SOIL Act of 2025
- Sponsor
- Rep. Issa, Darrell [R-CA-48]
- Committees
- Energy and Commerce Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Jul 16, 2025
Bottom line
The bill aims to bolster national security by creating a direct legal prohibition against adversarial foreign governments acquiring real estate near critical U.S. military and infrastructure assets.
What it actually does
This bill amends the Defense Production Act of 1950 to prohibit certain foreign countries—specifically China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, along with entities controlled by them—from purchasing, leasing, or being granted concessions for property located within 10 miles of a 'sensitive site' in the United States. Sensitive sites are defined to include air or maritime ports, U.S. military installations, and other national security facilities as determined by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that this bill is a crucial national security measure designed to prevent adversarial foreign governments from acquiring land near sensitive U.S. military and critical infrastructure sites. They contend that such acquisitions pose significant risks of espionage, surveillance, and potential sabotage, and that a direct prohibition is necessary to safeguard national security interests against evolving foreign threats.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that existing mechanisms, such as the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) review process, are already sufficient to address national security concerns related to foreign investments. They could also raise concerns that a blanket prohibition might be overly broad, potentially deterring legitimate foreign investment, creating unnecessary bureaucratic burdens, or negatively impacting property values for landowners near designated sensitive sites.
The bill is exceptionally short and clear, allowing for a very quick read and ample time to consider its implications.
Section 2, amending Section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950
Prohibition on Certain Foreign Countries Purchasing or Leasing Property Near Sensitive Sites
This provision adds a new subsection (r) to the Defense Production Act of 1950, which explicitly forbids 'covered foreign countries' from purchasing, leasing, or receiving concessions for any property located within 10 miles of a 'sensitive site' in the United States. 'Covered foreign countries' include China, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and any entity controlled by or acting on behalf of their governments. 'Sensitive sites' encompass air/maritime ports, U.S. military installations, and other national security facilities as defined by CFIUS.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that this direct prohibition is a necessary and unambiguous measure to close potential loopholes in existing foreign investment review processes. They believe it provides a clear barrier against foreign adversaries acquiring strategically important land, thereby bolstering national security against espionage and potential sabotage.
Critics contend
Critics might contend that existing CFIUS review mechanisms are already sufficient to address national security risks on a case-by-case basis. They could argue that a blanket prohibition is overly broad, potentially impacting legitimate economic activity or property rights without a clear, demonstrated need for such a drastic, pre-emptive measure.
Tradeoffs
This provision balances the imperative of national security against potential impacts on property rights and the free market for real estate. While it aims to protect critical assets, it could also limit the pool of potential buyers or lessees for landowners near designated sensitive sites, potentially affecting property values or market liquidity.
The definition of 'sensitive site' includes any public or private real estate that 'the Committee determines could... reasonably provide a covered foreign country the ability to collect intelligence on activities being conducted at a location described under clause (ii) or (iii); or... otherwise expose national security activities at a location described under clause (ii) or (iii) to the risk of foreign surveillance by a covered foreign country.'
Section 2, subsection (r)(4)(B)(iv) of the Defense Production Act of 1950
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to provide flexibility to expert agencies in adapting to evolving threats and technologies, rather than an attempt to obscure the provision's intent.
Case for: Proponents argue that this flexible definition is essential for CFIUS to adapt to new and emerging national security threats, ensuring the prohibition remains effective against evolving espionage tactics and technologies without requiring constant legislative updates. It allows for a dynamic response to unforeseen risks.
Case against: Critics might argue that granting such broad discretionary power to CFIUS without more specific legislative guidance could lead to an overly expansive interpretation of 'sensitive site.' This could potentially impact a wider range of properties and transactions than initially intended by Congress, creating uncertainty for property owners and real estate markets.
Estimated impact: This provision grants CFIUS significant authority to expand the scope of the prohibition beyond explicitly listed sites, potentially affecting a larger number of real estate transactions and property owners than initially apparent from the bill's explicit list of sensitive sites.