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Summaries are AI-generated from primary sources. Verify anything important against the original record.

All bills
4 versions
CosmeticWhat changed in REFERRED IN SENATEcompared with ENGROSSED IN HOUSE (Apr 28, 2025)

Technical corrections only. The two versions of H.R. 2458 are substantively identical, with v4 reflecting the bill's procedural status after being passed by the House and referred to the Senate. No substantive policy changes were made between v3 and v4.

H.R. 2458·119th Congress·Introduced Mar 27, 2025

Secure Space Act of 2025

Passed HouseScience, Technology, CommunicationsMajor
View bill text
Sponsor
Rep. Pallone, Frank [D-NJ-6]
Committees
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee (primary)
Last action
Apr 29, 2025

Bottom line

The Secure Space Act of 2025 aims to enhance national security by extending existing prohibitions on untrusted telecommunications vendors to the U.S. satellite communications sector, restricting their access to the market.

What it actually does

This bill amends the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 to prohibit the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from granting licenses or market access for satellite systems (geostationary or nongeostationary orbit) or earth stations if such authorizations would be held or controlled by an entity that produces or provides 'covered communications equipment or service,' or an affiliate of such an entity. It mandates the FCC to issue implementing rules within one year of enactment.

Proponents argue

Proponents argue that this bill is a critical step to safeguard U.S. national security and protect vital space-based communications infrastructure from potential espionage, sabotage, and supply chain vulnerabilities posed by foreign adversaries. They assert that extending existing 'rip and replace' provisions to the satellite domain is necessary to prevent untrusted entities from gaining control over or access to systems essential for national defense, economic stability, and public safety.

Opponents contend

Opponents might contend that while national security is paramount, such broad prohibitions could inadvertently stifle competition and innovation within the rapidly growing satellite industry. They may argue that restricting market access for certain entities could lead to higher costs for satellite operators and consumers, limit technological choices, or complicate international partnerships, potentially hindering the U.S.'s global leadership in space communications.

The bill is concise and straightforward, making it accessible for a quick read. However, a full understanding of its implications requires familiarity with the underlying Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 and the FCC's designations of 'covered communications equipment or service.'

Section 1

Short Title - Secure Space Act of 2025

prominently featuredstraightforward

This section formally names the Act as the 'Secure Space Act of 2025.' This is standard legislative practice and provides a common reference name for the bill.

GroupImpactMechanismScale
GroupGeneral PublicImpactProvides a clear, concise name for the legislation.MechanismScale

Supporters argue

Naming the Act provides clarity and ease of reference for legislative, regulatory, and public discourse.

Critics contend

No specific opposition is typically raised against the short title of a bill, as it is a procedural element.

Tradeoffs

None inherent in the provision of a short title.

Section 2(a) and new Section 10 of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019

Prohibition on Grant of Certain Satellite Licenses, United States Market Access, or Earth Station Authorizations

prominently featuredmoderately complex

This provision prohibits the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from granting licenses for geostationary orbit (GSO) or nongeostationary orbit (NGSO) satellite systems, or authorizations for individually licensed or blanket-licensed earth stations, if the license or authorization would be held or controlled by an entity that produces or provides 'covered communications equipment or service' or an affiliate of such an entity. This extends existing national security restrictions from terrestrial networks to the space domain.

New Section 10(b)

Definitions for Satellite and Earth Station Terms

mentioned in summarystraightforward

This section defines key terms used in the prohibition, including 'blanket-licensed earth station,' 'gateway station,' and 'individually licensed earth station.' These definitions clarify the scope of the earth stations and satellite systems to which the new restrictions apply, ensuring consistent interpretation and application by the FCC.

Section 2(b)

Applicability of Prohibition

buried in fine printstraightforward

This section specifies that the new prohibition on granting licenses, petitions for market access, or authorizations applies to any such grants made on or after the date the Act is enacted into law. This clarifies the effective date of the new regulatory regime.

Section 2(c)

FCC Rulemaking Requirement

buried in fine printstraightforward

This section mandates that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) must issue rules to implement the new prohibition within one year after the Act's enactment date. This ensures that the statutory prohibition is translated into clear, enforceable regulatory guidelines and procedures.

FOUND

The core prohibition of the bill relies entirely on the definition of 'covered communications equipment or service' as established in the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019. This term is not defined within H.R. 2458 itself.

New Section 10(a)(1)

Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to amend existing law and rely on its established definitions, avoiding redundancy and maintaining consistency across related statutes. However, it means the full scope of the bill is not immediately apparent from its text alone.

Case for: Supporters argue that referencing existing law streamlines the legislative process and ensures that the new prohibitions align perfectly with the established framework for identifying and addressing national security risks in communications networks. It leverages prior FCC determinations and avoids creating conflicting definitions.

Case against: Critics might argue that by not explicitly defining the term within the bill, it makes the legislation less transparent and accessible to the public and industry stakeholders who may not be intimately familiar with the nuances of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019. This could lead to confusion or a lack of immediate clarity regarding the bill's true impact.

Estimated impact: The definition of 'covered communications equipment or service' is fundamental to the bill's entire purpose, as it determines which entities are subject to the prohibition. Its scope directly dictates the effectiveness and reach of the national security measures.

About this analysis. AI-Generated from the official bill text and available committee reports. Gaps in available data are noted explicitly. Verify important details with the official Congress.gov record.

On this page

  • Executive summary
  • Key provisions
  • Buried treasure
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  • Critical analysis
  • Questions to ask
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