Advancing GETs Act of 2025
- Sponsor
- Rep. Castor, Kathy [D-FL-14]
- Committees
- Energy and Commerce Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Apr 8, 2025
Bottom line
The Advancing GETs Act aims to accelerate the deployment of grid-enhancing technologies by offering financial incentives and improving data transparency and technical support for their adoption, ultimately seeking to modernize and optimize the electric grid.
What it actually does
This bill mandates the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to establish a shared savings incentive program for developers who invest in grid-enhancing technologies (GETs). It requires FERC to return 10-25% of the savings generated by these technologies to the developer over a three-year period, provided the expected savings are at least four times the investment cost. Additionally, the bill requires transmission operators to report congestion data annually, directs FERC and the Department of Energy to map these congestion costs, and tasks the Secretary of Energy with creating an application guide and technical assistance clearinghouse for GETs.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that the bill will incentivize crucial investments in grid modernization, leading to increased grid capacity, efficiency, and reliability without the need for extensive new transmission line construction. They contend that GETs can unlock existing grid potential, reduce congestion costs, lower consumer electricity bills, and integrate more renewable energy sources faster. The shared savings mechanism ensures that developers are rewarded for delivering tangible benefits, while the data reporting and technical assistance provisions will further streamline adoption and demonstrate the value of these technologies.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that the shared savings incentive could lead to inflated savings estimates or create a complex regulatory burden for FERC. Concerns could be raised about the potential for utilities to pass on the incentive costs to consumers without sufficient oversight, or that the 10-25% return might be an excessive reward for technologies that should be adopted as standard practice. Some might also contend that while GETs are beneficial, they are not a substitute for larger, long-term transmission infrastructure investments and that this bill might distract from that greater need.
The bill is relatively short and clearly structured, making it accessible for an informed reader to understand its core provisions within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 3
Establishment of Shared Savings Incentive
This provision requires FERC to create a program within 18 months that gives a financial reward to companies that install grid-enhancing technologies (GETs). The reward will be 10-25% of the cost savings generated by the GET, paid back over three years. To qualify, the expected savings must be at least four times the initial investment cost. This aims to encourage faster adoption of these efficiency-boosting technologies.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this incentive is crucial to overcome the financial hurdles and risk aversion that currently slow GET adoption. By directly linking developer compensation to demonstrated savings, it ensures that only effective technologies are rewarded, ultimately benefiting the grid and consumers through lower costs and improved reliability.
Critics contend
Critics might contend that the incentive could lead to inflated savings projections or that the percentage return is too high, potentially shifting costs to consumers without sufficient justification. They may also argue that the market should naturally drive GET adoption if the benefits are truly substantial.
Tradeoffs
The provision balances the need to incentivize innovation and investment in grid modernization against concerns about potential over-compensation for developers and the ultimate impact on consumer rates.
Section 3(e)(1)
4x Savings-to-Cost Ratio
This limitation specifies that an investment in grid-enhancing technology (GET) is only eligible for the shared savings incentive if the expected savings generated by the GET over a three-year period are at least four times greater than the initial cost of the investment. FERC is responsible for defining how these costs and savings are quantified, including permitting, installation, and purchase costs.
Section 4
Annual Congestion Cost Reporting
Starting one year after FERC finalizes a new rule, all operators of transmission facilities must submit annual reports to FERC. These reports must detail the costs associated with managing congestion on their transmission systems, including specific constraints that cost over $500,000. The reports need to identify the cause of these constraints and any planned upgrades to address them. FERC will also establish a universal metric for this reporting.
Section 4(c) and (d)
Joint FERC-DOE Congestion Map and Data Publication
FERC and the Department of Energy (DOE) are jointly required to use the collected congestion data to create and annually update a public map showing congestion management costs across the transmission system. Both the raw data and the map will be made publicly available on the websites of FERC and DOE.
Section 5
DOE GET Application Guide and Clearinghouse
The Secretary of Energy must establish an application guide within 18 months to help utilities and developers implement grid-enhancing technologies (GETs). This guide will be updated annually. The Secretary will also provide technical assistance upon request and create a clearinghouse of past GET projects to share lessons learned and solutions for specific applications.
Requires the Commission (FERC) to determine appropriate consumer protections for the shared savings incentive established under the bill.
Section 3(e)(3)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to grant regulatory agencies discretion in implementing specific safeguards rather than codifying every detail in statute. It ensures flexibility for FERC to adapt protections as needed.
Case for: Proponents would argue that this provision is essential to ensure that the financial incentives for GET developers do not inadvertently lead to higher costs for consumers. It empowers FERC, as the expert regulator, to design safeguards that balance innovation with ratepayer interests.
Case against: Critics might argue that the lack of specific statutory guidance on consumer protections could allow FERC too much latitude, potentially leading to weaker protections than necessary. They might prefer more explicit directives from Congress to ensure consumer interests are robustly defended.
Estimated impact: This provision has a potentially significant impact on the financial outcomes for electricity consumers, as the nature and strength of these protections will determine how the costs and benefits of GET incentives are ultimately distributed.