Technical corrections only. The diff reflects the bill's progression from being engrossed in the House to being referred to the Senate, including a minor clerical update to the attestation. No substantive policy changes were made between v2 and v3.
Enhanced Iran Sanctions Act of 2025
- Sponsor
- Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]
- Committees
- Foreign Relations Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Mar 17, 2026
Bottom line
The bill intensifies economic pressure on Iran's petroleum and petrochemical sectors to curb its nuclear ambitions, WMD development, and support for terrorism.
What it actually does
This bill expands U.S. sanctions against Iran by authorizing the President to impose sanctions on foreign persons involved in significant transactions related to the processing, refining, export, transfer, or sale of Iranian oil, condensates, or petrochemical products. It also broadens the Rewards for Justice program to cover individuals attempting to evade these sanctions, aiming to deny Iran financial resources for its nuclear, WMD, and destabilizing activities.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that strengthening sanctions is crucial to deny Iran the financial resources it uses to fund its nuclear weapons capabilities, develop weapons of mass destruction, support missile and drone proliferation, finance international terrorism, engage in destabilizing regional efforts, and repress its own citizens. They believe these measures are necessary to enhance global security and uphold human rights.
Opponents contend
Critics might contend that expanded sanctions could exacerbate humanitarian crises in Iran, complicate future diplomatic efforts, or inadvertently harm legitimate economic activities involving third-party nations. Some may argue that such broad sanctions could be counterproductive, potentially pushing Iran further away from international cooperation.
The bill is relatively concise, making it accessible for an informed reader to evaluate its core provisions within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 3
Expansion of Rewards for Justice Program
This section amends the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 to include the identification of persons violating or evading U.S. sanctions against Iran, specifically those involved in transactions related to Iranian oil, condensates, or petrochemical products, under the Rewards for Justice Program. This means individuals who provide information leading to the identification of such sanction evaders could be eligible for financial rewards.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this provision provides a powerful incentive for individuals to come forward with critical information, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of Iran sanctions enforcement and making it harder for illicit networks to operate undetected.
Critics contend
No specific opposition is typically raised against this provision, as it is an enforcement mechanism for existing policy. However, some might express concerns about the potential for misinformation or unintended consequences if not carefully managed.
Tradeoffs
Balances the need for robust enforcement with potential risks associated with incentivizing intelligence gathering.
Section 4(a)
Authority to Impose Sanctions on Iran-Related Petroleum Transactions
This subsection grants the President the authority to impose sanctions on foreign persons who knowingly engage in significant transactions related to the processing, refining, export, transfer, or sale of Iranian oil, condensates, or petrochemical products. It also extends this authority to subsidiaries, corporate officers, immediate family members who demonstrably benefit from such activities, and those who conduct significant transactions with sanctioned entities under related acts.
Section 4(b)
Types of Sanctions Imposed
This subsection details the specific sanctions that can be imposed: blocking all property and interests in property of sanctioned foreign persons within U.S. jurisdiction, and rendering sanctioned aliens inadmissible to the United States, ineligible for visas, and subject to visa revocation.
Section 4(c)
Sanctions Exceptions
This subsection outlines several exceptions to the sanctions: to comply with international obligations (e.g., UN Headquarters Agreement), for authorized U.S. intelligence and law enforcement activities, for humanitarian assistance to the people of Iran (including agricultural commodities, food, medicine, and medical devices), and for the safety of vessels and crew (providing provisions to avoid environmental or human damage).
Section 4(d)
Presidential Waiver Authority
This subsection grants the President authority to waive sanctions on a case-by-case basis for up to 180 days if it is certified to be in the national interests of the United States, with a detailed justification to Congress. Waivers can be renewed for additional 180-day periods if vital to national interests, requiring a report to Congress including a justification, a plan to phase out the waiver, and steps taken for reoccurring waivers.
Section 4(f)
Conditions for Sanctions Termination
This subsection specifies that the requirement to impose sanctions will cease 30 days after the President certifies to Congress that Iran no longer repeatedly supports international terrorism (as determined by various acts) and has verifiably ceased the pursuit, acquisition, and development of, and dismantled its, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and ballistic missiles and launch technology.
This subsection grants the President authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to implement the sanctions, requires regulations to be issued within 60 days, and applies IEEPA penalties (civil and criminal) for violations of this Act.
Section 4(e)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice for establishing the legal framework for enforcement and delegating regulatory authority to the Executive Branch.
Case for: Supporters argue it ensures the sanctions are legally enforceable and provides a clear framework for implementation, deterring violations through significant penalties.
Case against: No specific opposition, as it's a procedural enforcement mechanism.
Estimated impact: Establishes the legal teeth for the entire sanctions regime, making violations subject to substantial fines (up to $1 million per violation for entities) and imprisonment (up to 20 years for individuals).
This subsection explicitly states that the sanctions authority does not include the authority or requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods, defining 'good' as any article, substance, material, supply, or manufactured product, excluding technical data.
Section 4(g)
Why it matters:This is a carve-out that limits the scope of the sanctions, potentially included to address concerns about broader economic impacts, WTO obligations, or to avoid a complete embargo on all Iranian non-petroleum products.
Case for: Proponents might argue this exception prevents the sanctions from becoming overly broad and impacting legitimate trade in non-strategic goods, potentially easing concerns from trading partners and avoiding unnecessary economic friction.
Case against: Critics seeking maximum pressure on Iran might argue this exception creates a loophole, allowing some economic activity that could indirectly benefit the regime or reduce the overall economic impact of the sanctions.
Estimated impact: Limits the economic reach of the sanctions, preventing a complete embargo on all Iranian goods and allowing for continued trade in non-petroleum products.