2 versions

CosmeticWhat changed in REPORTED IN HOUSEcompared with INTRODUCED IN HOUSE (May 15, 2025)

Technical corrections only. The two versions of H.R. 3446 are substantively identical, with v2 reflecting the bill being reported in the House and including associated legislative metadata such as the Union Calendar number and report number. No policy changes were made between v1 and v2.

H.R. 3446119th CongressIntroduced May 15, 2025

FDIC Board Accountability Act

Reported To HouseFinance and Financial SectorMajor

View bill text

Sponsor: Rep. Huizenga, Bill [R-MI-4]
Committees: Financial Services Committee (primary)
Last action: Sep 8, 2025

Bottom line

This bill restructures the FDIC Board by reducing voting members, adding specific expertise requirements for appointed members, and making the BCFP Director a non-voting observer, alongside imposing term limits.

What it actually does

This bill amends the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to alter the composition of the FDIC Board of Directors. It reduces the number of Presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed members from three to two, while adding specific experience requirements for these two members, mandating one have State bank supervisory experience and another have experience supervising institutions under $10 billion in total assets. It also converts the Director of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (BCFP) from a voting member to a non-voting observer and imposes term limits on appointed members.

Proponents argue

Proponents would likely argue that these changes enhance the FDIC Board's expertise, particularly regarding smaller institutions and state-chartered banks, ensuring more relevant oversight. They might also contend that term limits promote fresh perspectives and accountability, while making the BCFP Director a non-voting observer streamlines decision-making and focuses the Board on core deposit insurance functions.

Opponents contend

Opponents might argue that reducing the number of Presidentially-appointed voting members could diminish the Board's overall independence or broad perspective. They might also contend that removing the BCFP Director's voting status could weaken consumer protection advocacy within the FDIC's decision-making process, especially concerning issues impacting consumers and financial stability.

The bill is very concise, allowing for a quick and thorough review by any interested reader.

Section 2(1)(A) and (B) amending 12 U.S.C. 1812(a)(1)

Changes to Appointed Board Members and Expertise Requirements

prominently featuredstraightforward

This provision amends the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to change the composition of the FDIC Board. It reduces the number of Presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed members from three to two. Crucially, it mandates that one of these two appointed members must have State bank supervisory experience, and the other must have demonstrated primary experience working in or supervising depository institutions with less than $10 billion in total assets.

GroupImpactMechanismScale

GroupFDIC Board of DirectorsImpactChanges composition and expertise requirements for appointed members.MechanismStatutory amendment to membership criteria.ScaleDirect impact on board structure and qualifications.

GroupState-chartered banksImpactIncreased representation of state bank supervisory experience on the board.MechanismMandated experience for an appointed member.ScaleIndirect influence on regulatory perspective and policy considerations.

GroupCommunity banks (under $10 billion in assets)ImpactEnsures direct experience with smaller institutions on the board.MechanismMandated experience for an appointed member.ScaleIndirect influence on regulatory perspective and policy considerations.

Supporters argue

Supporters argue that these specific experience requirements will ensure the FDIC Board has a deeper understanding of the unique challenges and regulatory needs of state-chartered banks and smaller community institutions, leading to more informed and effective policymaking.

Critics contend

Critics might argue that narrowing the required expertise for appointed members could limit the pool of qualified candidates or potentially overemphasize specific segments of the banking industry at the expense of broader financial system considerations.

Tradeoffs

The tension lies between ensuring specialized expertise for specific banking sectors and maintaining a broad, holistic perspective on the entire financial system within the FDIC's governance.

Section 2(1)(B) adding 12 U.S.C. 1812(a)(3)

Director of Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection as Non-Voting Observer

prominently featuredstraightforward

This provision changes the role of the Director of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (BCFP) on the FDIC Board. Previously a voting member, the BCFP Director will now serve as a non-voting observer, meaning they can attend meetings and participate in discussions but cannot cast a vote on Board decisions.

Section 2(2)(A) and (B) amending 12 U.S.C. 1812(c)

Imposition of Term Limits for Appointed Board Members

prominently featuredstraightforward

This provision introduces new term limits for appointed members of the FDIC Board of Directors. It states that no individual may be appointed for more than two terms, and no person shall serve as a member for more than twelve years in total, regardless of whether those years constitute full terms or partial terms.

About this analysis. AI-Generated from the official bill text and available committee reports. Gaps in available data are noted explicitly. Verify important details with the official Congress.gov record.

CosmeticWhat changed in REPORTED IN HOUSEcompared with INTRODUCED IN HOUSE (May 15, 2025)

H.R. 3446119th CongressIntroduced May 15, 2025

FDIC Board Accountability Act

Reported To HouseFinance and Financial SectorMajor

View bill text

Sponsor: Rep. Huizenga, Bill [R-MI-4]
Committees: Financial Services Committee (primary)
Last action: Sep 8, 2025

Bottom line

What it actually does

Proponents argue

Opponents contend

The bill is very concise, allowing for a quick and thorough review by any interested reader.

Section 2(1)(A) and (B) amending 12 U.S.C. 1812(a)(1)

Changes to Appointed Board Members and Expertise Requirements

prominently featuredstraightforward

GroupImpactMechanismScale

Supporters argue

Critics contend

Tradeoffs

The tension lies between ensuring specialized expertise for specific banking sectors and maintaining a broad, holistic perspective on the entire financial system within the FDIC's governance.

Section 2(1)(B) adding 12 U.S.C. 1812(a)(3)

Director of Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection as Non-Voting Observer

prominently featuredstraightforward

Section 2(2)(A) and (B) amending 12 U.S.C. 1812(c)

Imposition of Term Limits for Appointed Board Members

prominently featuredstraightforward