A complete transformation of H.R. 5334. While v5 entirely replaced the original bill's content with the "Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026," v6 retains these comprehensive sanctions as Division A and adds back the original bill's purpose as a new Division B, "Supporting Early-Childhood Educators' Deductions." This makes v6 a multi-purpose bill, fundamentally different from the sanctions-only v5.
Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026
- Sponsor
- Rep. Panetta, Jimmy [D-CA-19]
- Committees
- Ways and Means Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Sep 18, 2026
Bottom line
The bill enacts a comprehensive and aggressive sanctions regime against Russia and Iran while also providing a tax benefit for early childhood educators.
What it actually does
This bill, divided into two main parts, significantly expands and strengthens sanctions against the Russian Federation and extends existing sanctions against Iran. Division A imposes wide-ranging sanctions on Russian officials, financial institutions, energy sector, and trade, including new duties on Russian goods and on countries that facilitate sanctions evasion or purchase Russian energy. Division B, an unrelated provision, expands the educator expense deduction to include early childhood educators.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that these robust sanctions are essential to hold the Russian Federation accountable for its aggression against Ukraine, to deter further destabilizing actions, and to cut off its financial and military resources. Extending Iran sanctions is seen as critical to counter its malign influence. The inclusion of early childhood educators in tax deductions is championed as a way to support vital professionals and improve educational access.
Opponents contend
Critics might contend that such extensive sanctions could have severe unintended consequences, including destabilizing global energy markets, increasing inflation, and potentially harming allied economies reliant on Russian resources. Some may also argue against the omnibus nature of the bill, suggesting that unrelated tax policy should not be attached to critical foreign policy legislation, potentially obscuring debate on each component.
The bill is lengthy and contains highly technical legal and financial language, requiring significant time and expertise to fully comprehend. Given its enrolled status, the public review period for this version has already passed.
DIVISION A, TITLE I, SEC. 102
Sanctions on Russian Government Officials and Supporters
This section mandates the President to impose sanctions on a wide array of Russian government officials, including the President, Prime Minister, and various ministers, as well as military commanders and intelligence chiefs. It also targets foreign persons who knowingly support Russia's defense industrial base, facilitate sanctions evasion, undermine Ukraine's military readiness or critical infrastructure, or are oligarchs benefiting from association with the Russian government. Additionally, it sanctions foreign vessels used to circumvent sanctions and their operators.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that directly targeting key Russian officials and their enablers is crucial to exert maximum pressure on the Kremlin, disrupt its war efforts, and hold individuals accountable for their roles in aggression and human rights abuses. This broad approach closes loopholes and prevents circumvention.
Critics contend
Critics might argue that such extensive targeting could lead to unintended humanitarian consequences, complicate future diplomatic efforts, or push Russia further into alliances with other adversarial nations, making de-escalation more difficult. Some may also raise concerns about the broad definitions of 'support' and 'affiliation'.
Tradeoffs
The provision balances the desire for strong punitive action against Russia with the potential for broader geopolitical and economic ripple effects. It also navigates the tension between comprehensive enforcement and the risk of overreach or unintended harm.
DIVISION A, TITLE I, SEC. 103
Sanctions on Russian Financial Institutions
This section mandates sanctions on the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, Sberbank, VTB Bank, Gazprombank, and other government-owned Russian financial institutions, along with their subsidiaries. It also requires sanctions on foreign financial institutions that conduct significant transactions with these entities. The sanctions include blocking property, imposing CAATSA sanctions, and restricting correspondent and payable-through accounts. It also explicitly clarifies that interest earned on immobilized Russian sovereign assets does not need to be returned.
DIVISION A, TITLE I, SEC. 107
Prohibition on Investment by United States Persons in the Russian Federation
This section prohibits United States persons, wherever located, from making new investments in the Russian Federation. It also bans the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply of certain services (as identified by the Treasury Secretary) to any person in Russia. Furthermore, it prohibits any US person from approving, financing, facilitating, or guaranteeing transactions by foreign persons that would be prohibited if performed by a US person.
DIVISION A, TITLE I, SEC. 111
Prohibition on Uranium Imports from Russia and Sanctions on Rosatom
This section mandates the President to implement a prohibition on importing uranium from the Russian Federation, including from Rosatom State Atomic Energy Corporation. It also requires the President to impose sanctions, including asset blocking and visa restrictions, on leaders, officials, and principal shareholders of Rosatom or its subsidiaries, beginning on a specified date.
DIVISION A, TITLE I, SEC. 112
Increase in Duties on Goods Imported from the Russian Federation
This section mandates the President to increase the rate of duty for all goods imported into the United States from the Russian Federation to a rate of up to 500 percent ad valorem. This increased duty applies to all goods, including energy products, and is in addition to any other existing duties, fees, or charges.
DIVISION A, TITLE I, SEC. 113
Duties on Countries Purchasing Russian Energy or Facilitating Sanctions Evasion
This section mandates the President to impose duties of up to 100 percent ad valorem on all goods imported into the United States from countries that are among the top 5 largest importers of Russian crude oil or natural gas, or among the top 5 countries facilitating Russian oil sanctions evasion. These duties are in addition to existing tariffs. The United States Trade Representative can modify these rates based on a country's actions to increase or decrease Russian energy purchases or sanctions evasion.
DIVISION A, TITLE II, SEC. 201
Extension of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996
This section amends Section 13(b) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, extending its termination date from 2026 to 2031. This effectively prolongs the authority for the President to impose sanctions on persons engaged in certain activities related to Iran's weapons of mass destruction, missile programs, and support for terrorism.
DIVISION B, SEC. 1
Educator Expense Deduction for Early Childhood Educators
This section amends the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to expand the existing educator expense deduction. Currently, this deduction is available to kindergarten through grade 12 teachers. This amendment extends eligibility to early childhood educators, defining 'school' to include facilities providing educational or childcare services for more than two individuals under age 6, operating at public expense or receiving fees. This change applies to expenses paid or incurred in taxable years beginning after December 31, 2025.
This clause specifies that sanctions can be imposed on foreign persons who engage in deceptive or structured transactions or dealings that circumvent US sanctions, including through the use of digital currencies or assets.
DIVISION A, TITLE I, SEC. 102(b)(2)(G)(iv)
Why it matters:While part of a comprehensive sanctions framework, the explicit mention of digital currencies and assets highlights a modern challenge in sanctions enforcement. Its placement might be standard legislative practice for detailed criteria, but it's a critical update to enforcement mechanisms.
Case for: Proponents argue this is essential to modernize sanctions enforcement, closing potential loopholes that sanctioned entities might exploit using emerging financial technologies like cryptocurrencies, ensuring the effectiveness of the overall sanctions regime.
Case against: Critics might argue that such broad language regarding digital assets could create uncertainty for legitimate businesses operating in the digital currency space, potentially leading to over-compliance or stifling innovation without clear guidance.
Estimated impact: Significantly expands the scope of sanctions enforcement to include digital assets, impacting entities attempting to use them for evasion.
This rule of construction clarifies that US or foreign financial institutions holding immobilized Russian sovereign assets are not required to return any interest earned on those assets to the Russian Federation, with an exception for interest earned on blocked assets of other persons.
DIVISION A, TITLE I, SEC. 103(e)(1)
Why it matters:This is a critical clarification regarding a contentious legal and financial issue surrounding sovereign assets. Its placement ensures legal precision without being a primary headline of the sanctions regime, which focuses on imposing new restrictions.
Case for: Proponents argue this clarification is vital for legal certainty and to ensure that any financial benefit derived from immobilized Russian assets can be directed towards supporting Ukraine, rather than inadvertently benefiting the aggressor.
Case against: Critics might argue that retaining interest on sovereign assets, even from a sanctioned state, could set a problematic international legal precedent regarding sovereign immunity and asset seizure, potentially leading to challenges or retaliatory actions.
Estimated impact: Clarifies the legal status of potentially billions in interest earned on immobilized Russian sovereign assets, impacting their potential use for Ukraine's reconstruction.
These subsections establish a detailed and stringent Congressional review process for the President to terminate any sanction, restriction, or duty under Division A. It includes a 30-day (or 60-day during summer) review period during which termination cannot take effect, and allows for a 'joint resolution of disapproval' in Congress. Crucially, approval of a motion to proceed to a joint resolution of disapproval and approval of the joint resolution itself in the Senate requires a three-fifths affirmative vote of Members, duly chosen and sworn.
DIVISION A, TITLE I, SEC. 117(b) and (c)
Why it matters:These procedural details are highly consequential for the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches regarding sanctions policy. Their detailed inclusion ensures Congress retains significant oversight and a high bar for lifting sanctions, reflecting a desire to prevent a President from unilaterally easing pressure on Russia or Iran.
Case for: Proponents argue that this mechanism ensures robust Congressional oversight over critical foreign policy decisions, preventing a President from unilaterally reversing sanctions without significant legislative buy-in, thereby ensuring long-term policy consistency and accountability.
Case against: Critics might argue that such a high bar for termination could make sanctions regimes overly rigid and difficult to adjust in response to changing geopolitical realities or diplomatic opportunities, potentially hindering the President's flexibility in foreign policy.
Estimated impact: Significantly shifts the balance of power for sanctions termination towards Congress, making it substantially harder for a President to unilaterally lift sanctions imposed by this Act.