Technical corrections only. The changes between v3 and v4 reflect the bill's procedural movement from the House to the Senate, including an updated attestation with the Clerk's name. There are no substantive policy changes in the bill text.
FUTURE Networks Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Matsui, Doris O. [D-CA-7]
- Committees
- Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Apr 29, 2025
Bottom line
The bill mandates the FCC to create a task force to study and report on the future of 6G wireless technology, with a focus on national security and public input.
What it actually does
This bill directs the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to establish a "6G Task Force" within 120 days of enactment. The Task Force will be composed of representatives from the communications industry (excluding "not trusted" entities), public interest organizations, academic institutions, and various levels of government. Its primary duty is to publish a report within one year on the status, uses, limitations (including cybersecurity), and government leveraging strategies for sixth-generation wireless technology, following a public comment period on a draft report.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that proactive engagement with emerging technologies like 6G is crucial for maintaining U.S. global leadership in telecommunications, ensuring national security, and fostering innovation. They contend that a dedicated task force will provide a comprehensive understanding of 6G's potential and challenges, allowing for strategic planning and policy development to secure America's competitive edge and protect critical infrastructure from foreign adversaries.
Opponents contend
Critics might express concerns that establishing a new task force could lead to bureaucratic inefficiencies or duplicate efforts already underway within the FCC or other federal agencies. Some may also raise questions about the broad discretionary power granted to the FCC Chair in determining which entities are "not trusted," potentially leading to arbitrary exclusions or limiting the diversity of expertise and perspectives on the task force.
The bill is very short and clearly written, making it highly accessible for any reader to understand its provisions and implications quickly.
Section 2(a)
Establishment of the 6G Task Force
This provision mandates the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to establish a task force, to be known as the "6G Task Force," within 120 days after the bill becomes law. This task force is specifically charged with exploring and reporting on sixth-generation wireless technology.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that establishing this task force is a vital step for the United States to proactively engage with and lead in the development of next-generation wireless technologies, ensuring future economic competitiveness and national security.
Critics contend
No specific opposition is typically raised against the establishment of a task force for emerging technology, though some might argue it could be an unnecessary bureaucratic layer if existing FCC divisions are already addressing these issues.
Tradeoffs
The primary tension is between the desire for proactive policy development and the potential for creating new bureaucratic structures that might overlap with existing governmental or private sector initiatives.
Section 2(b) and 2(d)(3)
Task Force Membership and Exclusion of "Not Trusted" Entities
This provision outlines the composition of the 6G Task Force, requiring representation from the communications industry, public interest organizations, academic institutions, and various levels of government (Federal, State, local, Tribal). Crucially, it grants the FCC Chair the authority to exclude any company, organization, or institution deemed "not trusted" if it is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the influence of a foreign adversary, or if it otherwise poses a threat to U.S. national security, using criteria from existing law.
Section 2(c)
6G Technology Report and Public Comment
This provision requires the 6G Task Force to publish a comprehensive report within one year of its establishment. The report must detail the status of industry standards for 6G, identify possible uses and limitations (including supply chain and cybersecurity risks), and suggest strategies for federal, state, local, and tribal governments to leverage 6G technology. A draft of this report must be released for public comment 180 days after the Task Force's establishment, with those comments considered for the final version.
This section defines the term "not trusted" for the purpose of excluding certain entities from the 6G Task Force. It specifies that an entity is "not trusted" if the FCC Chair publicly determines it is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the influence of a foreign adversary, or if the Chair otherwise determines it poses a threat to U.S. national security, using criteria from the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (47 U.S.C. 1601(c)).
Section 2(d)(3)
Why it matters:Defining terms in a dedicated section is standard legislative practice. However, the cross-reference to another Act adds a layer of technicality that makes the full implications of the "not trusted" determination less immediately apparent without consulting external legal text.
Case for: Proponents argue that this specific definition is crucial for protecting national security by explicitly empowering the FCC Chair to prevent entities with ties to foreign adversaries or those posing security risks from influencing critical 6G policy development. It leverages existing legal frameworks for consistency.
Case against: Critics might contend that the broad discretionary power granted to the FCC Chair, especially the "otherwise determines that such entity poses a threat" clause, could be used arbitrarily or for political purposes, potentially excluding legitimate actors and limiting the diversity of expertise on the task force. The reliance on external criteria might also obscure accountability.
Estimated impact: This provision could significantly impact the composition of the 6G Task Force, potentially excluding major global telecommunications players or academic institutions, thereby shaping the perspectives and recommendations of the task force on future U.S. 6G policy and international collaboration.