Technical corrections only. The two versions of H.R. 2069 are substantively identical, with v4 representing the enrolled bill after passing both chambers, while v3 was the version received in the Senate. No policy changes were made between these versions.
Stop Secret Spending Act of 2025
- Sponsor
- Rep. Moore, Barry [R-AL-1]
- Committees
- Oversight and Government Reform Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Sep 11, 2026
Bottom line
The bill aims to significantly increase transparency in federal spending by requiring comprehensive public reporting of all federal awards, including previously opaque 'other transaction agreements,' on USAspending.gov.
What it actually does
This bill amends the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 (FFATA) to mandate that 'other transaction agreements' (OTAs) be reported to USAspending.gov, enhancing transparency in federal spending. It requires the Secretary of the Treasury to establish data standards for these agreements, publish an annual report on all unreported federal spending, and implement a plan to ensure full compliance. Additionally, it strengthens Inspector General reporting on FFATA compliance and clarifies agency responsibilities for data quality on the USAspending.gov website.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that the bill is a critical step towards greater government accountability and transparency, closing loopholes that have allowed substantial federal spending, particularly through 'other transaction agreements,' to remain hidden from public view. They contend that by making this data publicly accessible, the bill will empower taxpayers and oversight bodies to monitor how federal funds are utilized, thereby reducing waste, fraud, and abuse, and fostering greater public trust in government operations.
Opponents contend
Opponents or those with concerns might argue that the extensive new reporting requirements could impose significant administrative and financial burdens on federal agencies, potentially diverting resources from their core missions. They may also raise concerns about the potential for public disclosure of sensitive information, such as national security-related details or proprietary business data, particularly in the context of certain 'other transaction agreements' often used for rapid research and development in defense sectors.
The bill is concise and its primary objectives are clearly articulated, making it accessible for an informed reader to understand its implications within a short timeframe.
Section 2(a)
Inclusion of Other Transaction Agreements in FFATA Reporting
This provision amends the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 (FFATA) to explicitly include 'other transaction agreements' (OTAs) within the scope of federal awards that must be reported to USAspending.gov. This closes a previous loophole where OTAs, which are flexible agreements often used for research and development, were not consistently disclosed, making a significant portion of federal spending less transparent.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this provision is crucial for ensuring comprehensive transparency across all federal spending mechanisms, preventing the use of OTAs as a means to circumvent public accountability.
Critics contend
Some agencies or contractors might express concerns about the administrative overhead of reporting these agreements, which are often designed for flexibility and speed, and the potential for public disclosure to hinder competitive advantages or national security interests.
Tradeoffs
This provision balances the need for government transparency and accountability against potential administrative burdens and, in some cases, concerns about disclosing sensitive project details.
Section 2(b)
Establishment of Data Standards for Other Transaction Agreements
This section mandates that within three years of the bill's enactment, the Secretary of the Treasury must ensure that data related to other transaction agreements is automatically transmitted to USAspending.gov and presented in a centralized, accessible view on the website. This aims to standardize and streamline the reporting process, making the data more usable and comparable for public oversight.
Section 2(c)
Annual Report on Federal Spending Not Posted to USAspending.gov
This provision requires the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Director of OMB, to annually publish a report on USAspending.gov detailing the total amount of federal spending for which data has *not* been posted to the website. The report must also provide reasons for non-disclosure, such as national security classification, legislative/judicial branch awards, or subawards below a primary subaward.
Section 2(d)
Phased Implementation Plan for Other Transaction Agreement Reporting
This section outlines a phased implementation plan. If OTA data is not automatically transmitted to USAspending.gov within one year of enactment, the Secretary must publish a detailed report of all OTAs from the preceding fiscal year. If not fully compliant within two years, the Secretary must submit a plan to Congress detailing the status and actions to achieve full incorporation of OTA data by the three-year deadline.
Section 3(a)
Enhanced and Regular Inspector General Reporting on FFATA Compliance
This provision amends FFATA to require Inspectors General (IGs) of specified federal agencies to submit reports to Congress and make them publicly available. These reports assess their agency's compliance with FFATA's transparency requirements. The first report is due one year after enactment, and subsequent reports are required at least every two years for ten years, aligning with other financial reporting deadlines.
Section 3(b)
Requirements for Data Quality and Agency Reporting Determinations
This section establishes requirements for data quality, mandating that the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of OMB, in consultation with agencies, set standards to ensure information posted to USAspending.gov is complete and accurate. It also requires the Secretary and Director to assess and publish a list of federal agencies and components required to post information, and to provide written notice to those agencies and their IGs.
Defines 'relevant agency' as a federal agency with the authority to enter into an other transaction agreement, *as determined by the Director of OMB*.
Section 2(d)(1)(B)
Why it matters:While defining terms is standard legislative practice, the inclusion of 'as determined by the Director' grants significant discretionary power to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which could influence the breadth of the bill's application.
Case for: Proponents would argue this flexibility allows OMB to adapt to changing agency structures and ensure the reporting requirements are applied appropriately to those agencies actually using OTAs, avoiding unnecessary burdens on others.
Case against: Critics might contend that this discretion could be used to limit the scope of reporting, potentially allowing certain agencies or specific types of OTAs to avoid full transparency if OMB chooses not to designate them as 'relevant.'
Estimated impact: This provision could significantly influence the breadth of OTA reporting, potentially excluding some agencies or agreements from initial compliance efforts, thereby affecting the overall completeness of USAspending.gov data.
States that the amendments made by paragraph (1)(A) (which modify reporting requirements for agencies based on a list) take effect *on the date on which the Secretary publishes the first list* under new section 3(e)(2).
Section 3(b)(2)
Why it matters:Specifying effective dates is standard legislative practice for managing transitions. However, by tying the operative effect of broader reporting requirements to an administrative action (the Secretary's publication of a list), it introduces a potential delay in full implementation.
Case for: Proponents would argue this ensures that agencies are only subject to the new, clarified reporting requirements once the Secretary has formally determined and published the list of required agencies, providing clarity and avoiding premature enforcement.
Case against: Critics might argue this introduces a potential delay in the full implementation of improved data quality and reporting, as the effective date is tied to an administrative action that could be postponed, even if the Secretary is mandated to publish the list within one year.
Estimated impact: This provision could delay the full effect of improved data quality and agency reporting accountability until the Secretary's list is published, which is mandated within one year of enactment, potentially impacting the timeliness of transparency improvements.