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Summaries are AI-generated from primary sources. Verify anything important against the original record.

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3 versions
CosmeticWhat changed in REFERRED IN SENATEcompared with ENGROSSED IN HOUSE (Sep 2, 2025)

Technical corrections only. The only change between v2 and v3 is the addition of the Clerk's name, "KEVIN F. MCCUMBER," to the attestation line. There are no substantive policy changes in the bill text.

H.R. 2503·119th Congress·Introduced Mar 31, 2025

Undersea Cable Control Act

Passed HouseInternational AffairsMajor
View bill text
Sponsor
Rep. Kean, Thomas H. [R-NJ-7]
Committees
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee (primary)
Last action
Sep 3, 2025

Bottom line

The bill aims to secure critical undersea cable infrastructure by restricting foreign adversaries' access to necessary components and technologies through a coordinated national and international strategy, enhancing national security and protecting global communications.

What it actually does

This bill mandates the President, acting through the Secretary of Commerce and in coordination with the Secretary of State, to develop a comprehensive strategy to prevent foreign adversaries from acquiring goods and technologies essential for supporting undersea cables. The strategy must identify critical items, existing export controls, allied market share, and efforts to promote U.S. leadership in international standards. It also requires seeking international agreements with allies to unify export controls and directs the Secretary of Commerce to evaluate and implement appropriate export controls for identified items.

Proponents argue

Supporters argue that this bill is a critical national security measure designed to protect vital undersea communication infrastructure from exploitation by foreign adversaries. They contend that restricting access to key technologies and fostering international cooperation will safeguard global data flows, maintain U.S. technological leadership, and counter hostile influence in a strategically important domain.

Opponents contend

Opponents or those with concerns might argue that while the intent is valid, the bill's implementation could lead to significant diplomatic challenges in securing broad international consensus, especially regarding penalty provisions. They might also raise concerns about potential economic impacts on U.S. and allied companies due to stringent export controls, which could disrupt global supply chains or reduce competitiveness if not carefully managed.

The bill is concise and its provisions are clearly laid out, making it accessible for an informed reader to understand its core objectives and mechanisms within a short timeframe.

Section 2(a)

Mandate for Undersea Cable Control Strategy

prominently featuredstraightforward

This provision requires the President, primarily through the Secretary of Commerce and in coordination with the Secretary of State, to develop a strategy. The purpose of this strategy is to prevent foreign adversaries from obtaining the goods and technologies needed to support undersea cables, aligning with existing U.S. export control policy.

GroupImpactMechanismScale
GroupU.S. government agencies (Commerce, State)ImpactIncreased responsibility and workloadMechanismMandate to develop a comprehensive strategyScaleSignificant
GroupForeign adversariesImpactRestricted access to critical technologiesMechanismTargeted strategy to eliminate availabilityScaleHigh

Supporters argue

Proponents argue that this mandate is essential for proactively addressing national security threats posed by foreign adversaries seeking to compromise or control critical undersea communication infrastructure.

Critics contend

No specific opposition is typically raised against the general concept of developing a national security strategy, though concerns might arise regarding the scope or implementation details.

Tradeoffs

The primary tension involves balancing the urgency of national security with the administrative burden and potential diplomatic complexities of developing such a strategy.

Section 2(b)

Required Elements of the Strategy

prominently featuredmoderately complex

This section details seven specific components that must be included in the strategy. These range from identifying the critical items for undersea cables and existing export controls, to assessing the market share of U.S. allies, describing international negotiations, identifying foreign adversary entities, and outlining efforts to promote U.S. leadership in international standards-setting bodies.

Section 2(c)

Annual Report to Congress

mentioned in summarystraightforward

This provision requires the President to submit a report containing the strategy to relevant congressional committees within 180 days of the bill's enactment, and annually thereafter for three years. These reports must be unclassified, though they may include a classified annex, and must be made publicly available on a federal government website.

Section 2(d)

International Agreement Mandate

prominently featuredmoderately complex

Within one year of enactment, the President is directed to seek bilateral or multilateral agreements with U.S. allies. The goal of these agreements is to eliminate the availability of critical undersea cable items to foreign adversaries, and they must include penalty provisions for noncompliance. The President is also required to provide regular briefings to Congress on these negotiations.

Section 2(e)

Evaluation and Control of Export Items

prominently featuredhighly complex

This section directs the Secretary of Commerce to evaluate the export, reexport, and in-country transfer of identified items for appropriate controls under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). This includes considering whether to add these technologies to the Commerce Control List (CCL). The policy emphasizes considering end uses and end users, and controlling exports to embargoed countries. Annual notifications to Congress detailing evaluation results and rationales are also required.

About this analysis. AI-Generated from the official bill text and available committee reports. Gaps in available data are noted explicitly. Verify important details with the official Congress.gov record.

On this page

  • Executive summary
  • Key provisions
  • Follow the money
  • Critical analysis
  • Questions to ask
  • Implementation
  • Political analysis
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