4 versions

CosmeticWhat changed in REFERRED IN SENATEcompared with ENGROSSED IN HOUSE (Jun 9, 2025)

Technical corrections only. The only change between v3 and v4 is the addition of the Clerk's name, "KEVIN F. MCCUMBER," in the attestation section. No substantive policy changes were made to the bill's provisions.

H.R. 252119th CongressIntroduced Jan 9, 2025

Secure Our Ports Act of 2025

Passed HouseTransportation and Public WorksMajor

View bill text

Sponsor: Rep. Calvert, Ken [R-CA-41]
Committees: Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee (primary)
Last action: Jun 10, 2025

Bottom line

The bill aims to bolster national security by preventing adversarial foreign governments from controlling or operating critical U.S. port infrastructure.

What it actually does

This bill prohibits owners or operators of U.S. port facilities requiring a federal security plan from entering into contracts for the ownership, leasing, or operation of such facilities with state-owned enterprises from China, Russia, North Korea, or Iran. It also extends this prohibition to any foreign entity that has any percentage of ownership by one of these four countries.

Proponents argue

Supporters argue this bill is a vital national security measure, preventing foreign adversaries from gaining access to or control over strategic U.S. maritime infrastructure, thereby safeguarding supply chains and military readiness. They emphasize the risks of espionage, sabotage, and economic coercion posed by state-owned entities from these countries, making a broad prohibition essential.

Opponents contend

Opponents might argue that such a broad prohibition, particularly the 'any percentage' ownership clause, could limit competition, increase operational costs for ports, and potentially strain diplomatic relations with countries that have legitimate commercial interests, even if state-owned. Some might also contend that existing security protocols are sufficient or that the bill's scope is overly broad, potentially impacting legitimate business operations.

The bill text is exceptionally short and straightforward, allowing for quick comprehension of its core provisions.

Section 2(a), adding new section 70015 to title 46, United States Code.

Prohibition on Certain Contracts for Port Operation and Management

prominently featuredstraightforward

This provision makes it illegal for any owner or operator of a U.S. port facility that requires a federal security plan to enter into new contracts for the ownership, leasing, or operation of that facility with specific foreign entities. These prohibited entities include state-owned enterprises from China, Russia, North Korea, or Iran, as well as any foreign entity that has any percentage of ownership by one of these four countries. The intent is to prevent adversarial nations from gaining control or influence over critical maritime infrastructure.

GroupImpactMechanismScale

GroupU.S. Port Owners and OperatorsImpactRestricted contracting options and increased due diligence requirements for vetting potential partners.MechanismDirect legal prohibition on certain types of contracts for ownership, leasing, or operation of facilities.ScaleAffects all facilities requiring a security plan under 46 U.S.C. 70103(c), which includes most major U.S. ports and terminals.

GroupChinese, Russian, North Korean, and Iranian State-Owned EnterprisesImpactProhibited from owning, leasing, or operating U.S. port facilities.MechanismDirect legal prohibition, effectively excluding them from this sector of the U.S. economy.ScaleComplete exclusion from a specific, strategic sector of the U.S. economy.

GroupForeign entities with any ownership from listed countriesImpactProhibited from owning, leasing, or operating U.S. port facilities, regardless of the percentage of state ownership.MechanismDirect legal prohibition based on ownership structure.ScaleComplete exclusion, potentially impacting a broader range of private companies with even minor state-linked investment.

Supporters argue

Supporters argue this provision directly addresses a critical national security vulnerability by preventing adversarial nations from controlling strategic infrastructure. They assert that even minority ownership by state-linked entities could provide avenues for intelligence gathering, disruption, or sabotage, making a broad prohibition necessary to protect national interests.

Critics contend

Critics might contend that the 'any percentage' ownership clause is overly broad and could inadvertently penalize legitimate private businesses with minor, indirect state investment, leading to unnecessary economic friction and limiting potential investment in port infrastructure. They might also argue that existing security review mechanisms, such as CFIUS, are sufficient.

Tradeoffs

The bill balances national security concerns against potential impacts on international trade, foreign investment, and the operational flexibility of U.S. port facilities. It prioritizes a maximalist approach to security by accepting potential economic costs or diplomatic complexities arising from broad prohibitions.

About this analysis. AI-Generated from the official bill text and available committee reports. Gaps in available data are noted explicitly. Verify important details with the official Congress.gov record.