A complete substitute amendment, v2 fundamentally restructures and significantly expands the scope of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026. The bill's original focus on appropriations is broadened to include extensive new policy provisions across counterintelligence reform, general intelligence community matters, open-source intelligence, workforce issues, foreign country relations, and various reporting requirements. v2 is effectively a different bill from v1, introducing numerous new titles and sections.
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026
- Sponsor
- Rep. Crawford, Eric A. "Rick" [R-AR-1]
- Committees
- Intelligence (Permanent Select) Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Nov 28, 2025
Bottom line
H.R. 5167 provides the annual funding and implements substantial structural and policy updates for the U.S. Intelligence Community, aiming to enhance counterintelligence capabilities, streamline technology adoption, and sharpen focus on strategic foreign threats.
What it actually does
This bill authorizes appropriations for fiscal year 2026 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, including the Intelligence Community Management Account and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System. It significantly reorganizes counterintelligence efforts by establishing a National Counterintelligence Center with enhanced authorities, introduces new policies for technology adoption, especially artificial intelligence, and mandates reforms in open-source intelligence oversight and workforce matters. The bill also focuses on strategic competition with foreign adversaries, particularly China and Russia, and strengthens oversight of intelligence activities involving U.S. persons and federal officials.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that this bill is essential for equipping the Intelligence Community with the necessary resources and authorities to effectively address the rapidly evolving national security landscape. They emphasize that the enhanced counterintelligence framework, improved oversight of commercial data, and accelerated AI deployment capabilities are critical for maintaining a strategic advantage against sophisticated state actors like China and Russia, while also protecting classified information and personnel.
Opponents contend
Critics might express concerns that the expansion of counterintelligence authorities could lead to potential overreach or impact civil liberties, particularly with new data collection and sharing mechanisms. Some may also question the efficiency of creating new bureaucratic structures or argue that the bill does not adequately address specific privacy concerns related to the collection of publicly and commercially available information, or that it could hinder diversity efforts within the IC.
The bill is comprehensive, spanning 27 pages with numerous amendments to existing statutes and the establishment of new authorities. A thorough understanding requires significant time, especially for those unfamiliar with intelligence community structures and legal frameworks.
Sec. 101, 103
Authorization of Appropriations for Intelligence Activities
This provision authorizes funds for fiscal year 2026 for the conduct of intelligence and intelligence-related activities across the Federal Government. Specifically, it authorizes $674,500,000 for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence, with additional amounts detailed in a classified Schedule of Authorizations. This is a standard annual authorization for the Intelligence Community's operations.
Supporters argue
Supporters assert that these appropriations are fundamental to national security, enabling intelligence agencies to perform their critical missions of collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence to protect the United States from various threats.
Critics contend
While the principle of funding intelligence activities is generally accepted, critics may argue for greater transparency in spending, or question the allocation of funds to specific programs, though such details are often classified.
Tradeoffs
The primary tension lies in balancing the need for robust national security funding with fiscal responsibility and the inherent secrecy required for intelligence operations versus public accountability.
Sec. 302, new Title IV of National Security Act of 1947
Reorganization and Empowerment of the National Counterintelligence Center (NCC)
This section significantly reforms U.S. counterintelligence efforts by establishing the National Counterintelligence Center (NCC) within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, led by a Senate-confirmed Director. It broadens the definition of counterintelligence to include 'deter, disrupt, investigate, exploit, or' before 'protect against.' The NCC is granted extensive authority to direct, coordinate, and execute counterintelligence activities across the entire Federal Government, including establishing a National Counterintelligence Task Force, setting collection requirements, and evaluating agency effectiveness. It also centralizes damage assessments and FBI coordination under the NCC.
Sec. 403, amending 50 U.S.C. 3024(n)(6)(C)
Increased Acquisition Authority for National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
This provision significantly increases the delegated authority for the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to enter into agreements or transactions without prior congressional approval. The threshold is raised from $75,000,000 to $500,000,000. This expanded authority is conditional on the NRO Director providing notice to the congressional intelligence committees 14 days before entering into such an agreement and certifying that the transaction is essential to meet critical national security objectives.
Sec. 405, new Sec. 1115 of National Security Act of 1947
Prohibition on Use of DeepSeek on Intelligence Community Systems
This section mandates that the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with other IC heads, develop standards and guidelines to prohibit the use of the 'DeepSeek' application, or any successor application or service developed by 'High Flyer' or its successors, on national security systems. This includes systems operated by IC elements, their contractors, or other entities on their behalf. The provision requires the removal of such applications and includes exceptions for national security purposes and research activities, provided risk mitigation standards are applied.
Sec. 502, new Sec. 15A of CIA Act of 1949
CIA Authority to Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
This section grants the Director of the CIA new authority to counter unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) that pose a credible threat to safety or security over 'specially designated property' (listed in a classified annex). The authorized actions include detecting, identifying, tracking, warning, disrupting control, seizing, or destroying UAS. The CIA must coordinate with the FAA to ensure no adverse impact on national airspace, adhere to data retention limits, and notify Congress and the Attorney General of actions taken. This authority is set to terminate on December 31, 2029.
Sec. 511, new Sec. 430e of Title 10, U.S. Code
Preventing Duplication in Defense Intelligence Commercial Data Purchases
This provision aims to reduce redundant spending by prohibiting defense intelligence components from purchasing commercially available information (CAI) if that information is already accessible from another defense intelligence component. Exceptions can be granted by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security for specific reasons, such as verifying data quality, obtaining samples, maintaining operational security, or preventing significant harm to national security. Any such exception requires notification to congressional defense and intelligence committees.
Sec. 521, new Sec. 518 of National Security Act of 1947
FBI Notification for Counterintelligence Investigations of Federal Officials
This section requires the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to notify congressional leadership and the intelligence and judiciary committees within five days of initiating a counterintelligence assessment or investigation involving a candidate for Federal office, a holder of Federal office, or a covered congressional employee. The notification must include a summary of relevant facts and the individual's identity. An exception allows the Director to withhold notification from an individual who is the target of the assessment or investigation. The provision also mandates semiannual lists of covered congressional employees from the Senate and House.
Sec. 607, new Sec. 1118 of National Security Act of 1947
Purge Requirement for Incidental US Person Data in OSINT
This section mandates that each element of the intelligence community must purge any publicly available information (PAI) or commercially available information (CAI) that relates to a United States person if that information was 'incidentally collected' by the element. This requirement aims to enhance privacy protections for U.S. persons by ensuring that intelligence agencies do not retain such data when it is not directly relevant to their foreign intelligence mission.
Sec. 702, new Sec. 1203 of National Security Act of 1947
Prohibition on Political or Ideological Activism Requirements in IC
This section prohibits any element of the intelligence community from requiring covered individuals (including applicants, employees, and contractors) to engage in 'political or ideological activism' as a condition for obtaining a 'positive personnel action' (e.g., hiring, promotion, awards). It also forbids awarding additional points or favoring individuals based on such activism. An exception is made for requirements related to maintaining an individual's cover in clandestine operations.
Sec. 703, new Sec. 1204 of National Security Act of 1947
Merit-Based Personnel Decisions in the IC
This section requires the head of each intelligence community element to ensure that no personnel action is taken with a motivating factor of reversing societal discrimination, providing role models of a specific demographic, or assuming viewpoints based on race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, transgender status, or national origin. It includes an important exception for instances where such factors constitute a bona fide occupational qualification, such as linguistic ability or maintaining cover.
Sec. 801, new Sec. 1107B of National Security Act of 1947
Net Assessments of China's Power and National Security Implications
This section requires the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), through the National Intelligence Council and National Intelligence Management Council, to conduct and regularly update 'net assessments' of the People's Republic of China. These assessments must compare China's economic, technological, financial, trade, industrial, and diplomatic power against that of the United States, and analyze the national security implications of China's activities in these areas. The assessments will use open-source information for the U.S. portion and all-source intelligence for China. The first assessment is due within 180 days of enactment, and all assessments must be made readily available to other federal agencies and congressional intelligence committees.
Requires the head of eight specified intelligence community elements (ODNI, CIA, NSA, DIA, FBI, DOE, State, DHS) to designate a senior official responsible for biotechnology activities within their element. This ensures dedicated leadership and focus on this emerging technology across key intelligence agencies.
Sec. 404(a), new Sec. 123 of National Security Act of 1947
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice for detailing specific agency responsibilities under a broader policy directive. The list of agencies is a necessary detail rather than an attempt to obscure.
Case for: Supporters argue that designating senior officials for biotechnology ensures that each key intelligence element has dedicated leadership and expertise to track, analyze, and respond to advancements in this critical and rapidly evolving field, which has significant national security implications.
Case against: No specific opposition is typically raised against this type of organizational designation, as it aims to improve focus and coordination. Concerns, if any, might relate to potential bureaucratic overhead or the challenge of finding qualified individuals for such roles.
Estimated impact: Enhances the IC's ability to monitor and respond to biotechnology threats and opportunities, potentially involving significant resource reallocation within agencies.
Requires the Intelligence Community to utilize the 'Transnational Organized Crime Identity Intelligence Platform' (or a successor system) for information management, sharing, analysis, and collaboration related to international cartels and other transnational criminal organizations. This mandates the use of a specific, existing platform, rather than simply requiring collaboration.
Sec. 406(a)(1), new Sec. 1116 of National Security Act of 1947
Why it matters:This is likely a technical detail, ensuring continuity or leveraging an existing, effective tool rather than creating a new one. It's a specific implementation detail for a broader policy goal.
Case for: Supporters argue that mandating the use of a proven platform like the Transnational Organized Crime Identity Intelligence Platform ensures immediate operational capability and leverages existing investments, accelerating information sharing and collaboration against TCOs.
Case against: No specific opposition is typically raised against leveraging existing platforms for efficiency. However, some might argue that explicitly naming a platform could limit flexibility if a superior system emerges or if the named platform faces unforeseen technical challenges.
Estimated impact: Enhances interagency information sharing and analysis capabilities against TCOs, leveraging existing infrastructure.
Adds a new paragraph (8) to Section 102A(d) of the National Security Act of 1947, prohibiting the head of an intelligence community element from transferring, reprogramming, or otherwise reducing amounts made available for open-source intelligence (OSINT) activities without the prior approval of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), unless the amounts are below a DNI-established threshold.
Sec. 604(a), amending 50 U.S.C. 3024(d)
Why it matters:This is a technical legislative mechanism to ensure DNI oversight over OSINT funding, preventing agencies from unilaterally diverting funds from this prioritized area. It's a control measure rather than a hidden policy.
Case for: Supporters argue this provision ensures that OSINT, a growing and critical intelligence discipline, receives consistent funding and is protected from arbitrary budget cuts or reallocations by individual agencies, thereby strengthening the DNI's ability to prioritize and coordinate OSINT efforts.
Case against: No specific opposition is typically raised against DNI oversight of funding for key intelligence areas. However, some agency heads might prefer greater flexibility in managing their budgets, arguing that DNI approval could introduce delays or reduce responsiveness to evolving operational needs.
Estimated impact: Strengthens DNI's control over OSINT funding, ensuring resources are maintained for this critical area across the IC.
States that Section 308 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (as added by this bill), which treats certain CIA service as active-duty for VA benefits, shall apply with respect to injuries or illnesses incurred or aggravated 'before, on, or after' the date of the enactment of this Act. This provides retroactive applicability.
Sec. 705(b)
Why it matters:Applicability dates are standard legislative practice. The retroactive nature is a substantive policy choice, not an attempt to hide it, but its placement is typical for such clauses.
Case for: Supporters argue that retroactive application ensures that all qualifying CIA veterans, regardless of when their injuries or illnesses were incurred, receive equitable treatment and access to VA benefits, recognizing their past sacrifices.
Case against: No specific opposition is typically raised against providing retroactive benefits to veterans. However, retroactive provisions can sometimes create administrative complexities or unexpected fiscal burdens, though in this case, the scope is limited to 'covered service' defined in a classified annex.
Estimated impact: Expands eligibility for VA benefits to a potentially larger group of CIA veterans, depending on the definition of 'covered service.'