Technical corrections only. The diff between v3 and v4 reflects procedural updates as the bill moved from the House to the Senate, including changes to the header and footer information. There are no substantive policy changes to the legislative text.
Promoting Resilient Supply Chains Act of 2025
- Sponsor
- Rep. James, John [R-MI-10]
- Committees
- Energy and Commerce Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Apr 29, 2025
Bottom line
This bill creates a new Department of Commerce program and interagency working group to proactively strengthen U.S. critical supply chains and promote domestic and allied manufacturing of essential goods and emerging technologies, with a sunset clause of 10 years.
What it actually does
This bill establishes a critical supply chain resiliency and crisis response program within the Department of Commerce, led by the Assistant Secretary for Industry and Analysis. It mandates the creation of a Supply Chain Resilience Working Group to assess, map, and model critical supply chains, identify vulnerabilities, and develop strategies to mitigate shocks. The bill also aims to promote domestic manufacturing and reduce reliance on critical goods from adversarial nations, while encouraging collaboration with allies.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue the bill is crucial for national and economic security, addressing lessons learned from recent supply chain disruptions (e.g., pandemics, geopolitical conflicts). They contend it will bolster domestic manufacturing, reduce reliance on potentially hostile foreign sources, and ensure the U.S. maintains leadership in critical and emerging technologies, thereby safeguarding jobs and economic stability.
Opponents contend
Critics might argue that the bill creates another layer of bureaucracy within the Department of Commerce, potentially duplicating efforts already underway in other agencies. Concerns could also be raised about the potential for protectionist measures to inadvertently increase costs for consumers or stifle innovation by limiting access to global supply chains, or that the definitions of 'critical' could be overly broad or subject to political influence.
The bill is moderately complex but manageable for an informed reader to evaluate its core provisions within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 2
Additional Responsibilities for Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Analysis
This section expands the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Analysis. It tasks them with promoting the stability and resilience of critical supply chains and emerging technologies, leading a new Working Group, encouraging U.S. production, assessing supply chain strength, supporting domestic and allied manufacturing, and reducing reliance on goods from adversarial countries.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that centralizing these responsibilities within a dedicated Assistant Secretary role ensures focused leadership and strategic coordination for supply chain resilience, which is vital for national security and economic competitiveness.
Critics contend
Some might argue that these responsibilities could overlap with existing roles in other agencies (e.g., DoD, DHS), potentially leading to bureaucratic inefficiencies or turf wars rather than streamlined action.
Tradeoffs
Balances the need for focused leadership with potential for interagency overlap.
Section 3(a)-(c)
Establishment and Membership of Critical Supply Chain Resilience Working Group
This section establishes a 'Supply Chain Resilience Working Group' within 120 days of enactment, to be led by the Assistant Secretary. It specifies that the Working Group will include representatives from various Federal agencies, including State, Defense, Homeland Security, Transportation, Energy, Agriculture, Interior, Health and Human Services, ODNI, and the Small Business Administration, reflecting the broad scope of critical supply chains.
Section 3(b)
Working Group Activities for Supply Chain Assessment and Response
Within one year, the Working Group must conduct extensive activities, including assessing, mapping, and modeling critical supply chains (including for emerging technologies), identifying gaps and vulnerabilities, evaluating domestic and allied manufacturing capacity, and developing contingency plans. It also requires consultation with state/local governments and international partners.
Section 3(d)
Designation of Critical Industries, Supply Chains, and Goods
The Assistant Secretary is required to designate 'critical industries,' 'critical supply chains,' and 'critical goods' within 120 days of enactment, after a period of public comment and review. These designations must be updated at least every four years, including for new emerging technologies.
Section 3(f)
National Strategy and Annual Review on Critical Supply Chain Resiliency
Within 18 months of enactment, and annually thereafter, the Assistant Secretary, in consultation with the Working Group and other stakeholders, must submit a comprehensive report to Congress. This report will identify critical infrastructure, emerging technologies, supply chain threats (especially from adversarial nations), assess manufacturing capacity, and develop a strategy for the Department of Commerce to enhance supply chain resilience. The report must be unclassified but can have a classified annex, and requires public comment.
Section 4
Department of Commerce Capability Assessment
The Secretary of Commerce is required to produce a report within two years, identifying the duties, resources, and expertise within the Department relevant to supply chain resilience and manufacturing innovation. This report must assess the effectiveness and limitations of existing offices and bureaus and provide recommendations for enhancing activities, improving coordination, and consulting with other agencies.
This subsection provides significant protections for 'critical supply chain information' voluntarily submitted to the Department of Commerce. Such information, if accompanied by an express statement, is exempt from FOIA disclosure, protected from use in civil actions without consent, and restricted from disclosure by Federal, State, or local authorities for purposes other than this section (with exceptions for criminal investigations or Congressional oversight). It also clarifies that submitting this information does not waive other legal privileges.
Section 3(i)
Why it matters:This provision is a standard legislative mechanism to encourage private sector cooperation by addressing concerns about proprietary data and legal exposure. Its placement is typical for such protective clauses.
Case for: Supporters argue this protection is essential to incentivize private companies to share sensitive supply chain data with the government, which is crucial for accurate vulnerability assessments and effective response planning. Without such assurances, companies would be reluctant to disclose proprietary or competitive information.
Case against: Critics might argue that such broad exemptions from public disclosure could reduce transparency and accountability, potentially shielding information that could be relevant for public oversight or competitive analysis.
Estimated impact: High impact on data sharing practices between the private sector and the Department of Commerce, potentially enabling more comprehensive supply chain analysis.