Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Garbarino, Andrew R. [R-NY-2]
- Committees
- Transportation and Infrastructure Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Sep 3, 2025
Bottom line
This bill expands and refines the legal framework for detecting and mitigating unauthorized drones, aiming to enhance security and safety while addressing concerns about aviation safety, privacy, and civil liberties.
What it actually does
This bill reauthorizes and reforms counter-unmanned aircraft system (C-UAS) authorities for federal agencies, establishes new limited C-UAS detection authority for covered entities and law enforcement, and creates a pilot program for C-UAS mitigation by State and local law enforcement at specific sites and events. It also mandates performance requirements for C-UAS technology, establishes an FAA Office of Counter-UAS Activities, and modernizes drone safety statements. The bill aims to enhance security and safety while addressing concerns about aviation safety, privacy, and civil liberties.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue the bill is crucial for national security and public safety, providing updated tools to counter the growing threat posed by malicious drone use, especially around critical infrastructure, airports, and large public gatherings. They emphasize the need for clear legal authority, interagency coordination, and robust training to ensure effective and safe C-UAS operations.
Opponents contend
Opponents might raise concerns about the potential for expanded C-UAS authorities to infringe on privacy and civil liberties, particularly regarding the interception of communications and data retention. They may also highlight risks to aviation safety from C-UAS mitigation technologies and the potential for unintended interference with legitimate drone operations or other communication systems.
The bill is moderately technical, requiring careful reading to understand the nuances of authority delegation and coordination, which may exceed the time typically allotted for quick legislative review.
Sec. 3, amending 6 U.S.C. 124n(b)
Expanded Federal Counter-UAS Authorities and Enhanced Coordination
This provision amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to broaden the actions the Secretary of Homeland Security and Attorney General can take against unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), specifically adding the authority to "confiscate" in addition to "seize or exercise control." It also mandates explicit coordination with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Administrator to ensure that any authorized action does not adversely impact aviation safety, civil aviation operations, or the national airspace system, requiring mitigation actions if such an impact is identified.
Supporters argue
Proponents argue that this provision provides necessary flexibility and clarity for federal agencies to respond to evolving drone threats, ensuring aviation safety is a primary consideration while enhancing national security.
Critics contend
Opponents may express concern over the expansion of federal power to confiscate and disrupt, emphasizing the need for strict oversight and accountability to prevent misuse or overreach.
Tradeoffs
This provision navigates the tension between empowering federal agencies to counter drone threats and ensuring that such actions do not compromise civil liberties or aviation safety.
Sec. 3, amending 6 U.S.C. 124n(b)(4)
Mandated List of Approved Counter-UAS Technologies
This section requires the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in coordination with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the FAA, to maintain a list of approved makes and models of C-UAS detection and mitigation systems. For a system to be included, the FAA must determine it has no adverse impact on aviation safety, and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) or National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) must be consulted regarding spectrum impact. Additionally, C-UAS systems manufactured by entities from certain foreign adversary countries are prohibited from this list.
Sec. 3, amending 6 U.S.C. 124n(e)
Refined Privacy and Civil Liberties Safeguards
This section amends existing privacy protections related to C-UAS operations. It specifies that records of intercepted or acquired communications from unmanned aircraft systems must be disposed of immediately after a threat is mitigated, unless their maintenance is necessary for investigating or prosecuting a violation of law or for litigation, in which case they may be maintained for no more than 90 days. It also clarifies that such communications are not to be shared outside the department in possession of them, except for specific legal or security purposes.
Sec. 4, amending 49 U.S.C. 44810
FAA Counter-UAS Authority and Dedicated Office
This provision reauthorizes and expands the FAA's authority to detect and mitigate credible drone threats to the national airspace system and to test C-UAS technologies. It establishes a new Office of Counter-UAS Activities within the FAA, headed by a Director, to manage and direct the Administration's C-UAS efforts. This office will coordinate with other FAA divisions, federal and state agencies, airports, and stakeholders to ensure C-UAS activities do not adversely impact aviation safety or airspace efficiency.
Sec. 4, adding 49 U.S.C. 44810(e)
Minimum Performance Requirements for Counter-UAS Systems
This section requires the FAA, in coordination with DHS and DOJ, to establish minimum performance requirements for the safe and reliable deployment and use of C-UAS detection and mitigation systems within the national airspace system. These requirements must consider aviation safety (including operation in terminal airspace), the efficacy of the systems in detecting/mitigating unauthorized UAS, and the potential for interference with civilian communications and information technology networks. The Administrator is not required to conduct a rulemaking to publish these requirements.
Sec. 5
Limited Detection Authority for Critical Infrastructure and Event Operators
This section authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the FAA and Attorney General, to allow "covered entities" (owners of critical infrastructure like energy facilities, amusement parks, or state prisons, and organizers of covered events) to acquire, deploy, and operate approved C-UAS *detection* systems. This requires an application demonstrating a justifiable threat, a deployment plan, and typically a written agreement with a federal, state, local, or tribal law enforcement agency to operate the system, though a waiver for law enforcement participation is possible for entities with demonstrated expertise.
Sec. 6
State and Local Law Enforcement Counter-UAS Mitigation Pilot Program
This section establishes a pilot program to assess the efficacy of approved C-UAS *mitigation* systems at covered sites and events, allowing State and "covered local" law enforcement agencies (those with jurisdiction over at least 650,000 people) to acquire, deploy, and operate such systems in partnership with covered entities. Initial mitigation actions require case-by-case federal approval. The program includes a special provision for multinational sporting events (e.g., 2026 FIFA World Cup, Olympics) allowing for expedited deployment and potential transfer of agencies into the main pilot program after the event concludes.
Sec. 7
Comprehensive Airport Counter-UAS Planning and Deployment
This section mandates the FAA, in coordination with DHS and DOJ, to develop a comprehensive plan for C-UAS operations at "covered airports" (large/medium hub airports and major cargo airports) to ensure safety and security and respond to drone disruptions. It requires the deployment of approved C-UAS *detection* systems at these airports within specified timelines. Additionally, it establishes a pilot program for C-UAS *mitigation* systems at up to five covered airports, with the possibility of airport police participation, to assess the feasibility of mitigating drone threats impacting airport operations.
Sec. 8, adding 49 U.S.C. 44815
Prohibition on Careless or Reckless Counter-UAS Operations
This section prohibits any person (excluding federal government personnel acting under authority) from carelessly or recklessly operating a C-UAS system, equipment, or technology in a manner that adversely impacts or interferes with safe airport operations, navigation, air traffic services, or the safe and efficient operation of the national airspace system. The FAA Administrator is authorized to take necessary action to address violations, and civil penalties are established, with a maximum penalty for individuals or small businesses set at the same level as for other entities.
Sec. 9
Annual Public Report on Counter-UAS Activities
This section requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the FAA Administrator and the Attorney General, to issue an annual public report summarizing all C-UAS detection and mitigation activities conducted under this Act during the previous year. The report must include information on any violations or failures to comply, the number of detection and mitigation activities, instances of communications interception, whether mitigated drones were engaged in First Amendment-protected activities, and efforts to protect privacy and civil liberties. The report must be unclassified and posted on a publicly available website.
Sec. 10, amending 49 U.S.C. 44805(i)
Modernized Small Unmanned Aircraft System Safety Statements
This section requires manufacturers of small unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) to provide a safety statement to the initial operator upon first activation of the system, requiring electronic acknowledgment that the operator has read and understands it. The FAA is tasked with developing, maintaining, and revising the requirements for this safety statement, which must include information on applicable laws, airspace restrictions, methods for determining lawful operation, safety recommendations, and potential consequences for unsafe or unlawful use. The FAA will also issue an example statement, but manufacturers are not required to use it.
While the bill generally prohibits the inclusion of C-UAS systems manufactured by certain foreign enterprises (defined as 'covered manufacturers') on the approved list or their acquisition/operation by the FAA, it includes an exception. This exception allows the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Transportation to operate or procure such systems if it's for the sole purpose of research, evaluation, training, testing, or analysis, or if it supports the safe, secure, or efficient operation of the national airspace system or maintenance of public safety.
Sec. 3(1)(B), amending 6 U.S.C. 124n(b)(4)(D)(iv) and Sec. 4(a), amending 49 U.S.C. 44810(h)(3)
Why it matters:This is a standard legislative practice to provide necessary operational flexibility for federal agencies. It allows them to conduct essential research, development, and testing activities, or address immediate public safety needs, without being unduly constrained by broader procurement and deployment restrictions aimed at national security concerns.
Case for: Supporters argue this exception is vital for federal agencies to stay ahead of evolving drone threats, test new technologies, and ensure the safety of the national airspace. It allows for critical R&D and emergency operational needs without being fully restricted by procurement rules that might hinder innovation or immediate response capabilities.
Case against: Critics might argue that such exceptions could create loopholes, potentially allowing equipment from adversarial nations to be introduced into sensitive federal operations, even if for 'testing' purposes. This could raise supply chain security concerns or create pathways for unintended vulnerabilities, despite the stated limitations.
Estimated impact: This provision allows federal agencies to continue research, development, testing, and critical operational deployments with a broader range of C-UAS technologies, potentially accelerating the development and availability of effective countermeasures while maintaining some level of control over foreign-sourced technology.
For the limited C-UAS detection authority granted to covered entities (critical infrastructure owners, event organizers), the bill generally requires a written agreement with a federal, state, local, or tribal law enforcement agency to operate the system. However, this sub-provision allows the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the FAA and Attorney General, to waive this law enforcement partnership requirement if the covered entity demonstrates, to the satisfaction of the Secretary, that it has the necessary expertise and ability to safely and lawfully operate an approved C-UAS detection system.
Sec. 5(b)(3)
Why it matters:This is a practical flexibility clause, designed to accommodate private entities with robust internal security capabilities. While law enforcement partnership is the preferred model for oversight and accountability, this waiver acknowledges that some organizations may possess sufficient expertise to operate detection systems independently, thereby streamlining deployment.
Case for: Proponents argue this waiver allows experienced private security teams, such as those at large amusement parks or critical infrastructure sites with robust internal security, to deploy detection systems more efficiently without unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles, provided they meet high safety and operational standards.
Case against: Opponents might contend that waiving law enforcement involvement could reduce oversight and accountability, increasing the risk of privacy infringements or improper use of detection technologies by private entities without direct governmental supervision.
Estimated impact: This provision could streamline the deployment of C-UAS detection systems for certain well-resourced private entities, potentially accelerating security enhancements at critical sites, but it also reduces direct law enforcement involvement in some operations.
This section explicitly states that sections 553 and 554 of title 5, United States Code (which outline the public notice and comment rulemaking procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act, or APA), shall not apply to certain determinations made or guidance issued by the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, or the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration. Specifically, this exemption applies to policies related to the limited detection authority (Sec. 5), the mitigation pilot program (Sec. 6), C-UAS training standards (Sec. 3(n)), and FAA C-UAS performance requirements (Sec. 4(e)).
Sec. 11
Why it matters:This is a common legislative technique used to expedite the implementation of critical programs by bypassing lengthy public notice and comment periods typically required for federal regulations. It allows agencies to respond more quickly to evolving threats and implement new authorities without administrative delays.
Case for: Supporters argue this provision is necessary to rapidly implement critical C-UAS authorities and safety standards, allowing agencies to respond quickly to evolving threats without being bogged down by lengthy administrative processes that could delay essential security measures.
Case against: Critics would argue that bypassing APA rulemaking reduces transparency and public input, potentially leading to less robust or poorly considered policies, especially concerning new authorities that impact privacy, civil liberties, and aviation safety. It limits the opportunity for affected stakeholders to provide feedback.
Estimated impact: This provision significantly accelerates the implementation of key C-UAS programs and standards, including those related to detection, mitigation, training, and performance requirements. However, it does so at the cost of reduced public and stakeholder participation in the policy development process.