precision. However, the specific criteria for a 'covered system' are highly consequential and determine the practical reach of the entire Act.
Case for: Proponents would argue that this precise definition targets the most problematic aspects of ALPR technology – the aggregation of data, cross-jurisdictional searching, and advanced AI analysis – which pose the greatest threat to privacy, while potentially allowing for more limited, non-networked ALPR uses.
Case against: Opponents might argue that the definition is still too broad, encompassing systems that are essential for legitimate law enforcement purposes, or conversely, that it is too narrow, allowing some forms of problematic ALPR surveillance to continue if they don't meet all criteria.
Estimated impact: This definition dictates the entire scope of the bill's prohibitions, affecting potentially thousands of ALPR systems currently in use by federal, state, and local entities that rely on networked data sharing or advanced analytics.
This subsection allows for the sharing of any information between the explicitly excluded agencies (Secret Service, CBP, DoD, DHS, DoE) and any other Federal agency, provided it is for the purpose of conducting an activity or operation listed in paragraphs (1) through (3) of Section 3(d).
Section 3(d)(4)
Why it matters:This is a common legislative technique to ensure operational flexibility and inter-agency cooperation within the bounds of specified exceptions. It's not necessarily evasive, but its implications for data sharing are substantial.
Case for: Proponents would argue that this ensures critical information can be shared among federal agencies when necessary for national security, border protection, or presidential security, preventing artificial silos that could hinder threat response.
Case against: Critics might argue that this provision creates a potential loophole, allowing ALPR data collected by exempted agencies to be shared with non-exempted agencies, potentially circumventing the warrant requirement for those non-exempted agencies if the 'purpose' is broadly interpreted.
Estimated impact: This provision could facilitate the flow of ALPR data collected under exceptions to a broader range of federal agencies, potentially expanding the reach of surveillance data within the federal government, albeit for specific purposes.