A substantive expansion of prohibitions and enforcement. v2 introduces a direct prohibition on foreign states and sovereign wealth funds providing or receiving monetary support for litigation, adding new enforcement mechanisms like dismissal with prejudice. It also broadens disclosure requirements to cover direct monetary support, not just contingent agreements, and refines the definition of sovereign wealth funds.
Protecting Our Courts from Foreign Manipulation Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Cline, Ben [R-VA-6]
- Committees
- Judiciary Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Jun 15, 2026
Bottom line
This bill aims to prevent foreign governments and their investment arms from influencing U.S. litigation through undisclosed financial backing, enhancing transparency and imposing strict prohibitions on such funding.
What it actually does
H.R. 2675, the "Protecting Our Courts from Foreign Manipulation Act," amends title 28 of the U.S. Code to prohibit foreign states and sovereign wealth funds from directly or indirectly providing monetary support for civil actions in which they are not named parties. It also mandates extensive disclosure requirements for any foreign person, foreign state, or sovereign wealth fund providing third-party litigation funding, requiring parties and counsel to certify the source of funds and produce relevant documentation to the court, other parties, and the Attorney General. Violations can lead to severe penalties, including dismissal of the civil action.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that undisclosed foreign third-party litigation funding poses a significant national security risk and undermines the integrity of the U.S. judicial system by allowing foreign adversaries to influence legal outcomes without accountability. They contend that transparency is essential to ensure that U.S. courts are not used as instruments of foreign policy or economic warfare, and that prohibiting funding from foreign states and sovereign wealth funds directly addresses this vulnerability.
Opponents contend
Critics might argue that the bill could stifle access to justice for plaintiffs who rely on third-party funding, particularly in complex cases where litigation costs are high. They might also contend that the broad disclosure requirements could be overly burdensome, potentially chilling legitimate foreign investment in legal finance or creating an uneven playing field if domestic funding remains unregulated. Some may also question the scope of "foreign person" and whether it inadvertently captures entities that pose no national security threat.
The bill is relatively short and its core provisions are clear, making it accessible for an informed reader to evaluate its key impacts within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 2(a), adding 28 U.S.C. 1660(a)(1)
Direct Funding Prohibition
This provision makes it illegal for any foreign state or sovereign wealth fund to provide money, directly or indirectly, to support a civil lawsuit in which it is not a named party. It also makes it illegal for any party or lawyer in a civil action to receive such funding from these entities.
Supporters argue
Proponents argue this directly addresses national security concerns by preventing foreign governments from covertly influencing U.S. legal proceedings, which could be used to advance their strategic interests or undermine U.S. economic and political stability.
Critics contend
Opponents might argue that this blanket prohibition is overly broad and could prevent legitimate foreign investment in legal finance, potentially limiting access to justice for some litigants who rely on such funding.
Tradeoffs
Balances national security concerns and judicial integrity against potential impacts on the legal finance market and access to justice.
Section 2(a), adding 28 U.S.C. 1660(a)(2)
Contingent Payment Sourcing Prohibition
This provision makes it unlawful for any party or counsel to enter into an agreement where someone other than the named parties or counsel receives a payment contingent on the outcome of a civil action (or a portfolio of actions) if that payment is directly or indirectly sourced, in whole or in part, from a foreign state or sovereign wealth fund.
Section 2(a), adding 28 U.S.C. 1660(b)
Consequences of Violation
If a funding agreement violates the prohibitions, it is declared "null and void." If a plaintiff uses prohibited foreign funding, the civil action must be dismissed with prejudice. Furthermore, any final judgment obtained using such funding may be challenged and relieved under Rule 60(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows relief from judgment due to fraud or misconduct.
Section 2(a), adding 28 U.S.C. 1660(c)(1)(A)
Mandatory Disclosure of Foreign Funding
In any civil action, each party or their counsel must disclose in writing to the court, all other parties, the Attorney General, and the Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General for National Security the name, address, and citizenship/country of incorporation for any foreign person, foreign state, or sovereign wealth fund that has provided or agreed to provide direct/indirect monetary support, or has a contingent right to payment from the action or a portfolio of actions. If a certification of foreign sourcing is made, the source's details must also be disclosed.
Section 2(a), adding 28 U.S.C. 1660(c)(1)(B)
Documentation Production Requirement
Parties or counsel must produce copies of any documentation related to the disclosed monetary support or contingent payment agreements to the court, other parties, the Attorney General, and the Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General for National Security, unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court.
Section 2(a), adding 28 U.S.C. 1660(c)(1)(C)
Foreign Source Certification
For any civil action involving foreign third-party funding or contingent payment agreements, parties or counsel must submit a certification to the court. This certification must state either that the money has been or will be directly or indirectly sourced, in whole or in part, from a foreign person, foreign state, or sovereign wealth fund (including monetary amounts), OR that these disclosure and certification criteria do not apply to the action.
Section 2(a), adding 28 U.S.C. 1660(c)(2) & (3)
Disclosure Procedures
Disclosures and certifications must be made within 30 days of initial funding or agreement execution, or by the date the civil action is filed, whichever is later. For parties joined later, it's 30 days after joining. All disclosures must be declarations under penalty of perjury, made to the best knowledge after reasonable inquiry, and provided to all relevant parties and government officials. They must also be supplemented or corrected within 30 days of discovering any material inaccuracy or incompleteness.
Section 2(a), adding 28 U.S.C. 1660(d)
Sanctions for Non-Compliance
Failure to make required disclosures, productions, or certifications is treated as a violation of Rule 26(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, making it subject to the sanctions provisions of Rule 37. These sanctions can include prohibiting the use of undisclosed information, monetary penalties, or even dismissal of the case.
Section 3
Annual Report on Foreign Third-Party Funding
The Attorney General is required to submit an annual report to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. This report must detail activities involving foreign third-party litigation funding in Federal courts, including identities of funders and sources, judicial districts involved, estimated total amounts of foreign-sourced money, and a summary of the subject matters of cases receiving such funding.
Section 4
Retroactive and Prospective Application
The amendments made by this Act apply to any civil action that is pending on the date the Act is enacted, or any civil action commenced on or after that date.
Defines "foreign person" by reference to section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801), which includes any person who is not a U.S. citizen or permanent resident, and any entity not incorporated in the U.S.
Section 2(a), adding 28 U.S.C. 1660(e)(1)(A)
Why it matters:It is standard legislative practice to use existing definitions for consistency across statutes, but it requires external research to fully understand the broad scope of entities captured by this definition.
Case for: Proponents argue that using an established national security definition ensures a comprehensive approach to identifying foreign involvement and leverages existing legal frameworks to capture a wide array of non-U.S. entities.
Case against: Critics might argue that this broad definition, originally designed for intelligence gathering, is overly expansive for civil litigation funding and could capture many legitimate foreign investors, creating unnecessary burdens and potential privacy concerns for entities posing no national security threat.
Estimated impact: Significantly broadens the scope of entities subject to disclosure requirements beyond just state-affiliated actors, impacting a large segment of international legal finance and potentially many private foreign individuals and businesses.