Ban Flock Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Ocasio-Cortez, Alexandria [D-NY-14]
- Committees
- Homeland Security Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Oct 1, 2026
Bottom line
The 'Ban Flock Act' seeks to broadly restrict the use of automatic license plate readers by all levels of government in the United States, aiming to enhance privacy protections while providing limited exceptions for authorized uses and tolling.
What it actually does
This bill, known as the 'Ban Flock Act,' prohibits federal agencies and officials from acquiring, possessing, accessing, or using automatic license plate readers (ALPRs) or captured plate data without explicit statutory authorization. It also conditions federal financial assistance from several key agencies to state and local governments on their adoption of similar ALPR prohibitions. Furthermore, the bill bans the use of federal funds for any ALPR-related activities, with narrow exceptions for specific statutory authorizations and for toll collection under strict privacy and data retention rules.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that automatic license plate readers enable pervasive mass surveillance, allowing governments to track the movements of innocent individuals without probable cause, thereby infringing on fundamental civil liberties and privacy rights. They contend that this bill is a crucial step to rein in unchecked government surveillance, prevent potential abuses of power, and ensure that such powerful technologies are only deployed with explicit, narrowly defined congressional approval and robust safeguards against misuse.
Opponents contend
Opponents would likely argue that ALPRs are an invaluable and efficient tool for law enforcement and national security agencies, significantly aiding in the recovery of stolen vehicles, locating missing persons, identifying criminal suspects, and enhancing overall public safety. They contend that a blanket prohibition or severe restrictions would severely hamper legitimate police work, compromise national security efforts, and remove an effective technology used to combat crime and terrorism, potentially leading to increased crime rates and reduced public safety.
The bill is concise and clearly structured, allowing an informed reader to understand its core provisions and implications within a reasonable timeframe, especially considering its significant policy scope.
Section 3(a)
Prohibition on Federal Government Use of ALPRs
This section establishes a general prohibition on any federal agency or official from acquiring, possessing, accessing, or using automatic license plate readers (ALPRs) or any data derived from them within the United States. This includes data collected by other entities, effectively preventing federal access to private ALPR networks as well.
Supporters argue
Proponents argue this provision is essential to protect the privacy and civil liberties of individuals by preventing mass surveillance by the federal government without specific legal authorization. They believe it curtails potential abuses of power and ensures that government data collection is targeted and justified.
Critics contend
Opponents would contend that this prohibition severely cripples federal law enforcement and national security operations, removing a critical tool for tracking suspects, recovering stolen property, and responding to threats. They argue it would make the country less safe by hindering legitimate investigative capabilities.
Tradeoffs
This provision balances individual privacy rights against the perceived needs of federal law enforcement and national security for surveillance tools. It creates a tension between the desire for comprehensive security and the protection of civil liberties from government overreach.
Section 3(b)
Exception for Explicit Statutory Authorization
This section outlines the stringent conditions under which Congress could explicitly authorize the use of ALPRs or captured plate data by federal entities. Any such authorization must specifically detail the entities, types of data, purposes, and include robust safeguards such as a maximum 48-hour data retention limit, auditing requirements, and strong protections for due process, privacy, and equity.
Section 3(c)
Tolling Exception with Strict Limitations
This section carves out an exception for ALPRs used solely for assessing, billing, collecting, auditing, disputing, or enforcing toll payments. However, it imposes severe restrictions: data can only be used for tolling purposes, cannot be compared against law enforcement hot lists, stored in general databases, or sold for commercial use. It also mandates a 48-hour data deletion policy after successful payment, with limited exceptions for unresolved matters, and requires strong security and audit logs.
Section 4
Moratorium on State and Local Government Use via Grant Conditions
Beginning in the first fiscal year after enactment, this section prohibits five major federal agencies (Justice, Transportation, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, and Homeland Security) from providing financial assistance to any state or local government that does not have a law or binding policy in effect prohibiting ALPR use to the same or greater extent as the federal prohibition in Section 3(a).
Section 5
Prohibition on Use of Federal Funds to Purchase ALPRs
This section broadly prohibits the use of any federal funds, directly or indirectly, for purchasing, operating, maintaining, or upgrading ALPRs, or for acquiring, accessing, or retaining captured plate data. It also forbids using federal funds to enter into contracts or arrangements for ALPR services and prevents recipients from evading this prohibition by transferring funds or using federal funds to replace non-federal funds. Exceptions mirror those in Section 3 (explicit statutory authorization and tolling).
The definition of 'captured plate data' is exceptionally broad, including not only data from government-operated ALPRs but also 'data produced by or derived from fixed cameras, mobile readers, police vehicles, trailers, drones, tolling infrastructure, parking systems, private security networks, homeowners' associations, commercial parking operators, and data brokers.'
Section 2(2)
Why it matters:While definitions are standard legislative practice, the comprehensive nature of this definition, particularly its inclusion of private sector data sources, significantly broadens the bill's impact beyond just government-owned ALPRs. This could be seen as a deliberate attempt to ensure no federal access to any ALPR data, regardless of its origin.
Case for: Proponents argue that including private data sources is essential to prevent federal agencies from circumventing the ban by simply purchasing or accessing data collected by third parties. This ensures the privacy protections are comprehensive and effective against all forms of ALPR surveillance.
Case against: Opponents might argue that this broad definition creates an undue burden on federal agencies, preventing them from accessing potentially critical information from legitimate private sources that could aid in investigations or national security. It could be seen as overreaching into the private sector's data collection practices.
Estimated impact: Significantly expands the scope of the federal prohibition, preventing federal agencies from accessing a vast array of ALPR data currently collected by private entities, which could be a major source of information for some agencies.
Both the general exception for explicitly authorized ALPR use and the specific exception for tolling mandate a maximum data retention period of 'no more than 48 hours' for captured plate data.
Section 3(b)(2) and Section 3(c)(4)(A)
Why it matters:The 48-hour limit is a highly restrictive and consequential detail. While it serves as a strong privacy protection, its brevity makes it challenging for many investigative or analytical purposes that require longer data trails. Its placement ensures it applies to any authorized use, making it a fundamental constraint.
Case for: Proponents argue that a 48-hour retention limit is essential to prevent the creation of long-term tracking databases, ensuring that any authorized ALPR use is narrowly focused on immediate needs and does not enable historical surveillance of individuals' movements.
Case against: Opponents would contend that this limit renders ALPR data largely useless for many legitimate law enforcement investigations, particularly those involving complex criminal networks, cold cases, or patterns of activity that unfold over more than two days. They would argue it severely hampers investigative capabilities.
Estimated impact: This provision dramatically limits the utility of ALPR data for any authorized purpose, effectively preventing its use for historical tracking or long-term pattern analysis, which is a core function of many ALPR systems.