Title IX Take Responsibility Act of 2026
- Sponsor
- Rep. Dingell, Debbie [D-MI-6]
- Committees
- Education and Workforce Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Oct 5, 2026
Bottom line
This bill aims to expand the liability of educational institutions for sex-based harassment and broaden the remedies available to victims under Title IX, shifting the burden of prevention and correction more squarely onto schools.
What it actually does
This bill amends Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 to significantly revise the standards for institutional liability for sex-based harassment in federally funded education programs. It explicitly overturns Supreme Court precedents that required "actual notice" and "deliberate indifference," replacing them with broader standards of liability for harassment by employees/agents or third parties, and allows for a full range of legal and equitable remedies, including compensatory and punitive damages.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue the bill is necessary to restore Congress's original intent for Title IX, ensure students have adequate protection from harassment regardless of the perpetrator, and provide effective remedies for survivors. They contend that current court-imposed standards create high barriers for victims and incentivize schools to avoid knowledge of harassment, thereby undermining the law's purpose.
Opponents contend
Potential opponents might argue that the bill could impose excessive financial burdens on educational institutions, leading to increased litigation costs and potentially diverting resources from educational programs. They might also contend that the proposed liability standards are too broad, making schools responsible for actions beyond their reasonable control, and could lead to an overly litigious environment.
The bill is relatively short, but its legal implications and references to complex Supreme Court cases require careful reading to fully grasp its impact.
Section 1
Short Title
This section establishes the official short title of the Act as the "Title IX Take Responsibility Act of 2026," which is how the bill would be commonly referred to if enacted.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that a clear and descriptive short title helps communicate the bill's purpose and intent to the public and stakeholders.
Critics contend
No specific opposition is typically raised against short title provisions as they are procedural.
Section 2
Congressional Findings on Sexual Harassment and Title IX Enforcement
This section outlines Congress's findings regarding the prevalence of sexual harassment in K-12 and higher education, particularly affecting marginalized groups. It details how Supreme Court decisions (like Gebser and Davis) have created high barriers for victims to obtain remedies under Title IX, contrasting them with Title VII standards for workplace harassment. It asserts that these limitations thwart Congress's intent and create incentives for schools to avoid knowledge of harassment.
Section 3(a), new Section 901(d)(1)
Direct Liability for Harassment by School Agents/Employees Enabled by Authority
This provision establishes that a covered entity (e.g., a school) is liable for sex discrimination if its agent or employee engages in harassment, regardless of location, that is enabled or assisted by their authority, and which alters a person's ability to participate in an education program by creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment. This removes the "actual notice" and "deliberate indifference" standards for this specific scenario.
Section 3(a), new Section 901(d)(2)(A) and (B)
Institutional Liability for Known or Reasonably Knowable Harassment by Others
This provision states that a covered entity is liable for sex discrimination if an agent/employee (whose harassment is not enabled by authority) or a non-employee (third party) engages in harassment that creates a hostile environment, and the entity knew or "should have known" of the harassment. The entity can avoid liability if it demonstrates it exercised "reasonable care" to promptly prevent and correct the effects. This replaces the "actual notice" and "deliberate indifference" standards with a "knew or should have known" standard and a "reasonable care" defense.
Section 3(a), new Section 901(d)(2)(C) and (D)
Definition of "Reasonable Care" and Institutional Knowledge
This provision defines "reasonable care" for a covered entity's response to harassment. It specifies that knowledge of harassment by certain individuals (those with authority to redress, duty to report, or those reasonably believed to have such authority/responsibility) constitutes institutional knowledge. It also outlines what a demonstration of reasonable care includes: establishing effective prevention policies and complaint procedures, undertaking prompt investigations (unless frivolous), providing supportive measures to restore equal access, and taking immediate corrective action to stop harassment and correct its effects, regardless of whether subsequent harassment occurred.
Section 3(b), new Section 902(b)
Explicit Right to Bring Civil Action
This provision explicitly states that any person aggrieved by a covered entity's failure to comply with Title IX may bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction to enforce their rights. This codifies and aims to strengthen the private right of action that has been established by courts but was subject to judicial limitations.
Section 3(c), new Section 902A
Availability of Remedies, Including Compensatory and Punitive Damages
This provision explicitly allows plaintiffs in Title IX civil actions to recover equitable and legal relief, including compensatory and punitive damages, as well as attorney's fees (including expert fees). This directly reverses the limitations imposed by Gebser and similar Supreme Court opinions, which severely restricted the availability of monetary damages for sex-based harassment under Title IX.
Requires covered entities to take necessary corrective action to stop harassment and correct its effects, "regardless of whether the aggrieved person experienced subsequent harassment."
Section 3(a), new Section 901(d)(2)(D)(iv)
Why it matters:This is likely standard legislative practice to integrate specific legal reversals into the operative language defining new standards, rather than creating a separate, explicit "reversal" section. It's technically phrased but directly addresses a significant judicial barrier.
Case for: Proponents argue this ensures victims can seek remedies for the harm caused by initial harassment and an inadequate institutional response, even if they are not subjected to further harassment. It prevents schools from avoiding liability simply because a victim managed to avoid repeated abuse after an initial failure to act.
Case against: Opponents might argue that requiring subsequent harassment provided a clearer causal link for damages and that removing this requirement could broaden liability beyond directly attributable harm, potentially leading to claims for speculative or less tangible injuries.
Estimated impact: Significant for victims seeking damages, as it removes a major judicial barrier to recovery, potentially increasing the number of successful claims and the scope of damages awarded. It directly overturns the precedent set by *Kollaritsch v. Michigan State University Board of Trustees*.