Public Safety Power Shutoff Data Transparency Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Whitesides, George [D-CA-27]
- Committees
- Energy and Commerce Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Oct 19, 2026
Bottom line
This bill aims to increase transparency and data sharing regarding public safety power shutoff events to improve preparedness, response, and mitigation efforts, while protecting sensitive utility information.
What it actually does
This bill directs the Secretary of Energy to establish a Public Safety Power Shutoff Event Reporting Program. It mandates that covered electric utilities report detailed information on PSPS events, including geographic extent, affected customers, hazard conditions, and impacts on vulnerable communities. The program requires quarterly public summaries of aggregated data, facilitates data sharing with emergency management agencies, and provides a legal safe harbor for the raw data submitted by utilities.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue this bill is crucial for enhancing public safety and emergency preparedness by providing a centralized repository of data on PSPS events. They contend that better data will allow for more informed decision-making by state and local authorities, improve communication with affected communities, and help identify best practices for minimizing the impact of these events, especially on vulnerable populations.
Opponents contend
Critics might argue that the reporting requirements could impose an undue administrative burden on electric utilities, particularly smaller ones, potentially diverting resources from essential grid maintenance and safety improvements. Concerns could also be raised about the potential for misuse of the data, even with safe harbor provisions, or the risk of public misinterpretation of aggregated data.
The bill is concise and clearly written, making it accessible for a quick and comprehensive understanding by any interested reader.
Section 2(a)
Program Establishment
This provision directs the Secretary of Energy to create a new program called the 'Public Safety Power Shutoff Event Reporting Program' within the Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response. The purpose of this program is to collect and manage data related to power shutoff events initiated by utilities for public safety reasons.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that formalizing this program within DOE ensures a dedicated federal effort to address the growing challenge of PSPS events, leveraging DOE's expertise in energy security and emergency response.
Critics contend
No specific opposition is typically raised against the establishment of a program itself, though concerns about its scope or funding might arise.
Tradeoffs
The primary tension is balancing the need for federal oversight and data collection with the potential for bureaucratic overhead.
Section 2(b)
Mandatory Event Reporting
This section mandates that 'covered electric utilities' must report specific information to the Secretary of Energy within seven days of both initiating and ending a public safety power shutoff event. The required information includes the geographic area affected, start/end times, estimated number of customers and critical services impacted, the hazard conditions that prompted the shutoff, summaries of public communications, coordination with emergency entities, advance notifications to hospitals, and impacts on underserved communities.
Section 2(d)
Public Data Summaries and Community Feedback
This provision requires the Secretary of Energy to publish anonymized, aggregated quarterly summaries of the reported PSPS event data on a public website. These summaries must include information on frequency, duration, regional trends, and impacts on rural, low-income, and Tribal areas. It also mandates making this data available in a machine-readable format for emergency management agencies and establishing a mechanism for local governments and Tribal entities to submit feedback or supplemental data.
Section 2(f)
Data Protection and Safe Harbor
This section establishes a 'safe harbor' for the specific information reported by covered electric utilities to the Secretary. It exempts this data from Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, prevents its direct use in civil actions without consent (if submitted in good faith), and restricts its disclosure by federal employees to emergency preparedness/public safety purposes, criminal investigations, or to Congress/Comptroller General. Similar protections apply if the data is shared with state or local governments. However, these protections do not apply to the aggregated summaries published for the public.
Defines 'covered electric utility' to include not only large utilities (25,000+ customers) but also smaller utilities (under 25,000 customers) if they operate in areas designated by the Secretary as high-risk for wildfire or related natural hazards. It also includes any other entity owning or operating electric distribution facilities that conducts a PSPS event.
Section 2(i)(1)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to place definitions at the end. However, the specific criteria for smaller utilities are substantively important for determining the bill's reach.
Case for: Supporters would argue that including smaller utilities operating in high-risk areas is essential to capture a comprehensive picture of PSPS events, as these areas are often most vulnerable to wildfires and other hazards.
Case against: Critics might argue that extending reporting requirements to smaller utilities, especially those with limited resources, could impose a disproportionate burden, even if they operate in high-risk zones.
Estimated impact: Significantly expands the number of utilities subject to reporting requirements, particularly in states prone to wildfires or other natural hazards.
States that any failure to report information under this Act will be considered a failure to make information available under subsection (b) of section 13 of the Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974 (15 U.S.C. 772(b)).
Section 2(g)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative drafting practice to avoid re-stating existing law and to integrate new requirements into existing enforcement frameworks.
Case for: Supporters would argue that leveraging an existing enforcement mechanism provides a clear and established pathway for ensuring compliance without creating new, potentially redundant, legal structures.
Case against: Critics might argue that embedding enforcement through cross-reference makes the bill less transparent regarding the consequences of non-compliance, requiring additional research for full understanding.
Estimated impact: Ensures that the reporting requirements have legal teeth, as 15 U.S.C. 772(b) generally allows for civil penalties for non-compliance with information requests.