STOP CSAM Act of 2025
- Sponsor
- Rep. Moore, Barry [R-AL-1]
- Committees
- Judiciary Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Jun 11, 2025
Bottom line
This bill aims to strengthen legal frameworks and tech industry obligations to combat child sexual exploitation, providing more robust support for victims and holding platforms accountable for content on their services.
What it actually does
This bill amends federal law to enhance protections for child victims and witnesses in federal court, facilitate restitution payments, and increase accountability and transparency for tech companies regarding child sexual exploitation and abuse material (CSAM). It expands civil remedies for victims against online platforms and app stores, while also creating new criminal liabilities for platforms that intentionally host or knowingly promote CSAM.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue the bill is a critical step to update outdated laws, protect vulnerable children from online exploitation, and ensure that tech companies take more proactive measures to prevent the spread of CSAM and support law enforcement efforts. They emphasize the importance of victim support, restitution, and holding platforms accountable for their role in facilitating these crimes.
Opponents contend
Opponents, particularly some tech industry advocates and civil liberties groups, might argue that certain provisions, especially those related to new liabilities and reporting, could stifle innovation, raise significant privacy concerns, or impose overly burdensome requirements that are difficult to implement without compromising end-to-end encryption or user privacy. They may also contend that the bill could lead to over-moderation of legitimate content.
The bill is moderately complex, requiring careful reading to understand the legal amendments and their implications, which may exceed the time typically allotted for quick legislative review.
Section 2(a)(1) of the bill, amending 18 U.S.C. 3509(a)
Enhanced Definitions and Confidentiality for Child Victims
This provision broadens the definitions of 'exploitation' and 'psychological abuse' in federal law to cover more forms of harm to children, including child pornography, child sex trafficking, and specific patterns of coercive tactics. It also introduces the concept of 'protected information' for 'covered persons' (child victims/witnesses), establishing a presumption that public disclosure of this information is detrimental and requires a compelling public interest to override.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue these expanded definitions and confidentiality protections are crucial to better safeguard child victims from further trauma during legal proceedings and ensure their privacy is prioritized.
Critics contend
No specific opposition is typically raised against provisions that enhance protections for child victims' privacy in court, as these are generally seen as non-controversial and beneficial.
Tradeoffs
This provision balances the public's right to information with the paramount need to protect vulnerable child victims from re-victimization and psychological harm during legal processes.
Section 2(a)(5) and (6) of the bill, amending 18 U.S.C. 3509(h) and (i)
Authorized Appropriations for Victim Support Services
This provision authorizes $25,000,000 annually for the United States courts to fund guardian ad litem appointments for child victims, ensuring they have legal representation and support. It also mandates that if an adult attendant is in close proximity to a child testifying, a video recording of the attendant must be made and become part of the court record or be visible on closed-circuit television, adding transparency to the support role.
Section 3 of the bill, amending 18 U.S.C. 2259 and 3664
Mandatory Restitution and Victim Trust Funds
This provision makes restitution mandatory for a broader range of child pornography and exploitation offenses, including those involving identifiable minors in obscene visual depictions. Crucially, it allows federal courts to appoint a trustee or fiduciary to manage restitution payments for child victims, incapacitated victims, or foreign citizens/stateless persons, ensuring funds are managed in their best interest. It authorizes $15,000,000 annually for this purpose.
Section 4(a)(1) and (3) of the bill, amending 18 U.S.C. 2258A and 2258B
Mandatory CSAM Reporting, Data Sharing, and Increased Penalties for Tech
This provision significantly strengthens the duty of online service providers to report child sexual exploitation and abuse material (CSAM) to the CyberTipline. It mandates the inclusion of specific user identifying information (e.g., IP addresses, URLs), content details (including AI-generated CSAM), and requires prompt forwarding of reports to law enforcement. It also removes the previous 'safe harbor' for providers who proactively search for CSAM and introduces substantial criminal and civil penalties for non-compliance, with higher fines for larger platforms and when harm to individuals occurs.
Section 4(a)(1)(G) of the bill, adding new 18 U.S.C. 2258A(i)
Mandated Annual Transparency Reports on CSAM
This provision requires large online service providers (those with over 1 million monthly users and $50 million in annual revenue) to submit annual reports to the Attorney General and Federal Trade Commission. These reports must detail their CSAM reporting data, policies, user consequences, safety measures (including those for AI-generated content), efficacy assessments, factors limiting detection, and information on CSAM prevalence and trends on their services. The reports are subject to redaction for sensitive information and will be published.
Section 4(a)(6) of the bill, adding new 18 U.S.C. 2260B
New Criminal Liability for Hosting/Facilitating CSAM
This provision creates a new criminal offense for providers of interactive computer services that intentionally host or store child pornography, make it available to any person, or knowingly promote or facilitate certain child sexual exploitation offenses. Penalties include fines up to $1,000,000, or up to $5,000,000 if the offense involves conscious or reckless risk of serious personal injury or actual harm to an individual. It includes a rule of construction to protect good faith actions to comply with legal process.
Section 5(c) of the bill, adding new 18 U.S.C. 2255A
New Civil Action Against Tech Platforms for CSAM
This provision creates a new civil right of action for victims of child pornography or child sexual exploitation against interactive computer services and app stores. Victims can sue platforms that intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly promote, aid, abet, host, or store CSAM, or make it available. Relief includes actual damages or $300,000 in liquidated damages, attorney fees, and potential punitive damages. There is no statute of limitations for these claims, and Section 230 immunity is explicitly stated not to apply.
Section 5(c) of the bill, adding new 18 U.S.C. 2255A(g) and (h)
Encryption Protections and Affirmative Defenses in Civil Actions
This provision states that utilizing end-to-end encryption, not possessing decryption information, or failing to undermine encryption services shall not serve as an independent basis for liability in civil actions under 2255A. However, evidence related to encryption can be admissible to prove motive, intent, or rebut claims. It also establishes affirmative defenses for providers who remove CSAM within 48 hours (or 2 business days for smaller platforms) after obtaining knowledge, or if removal is technologically impossible without compromising encryption.
Expands the definition of 'psychological abuse' to include patterns of acts, threats, or coercive tactics intended to degrade, humiliate, intimidate, or terrorize a child, and the infliction of trauma through isolation, withholding necessities, physical restraint, or confinement in degrading conditions.
Section 2(a)(1)(C) of the bill, amending 18 U.S.C. 3509(a)(5)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice for updating existing statutes by modifying definitions, rather than creating entirely new sections.
Case for: Proponents argue this broader definition ensures that non-physical forms of abuse, which can be equally damaging, are recognized and addressed in federal court proceedings involving child victims, leading to more comprehensive justice.
Case against: No specific opposition is typically raised against expanding the definition of psychological abuse to better protect children, as these measures are generally seen as beneficial and non-controversial.
Estimated impact: Broadens the scope of recognized harm for child victims in federal cases, potentially leading to more comprehensive victim impact statements and considerations in sentencing.
This amendment removes the previous language that explicitly stated nothing in the section required a provider to 'affirmatively search, screen, or scan' for CSAM. The new language maintains that nothing in the section shall be construed to require such scanning, but the subtle change removes a specific 'safe harbor' interpretation.
Section 4(a)(1)(D) of the bill, striking and replacing 18 U.S.C. 2258A(f)(3)
Why it matters:The change is nuanced; while it doesn't explicitly mandate scanning, it removes a specific statutory shield that platforms previously cited. This could be seen as a deliberate, yet understated, move to encourage more proactive measures without a direct mandate, or to remove a perceived loophole.
Case for: Proponents might argue that removing this explicit 'safe harbor' encourages providers to be more proactive in their efforts to detect and report CSAM, even if it doesn't explicitly mandate scanning. It removes a potential legal shield for inaction that may have been misused.
Case against: Tech companies might argue that removing this specific language, even if not explicitly mandating scanning, creates ambiguity and could be interpreted as increasing pressure to scan, which they contend has privacy implications and technical challenges.
Estimated impact: Could subtly shift the legal landscape, encouraging more proactive measures by providers to avoid liability, even if direct scanning mandates are not imposed, potentially leading to increased content moderation efforts.