One Agency Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Cline, Ben [R-VA-6]
- Committees
- Judiciary Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Jan 14, 2025
Bottom line
The 'One Agency Act' aims to streamline federal antitrust enforcement by eliminating the dual jurisdiction of the DOJ and FTC, centralizing all such powers within the Attorney General's office.
What it actually does
This bill proposes to consolidate all federal antitrust enforcement authority under the Department of Justice (DOJ) by transferring the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) antitrust functions, including ongoing investigations, litigation, personnel, assets, and funding, to the Attorney General. It establishes a transition period during which the FTC's antitrust activities would be phased out and restricts the FTC from initiating new antitrust actions.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that the bill will promote more vigorous, effective, and efficient enforcement of antitrust laws by ending the overlapping jurisdiction between the DOJ and FTC. They contend that this consolidation will reduce wasted taxpayer resources, streamline enforcement efforts, and eliminate uncertainty for businesses and consumers by assigning primary federal responsibility to a single, best-suited entity, the Department of Justice.
Opponents contend
Opponents would likely argue that consolidating antitrust enforcement under a single agency eliminates the benefits of dual enforcement, such as diverse perspectives, specialized expertise, and the ability to pursue different types of cases. They might contend that it could lead to a loss of the FTC's unique administrative enforcement capabilities and consumer protection focus, potentially increasing the risk of political influence over enforcement decisions and disrupting ongoing cases during the transition.
The bill is relatively short and clearly structured, making it accessible for an informed reader to understand its core provisions and implications within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 4(a)
Transfer of Antitrust Enforcement Functions
This provision mandates the transfer of all Federal Trade Commission (FTC) antitrust actions, employees, assets, and funding to the Attorney General. The transfer is to occur by the end of a transition period, which can last up to one year and 180 days, with the Attorney General determining specific transfer dates to minimize disruption.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this transfer is essential for creating a single, unified federal antitrust enforcement body, which will eliminate redundant efforts, reduce inter-agency friction, and lead to more efficient and consistent application of antitrust laws.
Critics contend
Critics might argue that centralizing all antitrust power in the DOJ removes a valuable check and balance provided by dual enforcement. They may also raise concerns about the potential loss of the FTC's unique administrative law judge process and specialized economic expertise.
Tradeoffs
The bill trades the potential benefits of dual agency expertise and administrative enforcement flexibility for the perceived efficiency and clarity of a single enforcement authority.
Section 4(a)(3)
Personnel Assignment and DOJ Restructuring Authority
This section specifies that all transferred FTC antitrust employees will be assigned to the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. Crucially, it grants the Attorney General the authority to restructure the Antitrust Division as deemed appropriate to efficiently carry out the expanded antitrust enforcement responsibilities before the transition period expires.
Section 4(a)(4)
Handling of Ongoing Antitrust Actions and Consent Decrees
This provision details how existing FTC antitrust investigations, studies, litigations, and administrative proceedings will be transferred to and assumed by the Attorney General. It also specifies that the Attorney General will gain sole authority over FTC consent decrees after the transition period. Importantly, the FTC may, with the Attorney General's consent, deputize former FTC antitrust employees to continue specific ongoing administrative actions or court cases, and to enforce/negotiate modifications of existing consent decrees.
Section 4(a)(5)
Attorney General's Authority to Conduct Investigative Studies and Require Reports
This section grants the Attorney General the power to require persons, partnerships, and corporations engaged in or affecting commerce to file annual or special reports, or answers to specific questions, regarding their organization, business, conduct, and relation to other entities. These reports must pertain solely to competition or antitrust laws. The Attorney General is also authorized to publish information obtained, with a prohibition against disclosing trade secrets or confidential commercial/financial information, except to authorized law enforcement agencies.
Section 4(b)
Restrictions on FTC During Transition Period
Beginning on the effective date, the FTC is prohibited from hiring or assigning employees to an FTC antitrust unit, opening new antitrust investigations or matters, or initiating new FTC antitrust actions. The FTC also cannot enter into consent decrees, settlement agreements, or otherwise resolve FTC antitrust actions without the Attorney General's approval during this period. However, the Attorney General may deputize FTC antitrust employees to investigate or prosecute alleged antitrust violations on behalf of the AG during the transition.
Section 5(e)
Limitations on Future FTC Actions
This provision explicitly states that, notwithstanding any other law, the FTC shall not open new investigations or begin enforcement actions related to antitrust laws or unfair methods of competition under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, except as specifically allowed in the Act with the Attorney General's approval, and only relating to investigations, litigation, appeals, or consent decrees that were ongoing or in place before the effective date.
The bill allows the FTC to 'deputize former FTC antitrust employees, with the consent of the Attorney General,' to continue specific ongoing administrative actions, court cases, and to enforce or negotiate modifications of existing FTC consent decrees.
Section 4(a)(4)(B)(ii), (C)(ii), (D)(ii)
Why it matters:This is likely standard legislative practice to manage the practicalities of a complex agency transfer, ensuring continuity for existing cases without undermining the core policy of consolidation. It's a pragmatic exception to the broader transfer.
Case for: Supporters would argue this provision is a practical necessity to prevent the immediate collapse of ongoing, complex legal proceedings and to ensure that institutional knowledge is retained for critical cases during the transition, minimizing disruption to justice.
Case against: Critics might argue that this 'deputization' mechanism could lead to confusion or potential conflicts of interest, as former employees would be operating under a different agency's authority for cases they initiated under the FTC.
Estimated impact: Ensures continuity for an unspecified number of ongoing FTC antitrust cases and consent decrees, preventing immediate disruption but with a temporary and limited role for former FTC personnel.
The bill grants the Attorney General the authority to require persons, partnerships, and corporations to file annual or special reports, or answers to specific questions, concerning their organization, business, conduct, practices, management, and relation to other entities, specifically pertaining to competition or antitrust laws.
Section 4(a)(5)
Why it matters:This is likely standard legislative practice to ensure that all necessary powers previously held by the FTC for antitrust enforcement are explicitly transferred to the Attorney General, rather than being a deliberate attempt to hide the power.
Case for: Supporters would argue that this authority is fundamental for effective antitrust enforcement, allowing the Attorney General to gather essential market intelligence and monitor compliance proactively, which was a key function of the FTC.
Case against: Critics might express concern that centralizing this broad data collection power in a single agency could lead to increased administrative burdens on businesses or potential for overreach without the checks and balances of dual agency oversight.
Estimated impact: Transfers a broad, proactive investigative power from the FTC to the DOJ, affecting all businesses engaged in or whose business affects commerce, potentially increasing the scope of information requests from a single federal entity.
The bill waives any provision of law requiring notification to the FTC for premerger filings related to antitrust laws or unfair methods of competition, effectively consolidating all premerger notification requirements under the Department of Justice.
Section 5(b)
Why it matters:This is a necessary conforming amendment to reflect the core policy change. It's a technical adjustment rather than a hidden policy, ensuring that the practical implications of the transfer are addressed.
Case for: Proponents would highlight this as a key benefit of the bill, simplifying the premerger notification process for businesses by eliminating redundant filings with two agencies, thereby reducing administrative burden and uncertainty.
Case against: Opponents might argue that removing the FTC from premerger review eliminates a valuable second look and a distinct analytical perspective on potential mergers, potentially leading to less thorough scrutiny of complex transactions.
Estimated impact: Streamlines premerger notification for all companies involved in mergers and acquisitions, reducing the number of federal agencies they must interact with from two to one for antitrust review.