Technical corrections only. The changes between v2 and v3 reflect the bill's procedural progression from passing the House to being received and referred in the Senate, including updated legislative status information and the Clerk's name. No substantive policy changes were made to the bill's text.
Decoupling from Foreign Adversarial Battery Dependence Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Gimenez, Carlos A. [R-FL-28]
- Committees
- Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Mar 11, 2025
Bottom line
The bill aims to enhance national security and supply chain resilience by preventing DHS from purchasing batteries from designated foreign adversarial entities, potentially increasing procurement costs but reducing dependence.
What it actually does
This bill prohibits the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) from obligating funds to procure batteries produced by specific foreign entities, including several major Chinese battery manufacturers, as well as any entities identified on certain U.S. government watchlists related to forced labor or Chinese military ties. The prohibition takes effect on October 1, 2027, and includes provisions for waivers under specific national security or research circumstances. It also requires DHS to report on the anticipated impacts of this prohibition.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that this bill is crucial for national security, ensuring that critical government infrastructure and operations are not reliant on technology from entities linked to foreign adversaries or human rights abuses. They contend it will strengthen the domestic supply chain for batteries, reduce vulnerabilities, and protect sensitive data and infrastructure from potential risks associated with foreign-made components. Supporters believe the October 2027 effective date provides sufficient time for DHS to transition to alternative suppliers.
Opponents contend
Opponents, or those raising concerns, might argue that such a broad prohibition could significantly increase procurement costs for DHS, potentially impacting its budget and operational efficiency if alternative batteries are more expensive or less readily available. They may also raise concerns about the administrative burden on DHS to identify compliant suppliers and manage the transition, potentially leading to delays in critical equipment upgrades or deployment. Some might also argue that the scope of entities is too broad or that the waiver process could be cumbersome.
The bill is short and clearly written, making it accessible for a quick read and easy to understand its core provisions.
Section 2(a)
Prohibition on Procurement of Certain Batteries
Beginning October 1, 2027, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is prohibited from using any appropriated funds to buy batteries produced by specific foreign entities. This establishes a clear deadline and a direct restriction on DHS's purchasing power for these components.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this prohibition is essential for national security, preventing DHS from relying on potentially compromised supply chains and reducing dependence on foreign adversaries for critical technology.
Critics contend
Critics or those with concerns might argue that this could lead to increased costs for DHS or delays in acquiring necessary equipment if alternative suppliers are more expensive or have limited capacity.
Tradeoffs
The provision balances national security concerns and supply chain resilience against potential increases in procurement costs and the administrative burden of transitioning to new suppliers.
Section 2(b)
Specified Prohibited Entities
This subsection lists specific battery manufacturers whose products DHS is prohibited from procuring, including major Chinese companies like CATL and BYD. It also broadly includes any entity on lists related to the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, Chinese military companies, or the Commerce Department's Entity List, along with their subsidiaries or successors. This significantly expands the scope beyond named companies.
Section 2(c)
Definition of 'Produced By'
For the purpose of this Act, a battery is considered 'produced by' a prohibited entity if that entity either assembles or manufactures the final product that uses the battery, or if it creates or provides a majority of the components used in the battery. This clarifies the scope of the prohibition, extending it beyond just direct battery manufacturing to include products where the prohibited entity plays a significant role in the battery's final assembly or component supply.
Section 2(d)
Waiver Authority
The Secretary of Homeland Security can waive the procurement prohibition under two conditions: (1) if the batteries pose no national security risk AND there are no available, comparable, non-prohibited alternatives; or (2) if the batteries are for research, evaluation, training, testing, or analysis purposes. Any waiver granted must be reported to Congress within 15 days. This provides flexibility for DHS to address critical needs or conduct necessary evaluations without undermining the bill's intent.
Section 2(e)
Report on Anticipated Impacts
Within 180 days of the bill's enactment, the Secretary of Homeland Security must submit a report to Congress detailing the anticipated impacts on mission and costs for various DHS components, including U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, among others. This report is intended to provide Congress with a comprehensive understanding of the operational and financial consequences of implementing the battery procurement prohibition.
The prohibition extends to any entity on lists required under clauses (i), (ii), (iv), or (v) of section 2(d)(2)(B) of Public Law 117-78 (Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act), any entity identified by the Secretary of Defense as a Chinese military company (pursuant to section 1260H of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021), and any entity included in Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations (Commerce Department's Entity List).
Section 2(b)(7), (8), (9)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to incorporate existing legal frameworks and lists by reference, rather than reprinting extensive lists within the bill itself. It ensures the prohibition is dynamic and updates as these external lists are modified.
Case for: Proponents argue that incorporating these existing lists by reference provides a comprehensive and adaptable framework for identifying adversarial entities, leveraging established processes for national security and human rights concerns without needing to constantly update the bill text itself.
Case against: Critics might argue that relying on external, dynamic lists makes the full scope of the prohibition less transparent to the public and potentially more challenging for contractors to track, increasing compliance burdens.
Estimated impact: Significantly expands the number of entities whose batteries are prohibited beyond the six specifically named companies, encompassing a much broader range of entities deemed problematic by various U.S. government agencies.