FARMLAND Act of 2025
- Sponsor
- Rep. Feenstra, Randy [R-IA-4]
- Committees
- Agriculture Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Mar 28, 2025
Bottom line
The FARMLAND Act of 2025 aims to enhance national security and protect the U.S. food supply and agricultural intellectual property by increasing scrutiny, penalties, and reporting requirements for foreign ownership of agricultural land, particularly from adversarial nations.
What it actually does
This bill, known as the FARMLAND Act of 2025, significantly strengthens oversight of foreign investment in the United States agricultural industry. It increases civil penalties for non-compliance with disclosure requirements, mandates public disclosure of noncompliant foreign persons, and requires due diligence from entities involved in agricultural land transfers. The bill also expands the jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to review certain real estate transactions by foreign entities of concern, establishes a new investigative unit within the USDA, creates a database of foreign-owned agricultural land, and prohibits foreign persons from participating in Farm Service Agency programs.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that the bill is crucial for safeguarding United States national security, economic prosperity, and food security against malign foreign influence and intellectual property theft, especially from strategic competitors like China. They contend that current oversight is insufficient and that modernizing existing laws and expanding federal authority, including CFIUS's role, is necessary to prevent foreign adversaries from undermining the U.S. agriculture sector and critical infrastructure.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that while national security concerns are valid, the bill could be overly broad, potentially deterring legitimate and beneficial foreign investment in the U.S. agricultural sector. They may also raise concerns about increased administrative burdens on real estate entities and federal agencies, and the potential for the expanded powers to be misused or to create unintended negative economic consequences for agricultural landowners seeking to sell their property.
The bill is moderately complex, requiring careful reading to understand its amendments to existing law and the new authorities it creates. The estimated reading time is appropriate for an informed reader to grasp its implications.
Section 2(b)
Increased Civil Penalties for Disclosure Violations
This provision amends the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978 (AFIDA) to increase the civil penalties for failing to submit required reports or knowingly submitting false or misleading information. Previously, penalties could be up to 25% of the fair market value of the interest in agricultural land. This amendment establishes a minimum penalty of 5% and retains the maximum of 25%, making penalties more stringent for non-compliance.
Supporters argue
Proponents argue that stronger penalties are necessary to ensure compliance with foreign investment disclosure laws, which are currently under-enforced. They believe this will provide a greater deterrent against intentional concealment of foreign ownership, thereby improving transparency and national security.
Critics contend
No specific opposition is typically raised against increasing penalties for non-compliance with disclosure laws, as the principle of transparency is widely accepted. However, some may argue that the penalties could be disproportionate for minor or unintentional errors.
Tradeoffs
The provision balances the need for robust enforcement and transparency in foreign land ownership against concerns about potentially overly punitive measures for non-malicious errors.
Section 2(c)
Public Disclosure of Noncompliant Persons
This section mandates that the Secretary of Agriculture publicly disclose the names of all persons who pay a civil penalty under AFIDA, even after any appeals are completed. This aims to increase transparency and accountability regarding foreign entities that fail to comply with reporting requirements.
Section 2(e)
Due Diligence Requirements for Agricultural Land Transfers
This new section requires any entity involved in the purchase or transfer of agricultural land in the United States, including buyers, sellers, real estate agents, brokers, and title companies, to conduct due diligence related to the land and certify to the Secretary of Agriculture their compliance with all applicable provisions of AFIDA.
Section 4(a), (d)
Establishment of Chief of Operations of Investigative Actions and Duties
This section amends AFIDA to establish a new position within the Department of Agriculture: the Chief of Operations of Investigative Actions, a Senior Executive Service employee. This Chief is tasked with hiring additional staff to monitor AFIDA compliance, refer non-compliance to appropriate authorities, conduct investigations (in coordination with other federal and state agencies) into malign efforts to steal agricultural knowledge or disrupt the U.S. agricultural base, and refer transactions raising national security concerns to CFIUS.
Section 5(a)
Expansion of CFIUS Jurisdiction to Agricultural Real Estate
This section expands the jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to include the purchase, lease, or concession of private or public real estate in the United States by a 'foreign entity of concern.' This applies if the value of the transaction exceeds $5,000,000 (or cumulatively over 3 years) or the real estate exceeds 320 acres (or cumulatively over 3 years), and is primarily used for agriculture, energy extraction, or critical precursor materials for specific technology industries.
Section 5(d)
Inclusion of Secretary of Agriculture and FDA Commissioner on CFIUS
This provision amends the Defense Production Act of 1950 to add the Secretary of Agriculture and the Commissioner of Food and Drugs as members of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). This ensures that agricultural and food security expertise is directly integrated into CFIUS's national security reviews.
Section 6
Digitization and Consolidation of Foreign Land Ownership Data
This section mandates the Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security to jointly develop a publicly available database of agricultural land owned by foreign persons. The database will consolidate data collected under AFIDA and from FSA-153 forms, with an annual audit by the Chief of Operations of Investigative Actions to ensure accuracy and recommend improvements.
Section 7
Prohibition of Participation in Farm Service Agency Programs by Foreign Persons
This section prohibits any operator or owner who is a 'foreign person' from participating in Farm Service Agency (FSA) programs. It requires applicants to certify they are not foreign persons, authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to monitor compliance, and establishes civil penalties (up to 125% of benefits received) for foreign persons who receive prohibited benefits or submit false information. Penalties collected are available for enforcement.
Section 8
Authorization of Appropriations
This section authorizes specific appropriations to carry out the Act and its amendments. It allocates $35,000,000 for fiscal year 2026, to remain available until expended, for secure workspace buildout for the new investigative unit and for database system development. Additionally, it authorizes $9,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2026 through 2030 for all other activities mandated by the Act.
The definition of 'foreign entity of concern' is not explicitly stated within this bill but is instead referenced to section 9901 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (15 U.S.C. 4651).
Section 4(b)(2), Section 5(b)(7)
Why it matters:Referencing existing definitions is standard legislative practice to avoid redundancy and ensure consistency across federal law. However, for a reader, it means the scope of the bill's impact is not self-contained.
Case for: Using an established definition ensures consistency with broader national security policy and avoids creating conflicting definitions for similar concepts across different laws.
Case against: A reader must navigate multiple statutes to understand the full implications of the bill, making it less accessible and potentially obscuring the precise scope of entities targeted.
Estimated impact: This definition is central to the bill's scope, determining which foreign investments are subject to enhanced scrutiny and potential prohibition. It directly impacts entities associated with countries like China, Russia, and state sponsors of terrorism.
Requires the Secretary of the Treasury, in coordination with the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, to submit a report to Congress assessing the *feasibility* of requiring retroactive divestment of real estate owned by foreign entities of concern.
Section 5(f)
Why it matters:Framing it as a feasibility study allows Congress to explore a potentially controversial and complex policy without immediately enacting it, deferring a direct legislative decision. This is a common legislative tactic for sensitive issues.
Case for: Assessing retroactive divestment is crucial for understanding the full range of tools available to address existing national security risks posed by foreign ownership of strategic assets. It provides a pathway for future policy decisions.
Case against: Even a feasibility study for retroactive divestment could create significant uncertainty for foreign investors, potentially chilling legitimate investment and raising concerns about property rights and international law.
Estimated impact: While not a mandate for divestment, the study itself signals a potential future policy direction that could have profound impacts on existing foreign landholdings and international investment relations. The scale of impact could be billions of dollars if implemented.