Safeguarding Technology from CCP Influence Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Finstad, Brad [R-MN-1]
- Committees
- Oversight and Government Reform Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Oct 5, 2026
Bottom line
The bill aims to enhance U.S. national security by preventing federal procurement of IT hardware from companies linked to the Chinese government, potentially increasing procurement costs and shifting market opportunities.
What it actually does
This bill prohibits federal entities from acquiring computers or printers if the manufacturer, bidder, or offeror is determined to be a "covered Chinese entity," defined as an entity connected to the Government of the People's Republic of China. It includes a presidential waiver for national security reasons and applies to contracts entered into, renewed, or extended after enactment.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue this bill is a critical step to safeguard U.S. federal networks and data from potential espionage, sabotage, or undue influence by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). They would emphasize the importance of securing the supply chain for essential IT infrastructure and reducing reliance on potentially compromised foreign technology to protect national security interests.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that such a broad prohibition could limit competition, increase procurement costs for federal entities, and potentially slow down the adoption of new technologies. They might also raise concerns about the difficulty in definitively identifying all "covered Chinese entities" and the potential for unintended economic repercussions or retaliatory measures from China, as well as the administrative burden on agencies.
The bill is very short and straightforward, making it highly accessible for any reader to understand its core provisions quickly.
Section 2(a)
Prohibition on Computer or Printer Acquisitions
This section forbids any federal agency from buying computers or printers if the company making them, or the company bidding to supply them, is determined to be a "covered Chinese entity." This is a direct ban on federal procurement from companies linked to the Chinese government, aiming to secure federal IT supply chains.
Supporters argue
Supporters contend this prohibition is essential for national security, preventing potential backdoors, data exfiltration, or supply chain vulnerabilities that could be exploited by the Chinese government through hardware. It is a proactive measure to protect sensitive government information and infrastructure.
Critics contend
Critics might argue that such a blanket ban could lead to higher costs for federal agencies due to reduced competition and may not fully address sophisticated cyber threats, which can originate from various sources. They may also question the economic impact on global supply chains.
Tradeoffs
Balances national security concerns against potential increases in procurement costs and limitations on vendor choice for federal agencies.
Section 2(b)
Presidential Waiver for National Security
The President has the power to override the prohibition if they determine and certify to Congress that doing so is necessary for the national security of the United States. This provides flexibility in exceptional circumstances where the ban might inadvertently harm U.S. interests, allowing for strategic exceptions.
Section 2(d)(2)
Definition of Covered Chinese Entity
This defines a "covered Chinese entity" as any entity that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence or the Director of the FBI, determines to be owned, controlled, directed, subcontracted by, affiliated with, or otherwise connected to the Government of the People's Republic of China. This broad definition grants significant discretion to defense and intelligence agencies in identifying prohibited entities.
The definition of "manufacturer" is expansive, including not only the entity that transforms raw materials into the end item but also subcontractors, entities that direct the manufacturing, and any parent company, subsidiary, or affiliate of the primary manufacturer.
Section 2(d)(3)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to ensure comprehensive coverage and prevent circumvention of the primary prohibition by using complex corporate structures or subcontracting arrangements, thereby closing potential loopholes.
Case for: Supporters would argue this broad definition is crucial to prevent "covered Chinese entities" from circumventing the ban by using shell companies, complex supply chains, or affiliates to supply prohibited hardware to federal agencies. It ensures the intent of the bill is not easily defeated.
Case against: Critics might argue that such an expansive definition could inadvertently sweep in companies with minimal or indirect ties to a "covered Chinese entity," creating undue compliance burdens for legitimate businesses and potentially disrupting global supply chains unnecessarily.
Estimated impact: Significantly expands the scope of entities subject to the prohibition, potentially affecting a wider range of global technology companies and their supply chains, requiring extensive due diligence.
The prohibition applies not only to new contracts but also to any contract or other agreement that is "renewed, or extended" after the date of enactment.
Section 2(c)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to ensure that existing relationships with prohibited entities are phased out over time rather than being allowed to continue indefinitely, preventing the perpetuation of the very risks the bill seeks to mitigate.
Case for: Proponents would argue that including renewals and extensions is vital to prevent federal agencies from simply continuing existing contracts with "covered Chinese entities," thereby undermining the bill's purpose. It ensures a comprehensive transition away from prohibited technology.
Case against: Opponents might contend that applying the ban to renewed or extended contracts could create significant disruption and cost for federal agencies that have long-standing relationships or specialized equipment from now-prohibited vendors, potentially forcing premature and costly replacements.
Estimated impact: Ensures a more complete transition away from prohibited technology over time, but could necessitate significant contract renegotiations or equipment replacements for federal agencies, impacting budgets and operations.