What changed between these versions
A complete substitute amendment, v2 fundamentally restructures and significantly expands the scope of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026. The bill's original focus on appropriations is broadened to include extensive new policy provisions across counterintelligence reform, general intelligence community matters, open-source intelligence, workforce issues, foreign country relations, and various reporting requirements. v2 is effectively a different bill from v1, introducing numerous new titles and sections.
Overview
v2 introduces extensive changes throughout the bill, transforming it from a concise appropriations authorization into a comprehensive legislative package. The original text of v1 has been almost entirely replaced by a new, substantially longer version. · v2 represents a fundamental restructuring and massive expansion of the bill's scope. It moves beyond simple authorization to establish new centers, mandate new policies, impose new reporting requirements, and redefine authorities within the intelligence community, effectively creating a complete substitute for v1.
v2 is a complete substitute amendment, replacing the entirety of v1's operative text with a significantly expanded version. The most prominent change is the establishment of a robust framework for counterintelligence reform, including the formal establishment and enhanced authorities of the National Counterintelligence Center. Additionally, v2 introduces comprehensive provisions for open-source intelligence, new directives for artificial intelligence security and adoption, and numerous new reporting and oversight requirements across various intelligence community elements. The bill also addresses workforce matters, foreign country intelligence priorities, and modifies access to restricted data, making v2 a substantially different legislative proposal.
Major additions
This new title, cited as the 'Strategic Enhancement of Counterintelligence and Unifying Reform Efforts Act' or 'SECURE Act', establishes the National Counterintelligence Center (NCC) within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. It outlines the NCC's mission to direct, coordinate, and carry out counterintelligence activities, detailing specific duties such as countering foreign influence operations, strategic operational planning, and establishing a National Counterintelligence Task Force. It also creates a National Counterintelligence Program with its own budget and mandates various strategic reports.
This addition fundamentally reorganizes and strengthens the counterintelligence apparatus of the U.S. government. It centralizes authority and responsibility for counterintelligence under the NCC Director, enhancing coordination, deconfliction, and operational effectiveness across the intelligence community. This could lead to a more unified and proactive approach to combating foreign intelligence threats.
This new title introduces several general intelligence community matters. Key additions include Section 403 on intelligence acquisition enhancement, Section 404 requiring senior officials for biotechnology, Section 405 prohibiting the use of DeepSeek on intelligence community systems, Section 406 establishing a knowledge management system for international cartels, Section 407 requiring notice of diplomatic post closings' impact on intelligence, Section 408 on harmonizing AI data policies, Section 409 on accelerating AI capability review, Section 410 on enhancing IC technology adoption metrics, and Section 411 mandating an AI security playbook.
These additions introduce new policy directives and oversight mechanisms for critical emerging areas like biotechnology and artificial intelligence, as well as enhancing acquisition processes and information sharing for transnational threats. The prohibition on DeepSeek and the AI security playbook signify a proactive stance on securing advanced technologies. The requirement for senior biotechnology officials highlights a growing focus on this domain within the IC.
This title addresses matters relating to specific elements of the intelligence community. Subtitle A focuses on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), adding guidance on novel and significant expenditures and authority for the CIA regarding unmanned aircraft systems at its installations. Subtitle B covers Department of Defense elements, requiring avoidance of duplication in commercial information purchases, oversight of vendor support to clandestine activities, disestablishment of advisory boards for NGA and NRO, and expansion of commercial imagery procurement. Subtitle C includes notice requirements for FBI counterintelligence assessments of federal officials and a requirement for Department of Energy employees to report travel to countries of risk.
These additions enhance accountability and operational capabilities within specific intelligence agencies. The CIA's new UAS authority provides a critical security tool, while the expenditure guidance improves financial oversight. For DoD intelligence components, measures to avoid duplication and oversee vendor support aim to increase efficiency and reduce risk. The FBI notification requirement and DOE travel reporting enhance counterintelligence vigilance regarding federal personnel.
This title is entirely dedicated to open-source intelligence (OSINT) matters. It defines key terms, mandates the efficient use of OSINT, designates responsible officials for various OSINT areas, establishes oversight for commercially available information (CAI) acquisition, modifies budget requirements for OSINT, standardizes training for publicly available information (PAI) and CAI collection, requires purging incidentally collected U.S. person information, updates IC directives related to OSINT, mandates audits of OSINT expenditures, requires quarterly briefings on CAI procurement, and calls for a study on engagement with other agencies regarding OSINT requirements.
This title represents a significant and comprehensive effort to formalize, standardize, and enhance the intelligence community's approach to open-source intelligence. It aims to improve efficiency, reduce duplication, ensure proper oversight, and address privacy concerns related to the collection of publicly and commercially available information. The requirement to purge incidentally collected U.S. person data is particularly impactful for privacy and civil liberties.
This title focuses on intelligence community workforce matters. It mandates unclassified appraisals for employees of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), prohibits requiring political or ideological activism as a condition for positive personnel actions, ensures merit-based personnel decisions, and provides for the treatment of certain CIA service as active-duty service for purposes of benefits administered by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs.
These additions aim to improve transparency, fairness, and employee protections within the intelligence community workforce. The DIA appraisal requirement enhances career mobility, while the prohibitions on political activism and mandates for merit-based decisions address concerns about ideological screening in hiring and promotion. The VA benefits provision provides significant support for qualifying CIA veterans.
This title addresses matters relating to foreign countries, particularly the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia. It requires net assessments of the PRC's power, mandates a National Intelligence Management Council mission manager for the PRC, and calls for a National Intelligence Estimate on PRC advancements in biotechnology. It extends the intelligence community coordinator for Russian atrocities accountability, mandates a study on the IC's collection and analysis of foreign atrocities, and requires intelligence support for Ukraine.
These additions establish clear strategic priorities for intelligence collection and analysis concerning key adversaries and geopolitical hotspots. The focus on the PRC's economic and technological power, along with the biotechnology estimate, underscores a long-term strategic competition. The extension of the Russian atrocities coordinator and intelligence support for Ukraine highlight ongoing commitments to addressing current conflicts and human rights issues.
Deletions
This section stated that the authorization of appropriations by the Act does not constitute authority for intelligence activities not otherwise authorized by law.
While the text of this section is identical in v2 (as Section 401), its original placement as Section 301 in v1's Title III is deleted. Its re-placement in Title IV of v2 indicates a structural reorganization rather than a substantive policy deletion. The policy itself remains.
This section allowed appropriations for employee compensation and benefits to be increased by supplemental amounts necessary for increases authorized by law.
Similar to Section 301, the text of this section is identical in v2 (as Section 402), but its original placement as Section 302 in v1's Title III is deleted. This is a structural reorganization, not a substantive policy deletion. The policy itself remains.
This section established the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) and outlined its functions and authorities.
The repeal of this section is significant because v2 replaces the NCSC with the newly established National Counterintelligence Center (NCC) under Title III, which has expanded authorities and a more centralized role. This deletion is part of a broader restructuring of counterintelligence leadership and functions, effectively replacing the previous organizational framework with a new one.
These sections pertained to the National Counterintelligence Executive and the National Counterintelligence Board, respectively, which were predecessors or related entities to the NCSC.
The repeal of these sections is part of the comprehensive counterintelligence reform in v2, consolidating and updating authorities under the new National Counterintelligence Center. This streamlines the counterintelligence leadership structure by removing outdated or superseded provisions.
This section outlined the coordination of counterintelligence matters with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
While repealed from its original location, the core provisions of this section are transferred and significantly modified into a new Section 414 of the National Security Act of 1947 within v2's new Title III. Therefore, it is not a deletion of policy but a relocation and enhancement of existing coordination requirements, specifically integrating the new Director of the National Counterintelligence Center.
This section addressed damage assessments related to unauthorized disclosures of classified information, with the Director of National Intelligence responsible for conducting them.
Similar to the FBI coordination provision, this section is repealed from its original location but transferred and significantly modified into a new Section 415 of the National Security Act of 1947 within v2's new Title III. The responsibility for damage assessments is shifted from the DNI to the new Director of the National Counterintelligence Center, and new requirements for federal agencies and semiannual reports are added. This is a policy enhancement and relocation, not a deletion.
This section established the Open Source Center within the DNI and outlined its functions to ensure efficient and effective use of open-source intelligence.
The repeal of this section is significant as v2 introduces a comprehensive new Title VI dedicated entirely to open-source intelligence. This new title replaces the previous Open Source Center framework with a broader, more integrated approach to OSINT across the entire intelligence community, designating responsible officials and establishing new oversight and training mandates. This is a replacement with a more extensive framework rather than a simple deletion of policy.
This section authorized the establishment of an advisory board for the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA).
The repeal of this section disestablishes the NGA's advisory board, indicating a shift in how external advice or oversight is structured for the agency. This removes a formal mechanism for external input to the NGA.
This subsection authorized the establishment of an advisory board for the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).
The repeal of this subsection disestablishes the NRO's advisory board, similar to the NGA, removing a formal mechanism for external input to the NRO.
This section required an annual report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets.
The repeal of this section eliminates an annual reporting requirement, potentially reducing administrative burden but also removing a specific mechanism for congressional oversight on this topic.
This section required reports on the hiring and retention of minority employees within the intelligence community.
The repeal of this section removes a specific reporting requirement related to diversity in the intelligence community workforce. While other provisions in v2 address equal treatment, this particular reporting mechanism is eliminated.
This subsection of the Foreign Malign Influence Center provision required certain reports.
The deletion of this subsection removes a specific reporting requirement related to the Foreign Malign Influence Center, streamlining its reporting obligations.
This subsection pertained to reporting requirements related to counterintelligence and national security protections for intelligence community grant funding.
The deletion of this subsection removes a specific reporting requirement, potentially reducing administrative burden for grant funding oversight.
This section likely pertained to specific reporting or operational requirements related to the National Intelligence University.
The repeal of this section, along with the redesignation of subsequent sections, streamlines the provisions related to the National Intelligence University by removing an unspecified requirement.
This section addressed best practices to protect the privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights of Chinese Americans.
The repeal of this section removes a specific legislative directive concerning the protection of Chinese Americans' privacy and civil liberties. While general privacy protections may still apply, this targeted provision is eliminated.
This subsection required a report on the expansion of security clearances for certain contractors.
The deletion of this subsection removes a specific reporting requirement related to security clearances for contractors, reducing oversight on this particular aspect of IC personnel management.
This section required a report on trends in technologies of strategic importance to the United States.
The repeal of this section eliminates a specific reporting requirement on technology trends. While other provisions in v2 address technology (e.g., AI, biotechnology), this particular report is no longer mandated.
These subsections required various reports related to cooperative actions to detect and counter foreign influence operations.
The deletion of these subsections removes specific reporting requirements on foreign influence operations. While v2 introduces new provisions on countering foreign influence (e.g., under the NCC), these particular reporting mandates are eliminated.
This section required an assessment of homeland security vulnerabilities associated with certain retired and former intelligence community personnel.
The repeal of this section eliminates a specific assessment and reporting requirement concerning security risks posed by former IC personnel, potentially reducing oversight in this area.
This section pertained to national security effects of global water insecurity and emerging infectious disease and pandemics.
The repeal of this section removes a specific legislative directive for the intelligence community to focus on and report on global water insecurity and pandemics. While these issues may still be monitored, this particular mandate is eliminated.
This subsection required a report on counter active measures by Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, or other nation states to exert covert influence.
The deletion of this subsection removes a specific reporting requirement on foreign covert influence. While v2 introduces new provisions on countering foreign influence (e.g., under the NCC), this particular reporting mandate is eliminated.
This section required monitoring of mineral investments under the Belt and Road Initiative of the People's Republic of China.
The repeal of this section eliminates a specific monitoring and reporting requirement related to China's Belt and Road Initiative and mineral investments. While v2 introduces other provisions related to China, this particular focus is removed.
This section required a report on proposals to modify or introduce new aircraft or sensors for flight by the Russian Federation under the Open Skies Treaty.
The repeal of this section removes a specific reporting requirement related to Russia and the Open Skies Treaty, reflecting the changing geopolitical landscape and the U.S. withdrawal from the treaty.
This subsection required a report on efforts of state sponsors of terrorism, other foreign countries, or entities to illicitly acquire satellites and related items.
The deletion of this subsection removes a specific reporting requirement on illicit satellite acquisition. While satellite security remains a concern, this particular reporting mechanism is eliminated.
This section required a report on commerce with, and assistance to, Cuba from other foreign countries.
The repeal of this section eliminates a specific reporting requirement related to Cuba's foreign economic relations, potentially reflecting a shift in U.S. policy or oversight priorities concerning Cuba.
Modifications
This instruction signifies that v2 is a complete substitute for v1, meaning all original content of v1 is replaced by the new, italicized text in v2. This is the overarching change that enables all other additions, deletions, and modifications.
Before
The enacting clause simply stated 'Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,' followed by the bill's content.
After
The enacting clause is followed by an instruction to 'Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic,' indicating a complete replacement of the bill's original text with the amended version.
The expanded table of contents reflects the dramatic increase in the bill's scope and complexity. It provides a roadmap to the numerous new policy areas and specific directives introduced in v2, indicating a shift from a basic appropriations bill to a comprehensive intelligence policy authorization.
Before
The table of contents in v1 listed three titles: Title I (Intelligence Activities), Title II (Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System), and Title III (General Intelligence Community Matters), with a total of 7 sections.
After
The table of contents in v2 lists nine titles: Title I (Intelligence Activities), Title II (Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System), Title III (Counterintelligence Reform), Title IV (General Intelligence Community Matters), Title V (Matters Relating to Elements of the Intelligence Community), Title VI (Open-Source Intelligence Matters), Title VII (Intelligence Community Workforce Matters), Title VIII (Matters Relating to Foreign Countries), and Title IX (Reports and Other Matters), with a total of 70 sections.
The increase of $32,500,000 for the Intelligence Community Management Account provides additional funding for the Director of National Intelligence to manage and oversee the intelligence community, supporting the expanded functions and new initiatives introduced in v2.
Before
v1 authorized $642,000,000 for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2026.
After
v2 authorizes $674,500,000 for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2026.
This modification broadens the statutory definition of counterintelligence to explicitly include proactive and offensive measures ('deter, disrupt, investigate, exploit') in addition to defensive 'protection.' This provides a clearer legal basis and mandate for a more aggressive and comprehensive approach to counterintelligence activities by the intelligence community.
Before
The definition of 'counterintelligence' in the National Security Act of 1947 described protecting against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by foreign governments, organizations, or persons.
After
The definition of 'counterintelligence' is amended to include 'deter, disrupt, investigate, exploit, or' before 'protect against' espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by foreign governments, organizations, or persons.
This change integrates the newly empowered Director of the National Counterintelligence Center directly into the statutory framework for coordinating counterintelligence matters with the FBI. This ensures that the NCC plays a central role in deconflicting and directing counterintelligence efforts, enhancing interagency collaboration and potentially streamlining responses to threats.
Before
Section 811 of the Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act of 1994 (50 U.S.C. 3381) outlined coordination requirements between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation on counterintelligence matters.
After
This provision is transferred and re-codified as Section 414 of the National Security Act of 1947. It is modified to include the 'Director of the National Counterintelligence Center' alongside the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in coordination requirements for counterintelligence matters, espionage information, and impact assessments. It also re-designates subsections and updates internal references.
This modification centralizes the responsibility for damage assessments under the new National Counterintelligence Center, aligning it with the NCC's broader counterintelligence mission. The new requirements for federal agencies to report disclosures and provide information, along with semiannual congressional reports, significantly enhance accountability and oversight regarding the compromise of classified national intelligence.
Before
Section 1105A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3235a) required the Director of National Intelligence to conduct damage assessments for significant unauthorized disclosures of classified national intelligence.
After
This provision is transferred and re-codified as Section 415 of the National Security Act of 1947. It transfers the responsibility for conducting damage assessments from the 'Director of National Intelligence' to the 'Director of the National Counterintelligence Center.' Additionally, it adds new subsections (d) and (e) requiring federal agencies to notify the NCC of disclosures and provide information for assessments, and mandates semiannual reports from the NCC to Congress on such disclosures.
This significantly increases the NRO's delegated authority for entering into certain agreements or transactions without needing DNI approval for amounts between $75 million and $500 million. This change aims to accelerate the NRO's acquisition processes, particularly for critical national security objectives, while maintaining congressional oversight through the notification requirement.
Before
This provision generally allowed the Director of National Intelligence to delegate authority for certain agreements or transactions up to $75,000,000.
After
This provision is amended to allow the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), if delegated the authority, to exercise the authority for agreements or transactions up to '$500,000,000' (instead of $75,000,000) with a 14-day prior notification to congressional intelligence committees and certification of critical national security objectives.
This modification aims to standardize and clarify the process for identifying and reporting 'novel and significant expenditures' by the CIA. By requiring a formal definition and internal procedures, it ensures more consistent and timely congressional notification, enhancing oversight of the CIA's financial activities.
Before
This subsection required the Director of the CIA to notify congressional committees of any 'novel and significant' expenditures.
After
This subsection is amended to add a new paragraph (2) requiring the Director to issue written guidance within 180 days to ensure timely identification and reporting of novel and significant expenditures. This guidance must define 'novel and significant expenditure,' establish internal evaluation procedures, and require timely congressional notification. The Director must regularly review and update this guidance and brief Congress on its issuance or material revisions.
This is a minor terminological update, changing 'Compound' to 'Installation' when referring to the CIA Headquarters. It has no substantive policy impact but modernizes the language used in the statute.
Before
This subsection referred to the 'Agency Headquarters Compound' in relation to the security of CIA installations.
After
This subsection is amended by striking 'Compound' and inserting 'Installation' each place it appears.
This modification centralizes control over open-source intelligence funding, giving the DNI greater authority to prevent reductions or reallocations of OSINT resources by individual IC elements. This aims to ensure consistent investment and strategic prioritization of OSINT capabilities across the community.
Before
This subsection outlined general budget information requirements for the DNI regarding the National Intelligence Program.
After
This subsection is amended by adding a new paragraph (8) which prohibits the head of an intelligence community element from transferring, reprogramming, or otherwise reducing amounts made available for open-source intelligence activities without prior DNI approval, unless below a DNI-established threshold.
This modification formalizes and strengthens the DNI's role in overseeing open-source intelligence activities. It ensures that OSINT efforts are regularly evaluated for effectiveness and that relevant budget information is transparently provided, leading to improved accountability and strategic alignment of OSINT resources.
Before
This subsection outlined general oversight responsibilities of the DNI.
After
This subsection is amended by adding a new paragraph (10) which requires the DNI to conduct regular oversight of the open-source intelligence activities of IC elements, evaluate their effectiveness, and ensure budget information includes details on such activities.
These modifications significantly increase the transparency and detail of budget reporting for open-source intelligence and drug control programs. Congress will receive more granular information on OSINT expenditures, activities, and personnel, enabling more informed oversight. The consolidated Drug Control Program Budget provides a comprehensive view of IC efforts in counternarcotics, enhancing accountability in these critical areas.
Before
This section outlined requirements for the DNI to submit budget information to Congress, including a classified annex and unclassified summary.
After
This section is amended to add new paragraph (5) to subsection (a) requiring budget justification materials for publicly available, commercially available, and other open-source information for intelligence purposes for fiscal years 2027-2029. It also adds a new subsection (b) detailing specific information required for these OSINT budget materials (e.g., activities, investments, disaggregation by program, personnel numbers). Furthermore, it adds a new subsection (c) requiring the DNI to annually develop and submit a consolidated Intelligence Community Drug Control Program Budget summary to Congress.
This modification removes specific statutory language that previously directed the DNI to ensure equal employment opportunity via 'recruitment, hiring, training, and retention of a diverse workforce.' While the general mandate for equal employment opportunity remains, the explicit methods tied to diversity initiatives are removed from this particular clause. This could be interpreted as a shift in emphasis regarding how equal opportunity is to be achieved.
Before
This provision directed the DNI to ensure equal employment opportunity through recruitment, hiring, training, and retention of diverse individuals.
After
This provision is amended by striking 'through the recruitment' and all that follows, replacing it with a semicolon. The original text read 'through the recruitment, hiring, training, and retention of a diverse workforce.' The amendment removes the specific mention of 'recruitment, hiring, training, and retention of a diverse workforce' as a means to ensure equal employment opportunity.
This modification formally exempts high-level federal officials (President, VP, Congress, judges) from the standard clearance process for Restricted Data, acknowledging their inherent need-to-know by virtue of office. It also mandates a streamlined verification process, ensuring these officials can access necessary information without unnecessary administrative hurdles, while still maintaining a record of their access.
Before
This subsection generally required individuals to be cleared for access to Restricted Data.
After
This subsection is amended to add a new paragraph (2) clarifying that paragraph (1) (the clearance requirement) does not apply to the President, Vice President, Members of Congress, or federal judges. It further requires the Secretary of Energy, in coordination with the DNI, to maintain an up-to-date list of these individuals and verify their authorized access without requiring more personally identifying information than the DNI requires for classified information.
This modification broadens the types of NSA activities that trigger congressional notification. It now explicitly includes 'sharing adjustments' with foreign partners, in addition to collection adjustments. This provides Congress with greater oversight into significant changes in both how NSA collects intelligence and how it shares that intelligence internationally, potentially impacting foreign relations and intelligence partnerships.
Before
This section required notification to congressional intelligence committees of 'intelligence collection adjustments' and a summary of the adjustment and its cause.
After
This section is amended to change 'intelligence collection adjustment' to 'covered intelligence collection or sharing adjustment' and to expand the definition of this term. The new definition includes significant changes to the quantity of intelligence collected by NSA regarding foreign entities OR policies/practices of NSA regarding sharing intelligence with foreign entities.
The deletion of subsection (d) removes a specific reporting requirement related to the Foreign Malign Influence Center, potentially reducing administrative burden for the center.
Before
This section, concerning the Foreign Malign Influence Center, included a subsection (d) which likely contained reporting requirements.
After
Subsection (d) is struck, and subsection (e) is redesignated as (d).
This modification clarifies that the DNI's authority to support workforce activities is specifically directed towards 'recruitment or retention.' This might narrow the interpretation of permissible support activities compared to a broader, unspecified scope, focusing DNI resources on these two critical areas.
Before
This subsection authorized the Director of National Intelligence to provide support for certain workforce activities, with specific language regarding the scope of that support.
After
The language 'to--' and all that follows through 'workforce.' is struck and replaced with 'to the recruitment or retention of the intelligence community workforce.'
This modification places a five-year sunset on the annual reporting requirement concerning foreign commercial spyware threats. This means the report will only be required for five years after its initial mandate, reducing long-term administrative burden but also limiting ongoing congressional oversight after that period.
Before
This provision required an annual report on measures to mitigate counterintelligence threats from the proliferation and use of foreign commercial spyware.
After
The phrase 'for five years' is inserted after 'annually thereafter'.
This modification shortens the duration of the authority or reporting requirement related to strikes against terrorist targets by one year. This means the provision will expire a year earlier than previously legislated, potentially impacting ongoing operations or oversight related to such strikes.
Before
This subsection contained a sunset date of '2027' for certain provisions related to strikes against terrorist targets outside areas of active hostilities.
After
The year '2027' is struck and '2026' is inserted.
Scope
Complete substitute — The changes are scattered throughout the bill, with the introduction of seven entirely new titles and numerous new sections within both new and existing acts. The original v1 was a short, focused appropriations bill, while v2 is a comprehensive legislative package touching upon nearly all aspects of intelligence community operations, oversight, and policy. — v2 represents a significant and fundamental change in policy direction relative to v1. It moves from a basic authorization of appropriations to establishing new organizational structures (like the strengthened National Counterintelligence Center), mandating new policy frameworks (for OSINT, AI security), and introducing specific directives for various intelligence community elements. This is a clear shift towards more detailed and proactive legislative guidance for the intelligence community. — The changes in v2 interact extensively with existing provisions of law. It repeals and replaces sections of the National Security Act of 1947, the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, and other intelligence authorization acts. New titles and sections are inserted into existing statutory frameworks, and definitions are modified that will have ripple effects across other provisions that reference them. The bill also explicitly amends and transfers several existing provisions, demonstrating a deep integration and modification of the current legal landscape for the intelligence community.
Impact analysis
Intelligence Community (IC) elements (general)
Procedural change and increased accountability.
IC elements face significantly increased oversight, new coordination mandates, and specific policy directives across a wide range of activities, including counterintelligence, open-source intelligence, and technology adoption.
Director of National Intelligence (DNI)
Increased authority and responsibility.
The DNI's authority and responsibilities are significantly expanded, particularly in leading counterintelligence efforts, overseeing open-source intelligence, and developing community-wide AI policies. The DNI also gains more control over OSINT funding.
National Counterintelligence Center (NCC, formerly NCSC)
Increased authority and operational scope.
The NCC is formally established with expanded authorities to direct, coordinate, and carry out counterintelligence activities, including strategic planning, countering foreign influence, and damage assessments. Its Director becomes the principal advisor on CI matters.
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Increased coordination and procedural change.
The FBI is now explicitly required to coordinate counterintelligence matters with the Director of the National Counterintelligence Center. New notification requirements are imposed for CI assessments/investigations of federal candidates or officeholders.
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Increased accountability, expanded operational tools, and enhanced employee benefits.
The CIA must issue new guidance for identifying and reporting 'novel and significant expenditures' to Congress. It also gains new authority to use unmanned aircraft systems for security at its installations. Additionally, certain CIA service is now treated as active-duty for VA benefits.
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
Increased operational flexibility and reduced external oversight.
The NRO Director can now approve certain acquisition agreements up to $500 million (up from $75 million) with congressional notification. Its advisory board is disestablished, and its authority to procure commercial imagery and data is expanded.
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)
Reduced external oversight.
The NGA's advisory board is disestablished.
Department of Energy (DOE) employees
Procedural change and increased security requirements.
DOE personnel are now required to report personal or official travel to 'countries of risk' and may be prohibited from bringing electronic devices to such countries.
Federal employees (general)
Increased protections and procedural change.
New protections are established against requiring political or ideological activism for positive personnel actions, and merit-based personnel decisions are reinforced.
United States persons
Increased privacy protections and enhanced oversight.
Intelligence community elements are now required to purge incidentally collected publicly available or commercially available information relating to U.S. persons. An annual report on U.S. persons on the terrorist watchlist is also mandated.
Congressional intelligence committees
Increased oversight and information access.
These committees will receive significantly more detailed and frequent reports and briefings across a wide array of intelligence community activities, including counterintelligence, OSINT, AI, and specific investigations.
Foreign entities/threat actors
Increased pressure and defensive measures.
The U.S. intelligence community is directed to enhance counterintelligence efforts, including offensive measures, and to develop an AI security playbook to defend against technology theft by threat actors.
Government of Ukraine
Increased support.
The Director of National Intelligence is mandated to ensure intelligence support, including information, intelligence, and imagery collection, sufficient to support Ukraine's defense and retaking of territory from Russia, unless there is a compelling interest not to provide such support.
President, Vice President, Members of Congress, and Federal Judges
Procedural change and streamlined access.
Access to Restricted Data under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is clarified, explicitly exempting these officials from standard clearance requirements and mandating a streamlined verification process.