United States Submarine Cable Security Policy Act of 2026
- Sponsor
- Rep. Pfluger, August [R-TX-11]
- Committees
- Energy and Commerce Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Oct 1, 2026
Bottom line
This bill aims to modernize and secure critical submarine cable infrastructure by centralizing regulatory authority, standardizing security protocols, and streamlining the licensing process, with a strong focus on mitigating national security risks from foreign adversaries.
What it actually does
This bill establishes a formal policy and regulatory framework for the security of submarine cables landing and operating in the United States. It transfers licensing authority from the President to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), mandates the FCC to adopt standard and enhanced security measures, and streamlines the application process while ensuring national security review by the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that the bill is crucial for national security, protecting vital communication infrastructure from foreign espionage and sabotage. They emphasize the need for a clear, consistent policy, streamlined processes for trusted entities, and robust measures against high-risk actors, ensuring the reliability and integrity of global data flows.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that the bill could create unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles, slow down critical infrastructure development, or potentially overreach in its security requirements, leading to increased costs for operators and potentially stifling innovation or competition in the submarine cable market. They might also raise concerns about the scope of the 'foreign adversary' definitions.
The bill is concise and well-structured, allowing an informed reader to understand its core provisions within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 2(a)(1)
Mandate for a National Submarine Cable Security Policy
This provision requires the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce, to establish a general, forward-looking policy within 180 days. This policy will identify and address security concerns related to licensing cables connecting the U.S. to foreign nations or 'covered nations' (as defined in 10 U.S.C. 4872(f)(2)), and arrangements with entities on the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act list (47 U.S.C. 1601).
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this establishes a much-needed, coherent national strategy for submarine cable security, moving beyond ad-hoc reviews to a proactive, standardized approach that protects critical infrastructure.
Critics contend
Critics might argue that defining 'covered nations' or 'entities on the list' could be overly broad or restrictive, potentially limiting legitimate international partnerships or increasing compliance burdens without sufficient flexibility.
Tradeoffs
Balances the need for comprehensive national security with the desire for flexibility and efficiency in international telecommunications infrastructure development.
Section 2(a)(2) and (3)
FCC Mandate for Security Rules
This section directs the FCC to promulgate rules within 180 days of receiving the new policy to adopt both 'standard' and 'enhanced' security measures. Standard measures will be a condition for all licenses, addressing physical and supply chain security, risk management plans, and concerns related to entities on the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act list. Enhanced measures apply when a license poses a national security risk not covered by standard measures.
Section 2(a)(4)
Limits on FCC's Imposition of Security Agreements
This provision prohibits the FCC from conditioning a license on an applicant entering into a security agreement with the Committee or requiring prior notice/approval from the Committee, for matters covered by the new standard or enhanced security measures. This aims to streamline the process and prevent redundant or conflicting security requirements.
Section 2(b)(2) and (c) (amending Cable Landing License Act with new Sec. 7(c))
Applicant Self-Certification for Expedited Review
This provision allows applicants to self-certify certain conditions (e.g., no material ownership changes within 48 months, 40% U.S. ownership, or other FCC-established criteria) to potentially avoid referral to the Committee for national security review. The FCC may only refer an application to the Committee if the applicant seeks to overcome a 'foreign adversary presumptive disqualifying condition' or cannot make the required self-certifications.
Section 2(c)(1)(A) (amending Cable Landing License Act, first section)
Centralization of Licensing Authority
This provision amends the Cable Landing License Act to transfer the authority to issue licenses for landing and operating submarine cables from 'the President of the United States' to 'the Commission' (Federal Communications Commission). This centralizes the regulatory process under a single agency.
Section 2(c)(1)(D) (new Sec. 7(b)(2)(B) of Cable Landing License Act)
Automatic License Approval for Delayed Applications
This provision stipulates that if the FCC fails to approve or deny an application within the specified timeframe (45 days for non-referred, 1 year for referred), the application is 'deemed to be approved.' Any such deemed-approved license is conditioned on compliance with the applicable standard or enhanced security measures.
Section 2(c)(1)(D) (new Sec. 7(f) of Cable Landing License Act)
Provisional Cable Landing Authority
This provision allows applicants who meet certain self-certification criteria (no foreign adversary disqualification, self-certified ownership) to land their cable 20 days after notifying the FCC and Committee, even before a license is fully issued. This provisional landing can be objected to by the Committee (with FCC concurrence). Operation of the cable is still prohibited until full license issuance, except for construction and testing.
The bill's security policy applies to cables connecting to a 'covered nation' (defined in 10 U.S.C. 4872(f)(2)) and arrangements with entities on the list published under section 2 of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (47 U.S.C. 1601).
Section 2(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (iii)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice for brevity and to ensure consistency with existing legal definitions.
Case for: Supporters would argue that using existing definitions ensures consistency across U.S. law regarding national security threats and avoids redundant legislative efforts.
Case against: Critics might argue that relying on external definitions makes the bill less transparent and harder for the public and industry to immediately understand its full implications without legal research.
Estimated impact: High, as these external definitions determine which foreign nations and telecommunications equipment providers are subject to enhanced scrutiny under the bill.
This provision allows existing licensees (whose licenses were conditioned on security agreements with the Committee) to petition the FCC to 'opt in' to the new standard or enhanced security measures, replacing their previous agreements.
Section 2(b)(3)(B)
Why it matters:This is a technical detail for transitioning existing agreements to the new framework, which is often placed in administrative sections.
Case for: Proponents would argue this provides a pathway for existing operators to benefit from the new, standardized, and potentially more predictable security framework, reducing administrative burden over time.
Case against: Critics might argue that allowing an opt-in could weaken specific, tailored security agreements that were deemed necessary for particular high-risk cables, potentially creating a less secure environment for legacy infrastructure.
Estimated impact: Medium, affects the ongoing compliance burden and security posture of existing submarine cables.