Stop Super PAC-Candidate Coordination Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Ramirez, Delia C. [D-IL-3]
- Committees
- Committee on House Administration (primary)
- Last action
- Sep 9, 2025
Bottom line
The bill aims to significantly tighten campaign finance regulations by reclassifying certain coordinated spending as direct contributions and restricting federal officials' fundraising for Super PACs, thereby limiting the influence of large, unregulated money in federal elections.
What it actually does
This bill amends the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) to explicitly define certain 'coordinated expenditures' as direct contributions to candidates, subjecting them to federal contribution limits and prohibitions. It establishes detailed criteria for what constitutes a coordinated expenditure and defines 'coordinated spenders' based on relationships with candidates or campaigns. Additionally, it clarifies and strengthens the ban on federal candidates and officeholders fundraising for Super PACs.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that this bill is a crucial step to close existing loopholes that allow Super PACs to effectively act as extensions of candidate campaigns while circumventing federal contribution limits. They contend it will reduce the influence of 'dark money,' increase transparency, level the playing field for candidates, and restore integrity and public trust in the electoral process by preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.
Opponents contend
Opponents contend that the bill imposes unconstitutional restrictions on free speech and association, particularly for independent expenditure groups and political consultants. They argue that the broad definitions of coordination, the removal of firewall protections, and the extensive look-back periods for former campaign staff are overly burdensome, vague, and would chill legitimate political discourse and advocacy, making it harder for groups to inform voters.
The bill is relatively short, but its dense legal definitions and intricate criteria for coordination require careful reading to understand its full implications. An informed reader would need sufficient time to parse the technical language.
Section 2(a)
Coordinated Expenditures Treated as Contributions
This provision amends the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) to explicitly classify any payment made by an outside person for a 'coordinated expenditure' (as defined later in the bill) as a direct contribution to a candidate. This means such spending would be subject to existing federal campaign contribution limits and prohibitions, which are significantly stricter than rules for independent expenditures.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this provision is essential to close a major loophole that allows Super PACs to effectively operate as extensions of campaigns, circumventing direct contribution limits and undermining the intent of campaign finance laws.
Critics contend
Opponents might argue that this reclassification infringes on the First Amendment rights of independent groups to engage in political speech, as it treats spending that is not directly controlled by a campaign as if it were a direct donation.
Tradeoffs
This provision balances the government's interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption in elections against the free speech rights of independent political organizations.
Section 2(b), adding new section 325(a)
Definition of 'Coordinated Expenditure'
This section broadly defines 'coordinated expenditure' to include any spending made 'in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of' a candidate or committee, or their agents. It also covers payments for communications that republish, disseminate, or distribute campaign materials prepared by the candidate or committee. Exceptions are made for bona fide news stories/commentary and candidate debates.
Section 2(b), adding new section 325(b)
Criteria for 'Coordination Described' and Firewall Removal
This section clarifies that a payment is coordinated if it is 'not made entirely independently' of the candidate or committee, including any general understanding. It explicitly states that discussions solely about legislative or policy matters do not constitute coordination, *unless* they involve campaign advertising, strategy, polling, or fundraising. Crucially, it removes the use of a 'firewall' as a safe harbor, meaning an organization can be found to have coordinated regardless of internal procedures to restrict information sharing.
Section 2(b), adding new section 325(c)
Definition of 'Coordinated Spender'
This section defines a 'coordinated spender' as a person (other than a political party committee) whose payments for 'covered communications' are automatically considered coordinated with a candidate. Criteria include groups formed at a candidate's suggestion (within 4 years), groups for which a candidate fundraises, groups managed by former campaign staff (within 4 years), groups retaining campaign professionals (within 2 years), or groups managed by/discussing campaigns with immediate family members of the candidate.
Section 2(b), adding new section 325(d)
Definition of 'Covered Communication'
This section defines 'covered communication' as a public communication that expressly advocates for a candidate's election or defeat, promotes/supports/attacks/opposes a candidate (regardless of express advocacy), or refers to a candidate during specific 'applicable election periods' (120 days before a general election, 60 days before a primary). For congressional candidates, the communication must be disseminated in the relevant jurisdiction.
Section 2(b), adding new section 325(e)
Penalties for Coordinated Expenditure Violations
This section establishes severe penalties for knowingly and willfully making a contribution that consists of a payment for a coordinated expenditure. The fine would be the greater of 300% of the amount by which the payment exceeds the applicable contribution limit, or 300% of the entire payment if the person is prohibited from making any contribution. Directors, managers, or officers of the violating entity are made jointly and severally liable if the penalty is not paid within one year.
Section 3
Ban on Fundraising for Super PACs by Federal Candidates and Officeholders
This section amends FECA to explicitly prohibit federal candidates and officeholders from soliciting, receiving, directing, or transferring funds to or on behalf of any political committee (or its account) or 527 organization that accepts donations not complying with FECA limits and prohibitions. This effectively bans federal officials from fundraising for Super PACs and similar 'dark money' groups, with exceptions for state or local party committees or candidates.
This clause explicitly states that a payment can be determined as coordinated 'without regard to whether or not the person established and used a firewall or similar procedures to restrict the sharing of information.'
Section 325(b)(4)
Why it matters:This is a significant departure from current FEC guidance and industry practice, which often relies on firewalls to demonstrate independence. Its placement might be seen as technical rather than a headline policy change, despite its profound impact.
Case for: Proponents argue that firewalls have proven ineffective or easily circumvented in practice, and removing this safe harbor is necessary to ensure genuine independence between campaigns and outside groups, thereby preventing subtle forms of coordination.
Case against: Opponents contend that firewalls are a practical and necessary tool for organizations to manage internal communications and comply with existing rules. Their removal creates an extremely difficult, if not impossible, standard for demonstrating independence, which critics argue will chill political speech.
Estimated impact: High, as it fundamentally changes compliance strategies for independent expenditure groups and increases their legal risk.
These clauses define a 'coordinated spender' to include a person established, directed, or managed by anyone who, during the *4-year period* (for former staff/advisers) or *2-year period* (for professional services) ending on the payment date, had specific professional or employment ties to the candidate or committee.
Section 325(c)(2)(C) and (D)
Why it matters:These are technical details within a lengthy definition, but they have significant implications for the post-employment activities of political professionals and the formation of new independent groups. Their specific placement might obscure their broad impact.
Case for: Supporters argue that substantial look-back periods are necessary to prevent former campaign operatives and consultants from immediately transitioning to 'independent' groups that are still effectively extensions of the campaign, leveraging their insider knowledge and relationships.
Case against: Critics would argue that these 4-year and 2-year look-back periods are excessively long, infringing on individuals' ability to seek employment and engage in political activity after leaving a campaign, and could be seen as an unconstitutional restriction on free association and speech.
Estimated impact: High, as it significantly restricts career paths for political professionals and the ability to form independent groups with any past ties to a candidate.