No Paydays for Hostage-Takers Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Baumgartner, Michael [R-WA-5]
- Committees
- Foreign Affairs Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Apr 9, 2025
Bottom line
This bill aims to increase transparency and accountability regarding Iranian funds and hostage-taking, while also tightening restrictions on Iranian diplomatic presence and U.S. travel to Iran, in an effort to deter hostile state actors.
What it actually does
This bill mandates several reports from the President and Secretary of State on Iranian funds, sanctions under the Robert Levinson Hostage Recovery and Hostage-Taking Accountability Act, and international efforts to freeze Iranian assets. It also seeks to restrict travel for Iranian diplomats at the UN and requires a determination on invalidating US passports for travel to Iran, aiming to deter hostage-taking by Iran and other adversaries.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that the bill strengthens the U.S. stance against state-sponsored hostage-taking, particularly by Iran, by increasing oversight of financial transactions, ensuring sanctions are applied, and limiting diplomatic privileges for a regime with a history of such actions. They believe it sends a strong message that there will be "no paydays for hostage-takers" and enhances national security by deterring wrongful detentions.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that some provisions could complicate delicate diplomatic efforts to secure the release of hostages, potentially escalating tensions rather than resolving them. They might also raise concerns about the practical implications of restricting diplomatic travel, suggesting it could hinder necessary international engagement, or that the measures could be seen as overly aggressive and counterproductive to broader foreign policy goals.
The bill is relatively short and its provisions are clearly laid out, making it accessible for an informed reader to evaluate within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 1
Short Title
This section establishes the official short title of the Act as the "No Paydays for Hostage-Takers Act," which is how the bill would be commonly referred to if enacted.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that a clear and concise short title helps communicate the bill's core purpose and intent to the public and policymakers, emphasizing the goal of preventing financial gains for those who engage in hostage-taking.
Critics contend
No specific opposition is typically raised against short titles, as they are administrative in nature.
Sections 2 and 3
Congressional Findings and Statement of Policy
These sections lay out Congress's understanding of Iran's history of hostage-taking, referencing the Robert Levinson Hostage Recovery and Hostage-Taking Accountability Act. They then declare it U.S. policy to take additional actions and impose strict penalties to deter Iran and other hostile actors from wrongful detention of U.S. nationals.
Section 4
Oversight of Restricted Iranian Funds in Qatar
This section requires the President to submit a report every 180 days for six years on the $6 billion in Iranian funds transferred to restricted accounts in Qatar. The report must itemize transactions, detail the funds' status, and describe the U.S. Government's review process. It also requires certifications on whether funds have been used for non-humanitarian purposes or enabled increased Iranian spending on defense, intelligence, or malign activities.
Section 5
Enhanced Review and Reporting on Levinson Act Sanctions
This section mandates that the President annually review all cases of hostage-taking or wrongful detention of U.S. nationals by or at the direction of Iran over the preceding 10 years. Based on credible evidence, the President must determine if any foreign person is responsible or complicit in such acts or provides support for them. A subsequent report must identify these persons and state whether sanctions under the Robert Levinson Act have been or will be imposed, or provide a justification for any waivers or non-application of sanctions.
Section 6
Restrictions on Iranian Diplomatic Travel to the U.S.
This section amends existing law to explicitly include individuals sanctioned under Executive Orders 13224 (terrorism) or 13382 (WMD proliferation) as of the bill's enactment date as grounds for denying admission to the U.S. as a representative to the United Nations. It also includes a Sense of Congress that Iran's malign activities should be a primary consideration for limiting travel for Iranian diplomats and their families. The President is required to report annually on actions taken to restrict such travel.
Section 7
Transparency on Global Blocked Iranian Assets
This section requires the President to submit an annual report for three years, listing identifiable Iranian assets valued over $100,000 that have been blocked or frozen globally in the prior two years. It also requires reporting on any changes to the status of these assets (e.g., unblocking, unfreezing, transferring) and a justification for any U.S. Government actions related to such changes.
Section 8
International Coordination on Freezing and Seizing Iranian Assets
This section expresses a Sense of Congress that the Secretaries of State and Treasury and the Attorney General should lead a coordinated international effort to find, restrain, freeze, and where legally authorized, seize assets of individuals and entities sanctioned for Iran's malign activities. It also calls for working with foreign governments to share intelligence, oversee assets, and provide technical assistance for asset forfeitures. The President is required to report annually on these actions for three years.
Section 9
Consideration of U.S. Passport Invalidity for Travel to Iran
This section includes findings on the Secretary of State's authority to restrict passport use for travel to dangerous areas, citing the precedent of North Korea. It expresses a Sense of Congress that the Secretary should declare U.S. passports invalid for travel to Iran due to the imminent danger of wrongful detention or hostage-taking. The Secretary of State is then required to annually determine and report for three years whether travel to Iran presents such a danger and whether this authority is being exercised.
Section 10
National Strategy to Deter Hostage-Taking
This section requires the President to develop and submit to Congress, within 180 days of enactment, a comprehensive strategy to deter and prevent wrongful detention and hostage-taking by U.S. adversaries. This strategy must identify penalties, outline clear U.S. Government policies barring ransom payments or transactions viewed as ransom, and detail plans for coordination with allies and partners.
Amends Section 407(a)(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (8 U.S.C. 1102 note) to add individuals sanctioned under Executive Orders 13224 (terrorism) or 13382 (WMD proliferation) as of the enactment date to the list of persons for whom the President can deny admission to the U.S. as a UN representative.
Section 6(c)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice for modifying existing law rather than rewriting it entirely.
Case for: Proponents argue this technical amendment directly strengthens the legal basis for denying visas to individuals involved in terrorism or WMD proliferation, closing a potential loophole and enhancing national security.
Case against: Critics might argue that such amendments, while technical, can have significant diplomatic consequences and should be more explicitly highlighted if they are intended to change the scope of who can be denied entry.
Estimated impact: This change directly impacts a specific, likely small, number of Iranian individuals who are already sanctioned under the specified Executive Orders and seek to enter the U.S. for UN activities.