Technical corrections only. The diff reflects the bill's transition from being engrossed in the House (v3) to being received and referred in the Senate (v4), including updated legislative metadata and a re-presentation of the bill text. No substantive policy changes were made between v3 and v4.
Communications Security Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Menendez, Robert [D-NJ-8]
- Committees
- Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Jul 16, 2025
Bottom line
The Communications Security Act establishes a permanent FCC advisory council focused on communications network security, explicitly excluding entities deemed a national security threat from participation.
What it actually does
This bill directs the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to establish or designate an advisory council within 90 days to provide recommendations on enhancing the security, reliability, and interoperability of communications networks. The council's membership will include representatives from the communications industry (excluding entities deemed 'not trusted'), public interest organizations, academic institutions (also excluding 'not trusted' entities), and various levels of government. The council is required to submit reports to the FCC Chair every two years, which must then be made publicly available.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that establishing a dedicated, permanent advisory council is crucial for proactively addressing evolving threats to communications infrastructure and ensuring the resilience and trustworthiness of essential networks. They contend that excluding 'not trusted' entities from the council's membership is a vital step to safeguard national security interests and prevent undue influence from foreign adversaries in critical policy discussions.
Opponents contend
Critics might express concerns that the broad definition of 'not trusted' entities, particularly the FCC Chair's discretion to determine if an entity 'poses a threat to the national security of the United States,' could be subject to political abuse or lead to arbitrary exclusions. They may also argue that excluding certain industry players, even those with foreign ties, could limit the diversity of technical expertise and perspectives available to the council, potentially hindering its effectiveness in addressing complex, global communications challenges.
The bill is concise and clearly written, making it accessible for a quick read and easy to understand its core provisions.
Section 2(a)
Establishment or Designation of Council
This provision mandates that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) either establish a new advisory council or designate an existing one within 90 days of the bill's enactment. The council's primary role is to advise the FCC on matters related to the security, reliability, and interoperability of communications networks. This ensures that the FCC receives ongoing expert guidance on these critical infrastructure issues.
Supporters argue
Proponents argue that a dedicated council provides a structured and consistent mechanism for expert advice, which is essential for the FCC to keep pace with rapidly evolving threats and technologies in communications networks.
Critics contend
No specific opposition is typically raised against the general establishment of an advisory council, though concerns might arise regarding its specific composition or scope.
Tradeoffs
The tradeoff is between the administrative burden of establishing and maintaining a council versus the benefit of continuous expert advice on critical infrastructure.
Section 2(b)
Council Membership Composition
This section outlines the required composition of the council's membership, to be appointed by the FCC Chair. It specifies that the council should include representatives from the communications industry, public interest organizations or academic institutions, and various government levels (Federal, State, local, Tribal). Crucially, it explicitly excludes companies, public interest organizations, or academic institutions that the Chair determines to be 'not trusted' from participating.
Section 2(c)
Reporting Requirements
The council is required to submit reports to the FCC Chair every two years, starting two years after its establishment or designation. These reports will include recommendations on increasing the security, reliability, and interoperability of communications networks, along with other relevant issues. The FCC is then mandated to make these reports publicly available on its website, ensuring transparency and public access to the council's findings and recommendations.
Section 2(d)
Permanent Duration of Council
This section explicitly exempts the council from the termination provisions of Section 1013(a)(2) of title 5, United States Code, which typically mandates the termination of advisory committees after a certain period. By doing so, the bill establishes the Council on Communications Security, Reliability, and Interoperability as a permanent advisory body to the FCC, ensuring its continuous operation without periodic reauthorization.
Defines 'not trusted' as an entity that the FCC Chair publicly determines is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the influence of a foreign adversary, or that the Chair otherwise determines poses a threat to the national security of the United States. For the latter, the Chair must use criteria from section 2(c) of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (47 U.S.C. 1601(c)).
Section 2(e)(4)
Why it matters:While placing definitions at the end is standard legislative practice, the broad discretion granted to the FCC Chair in determining what constitutes a 'threat to national security' and the direct impact of this definition on council membership makes it particularly consequential and potentially controversial, warranting closer scrutiny.
Case for: Proponents argue this definition is essential for safeguarding national security by preventing entities with ties to foreign adversaries from influencing critical communications policy. They contend that the FCC Chair, with access to intelligence, is best positioned to make such determinations, and referencing existing law provides a framework.
Case against: Critics may argue that the broad discretion given to the FCC Chair, particularly the 'otherwise determines' clause, could be subject to political pressure or arbitrary application, potentially leading to the exclusion of legitimate entities. They might also raise concerns about due process for entities deemed 'not trusted' and the potential for this power to be misused.
Estimated impact: This definition directly impacts the composition and perceived legitimacy of the advisory council, potentially excluding significant industry players or academic institutions, thereby shaping the advice provided to the FCC and potentially influencing future communications policy.