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4 versions
CosmeticWhat changed in REFERRED IN SENATEcompared with ENGROSSED IN HOUSE (Jun 23, 2025)

Technical corrections only. The v4 version includes administrative updates related to the bill's referral to the Senate and specifies the name of the House Clerk. There are no substantive policy changes between v3 and v4.

H.R. 1737·119th Congress·Introduced Feb 27, 2025

To direct the Secretary of Commerce to submit to Congress a report containing an assessment of the value, cost, and feasibility of a trans-Atlantic submarine fiber optic cable connecting the contiguous United States, the United States Virgin Islands, Ghana, and Nigeria.

Passed HouseScience, Technology, CommunicationsSubstantive
View bill text
Sponsor
Del. Plaskett, Stacey E. [D-VI-At Large]
Committees
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee (primary)
Last action
Jun 24, 2025

Bottom line

H.R. 1737 mandates a federal assessment of a proposed trans-Atlantic fiber optic cable project aimed at bolstering U.S. national security and economic opportunities through enhanced connectivity to Africa and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

What it actually does

This bill directs the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with other federal agencies, to submit a report to Congress within one year. The report must assess the value, cost, and feasibility of a trans-Atlantic submarine fiber optic cable connecting the contiguous United States, the United States Virgin Islands, Ghana, and Nigeria, with a focus on enhancing U.S. national security. It also requires an assessment of related infrastructure, such as a data center in the U.S. Virgin Islands.

Proponents argue

Supporters argue that this bill is a crucial step in evaluating strategic infrastructure that could significantly enhance U.S. national security, improve digital security, and foster economic opportunities, particularly by strengthening ties with African nations and securing telecommunications with the U.S. Virgin Islands. They believe a comprehensive assessment is necessary to inform future investments in critical digital infrastructure and counter potential geopolitical rivals.

Opponents contend

Critics might contend that while the goal is laudable, directing the Secretary of Commerce to conduct such a specific, large-scale assessment could divert resources from other pressing departmental priorities. They might also argue that the feasibility of such a complex, multi-national project is highly speculative, and that existing diplomatic or intelligence channels might already provide sufficient information without the need for a dedicated legislative mandate.

The bill is very short and clear, making it highly accessible for any reader to understand its core directive and scope within minutes.

Section 1(a)

Mandate for Trans-Atlantic Cable Assessment Report

prominently featuredstraightforward

This provision directs the Secretary of Commerce, within one year of the bill's enactment, to submit a report to specific Congressional committees. The report must assess the value, cost, and feasibility of establishing a trans-Atlantic submarine fiber optic cable. This cable would connect the contiguous United States, the United States Virgin Islands, Ghana, and Nigeria, with the explicit goal of enhancing U.S. national security.

GroupImpactMechanismScale
GroupSecretary of Commerce and other Federal agenciesImpactRequired to conduct an assessment and produce a report.MechanismLegislative directiveScaleSignificant administrative effort
GroupU.S. Congress (House Energy and Commerce, Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committees)ImpactWill receive the report to inform future legislative and policy decisions.MechanismReport submissionScaleInformational

Supporters argue

Supporters argue that this mandate is essential for gathering the necessary data and strategic insights to evaluate a critical infrastructure project that could significantly bolster U.S. national security and economic interests in key regions.

Critics contend

Critics might argue that while the assessment is useful, the specific timeline or the broad scope of the report could strain departmental resources without a clear immediate return on investment.

Tradeoffs

The primary tension involves balancing the strategic importance of such an assessment against the administrative burden and cost of conducting a comprehensive study within a fixed timeframe.

Section 1(b)

Required Elements of the Assessment Report

prominently featuredmoderately complex

This section specifies nine key areas that the report must assess. These include the digital security, national security, and economic opportunities of the proposed cable; the lifespan and security of existing cables to the U.S. Virgin Islands; the readiness of U.S. Virgin Islands infrastructure; potential engagement with 'trusted entities' and associated advantages; connectivity opportunities for the U.S. economy; the value, cost, and feasibility of a data center in the U.S. Virgin Islands for military and national security communications; and the state of submarine fiber optic cables connected to U.S. infrastructure.

Section 1(e)

Definitions of 'Trusted' and 'Not Trusted' Entities

mentioned in summarymoderately complex

This provision defines key terms for the report. Specifically, an entity is deemed 'not trusted' if the Secretary determines it poses an unacceptable risk to U.S. national security or the safety of U.S. persons, based on criteria outlined in the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019. Conversely, an entity is 'trusted' if it has not been determined to be 'not trusted.' These definitions are crucial for guiding the assessment of potential partners in the deployment of the fiber optic cable.

FOUND

The Secretary of Commerce is explicitly prohibited from requiring any entity to provide data for the purposes of preparing the report.

Section 1(c)

Why it matters:This could be standard legislative practice to avoid imposing new regulatory burdens on private entities, ensuring that data collection is voluntary. Alternatively, it could be seen as a subtle way to limit the depth or comprehensiveness of the report without explicitly narrowing its scope.

Case for: Proponents argue this protects private entities from undue burden and respects voluntary cooperation, fostering a collaborative environment rather than a coercive one for data gathering.

Case against: Critics might argue that this limitation could significantly hinder the Secretary's ability to gather comprehensive and accurate data, potentially leading to an incomplete or less robust assessment of the cable's value, cost, and feasibility. This could undermine the report's utility for Congress.

Estimated impact: Could lead to a less robust or less comprehensive report, potentially impacting the quality of future policy decisions regarding the cable project. The impact scale is informational.

About this analysis. AI-Generated from the official bill text and available committee reports. Gaps in available data are noted explicitly. Verify important details with the official Congress.gov record.

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