Aerial Transport and High Consequence Infectious Diseases Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Bacon, Don [R-NE-2]
- Committees
- Armed Services Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Oct 13, 2026
Bottom line
This bill mandates the creation of a dedicated Department of Defense program, led by the Air Force, to enhance the military's capability to transport patients with highly infectious diseases and support broader federal and civilian responses.
What it actually does
This bill directs the Secretary of the Air Force to establish a Department of Defense program by October 1, 2027, for the safe, long-range aerial transport of individuals infected or suspected of infection by high-consequence infectious diseases. The program will develop training, standards, equipment protocols, and doctrine, and will support other federal, state, local, and civilian partners.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue this bill addresses a critical national security and public health gap by ensuring the DoD has a robust, standardized capability to manage and transport patients with high-consequence infectious diseases, protecting both military personnel and the wider population during crises. It enhances preparedness for future pandemics or biological threats by institutionalizing a vital logistical and medical function.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that such a program could be redundant with existing capabilities or could be more efficiently handled by civilian agencies with DoD support, rather than establishing a new, dedicated Air Force-led program. Concerns could also be raised about the potential for mission creep for military operations and the associated costs without explicit funding mechanisms.
The bill is very short and can be read quickly, allowing ample time for detailed consideration of its implications.
Section 2(a)
Mandate for High-Consequence Infectious Disease Aerial Transport Program
This section requires the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, the Secretaries of the other military departments, and the Director of the Defense Health Agency, to establish a program by October 1, 2027. This program will provide for the safe, long-range aerial transport of individuals known to be or suspected of infection by high-consequence infectious diseases, creating a dedicated military capability for such specialized medical transport.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this provision is essential for national security and public health preparedness, ensuring the military can safely move highly infectious patients without risking broader contamination, thereby protecting both service members and the public.
Critics contend
Critics might argue that this mandate could divert resources from other critical military health priorities or that existing capabilities, perhaps augmented, could fulfill this role without a new, dedicated program.
Tradeoffs
Balances the need for specialized medical transport capabilities against potential resource allocation challenges within the DoD.
Section 2(b) and 2(c)(7)
Role as Department-wide Component and Interagency Support
The program will serve as the primary Department of Defense component for aerial transport of patients with high-consequence infectious diseases. Crucially, it also mandates that the program provide support to other federal departments and agencies, state and local governments, and civilian and academic partners, as deemed appropriate by the Secretary. This fosters interoperability and coordinated responses to infectious disease threats across various sectors.
Section 2(c)(1)-(6), (8)
Development of Training, Standards, Doctrine, and Equipment
This section outlines comprehensive requirements for the Air Force-led program. It includes developing training curricula and certifying DoD medical personnel, establishing medical care standards and safety protocols, serving as the joint force advocate for this capability, and setting standards for personal protective equipment and transport isolation systems. The program must also develop joint doctrine, coordinate specialized teams, and identify capability gaps to support research, development, testing, and evaluation of medical countermeasures and operational procedures.
Section 2(d)
DoD-Wide Doctrine and Policy for High-Consequence Infectious Disease Response
This provision directs the Secretary of Defense to develop and maintain Department of Defense-wide doctrine and policy. This overarching framework will guide the development, fielding, sustainment, and employment of all high-consequence infectious disease response capabilities across the entire Department, ensuring a unified and coordinated approach to managing such threats across all military branches and components.