Climate Resilient Elections Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Morelle, Joseph D. [D-NY-25]
- Committees
- Committee on House Administration (primary)
- Last action
- Sep 16, 2025
Bottom line
This bill aims to enhance the resilience of state election systems against natural disasters, particularly those exacerbated by climate change, through planning requirements, federal studies, and grant funding.
What it actually does
H.R. 5407, the "Climate Resilient Elections Act," mandates that states receiving federal election assistance submit and regularly update continuity of operations plans to the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) for administering elections during major disasters. It also directs the Comptroller General to report on the impact of natural disasters on voter registration and federal assistance for election administration. Furthermore, the bill authorizes $100 million in grants over five fiscal years (2026-2030) for the EAC to award to states to strengthen election systems against climate change-driven disasters, covering activities like voter education, official training, and improving voting systems.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that the bill is crucial for safeguarding democratic processes against the increasing threat of climate change-driven natural disasters, which have historically disrupted elections, disenfranchised voters, and undermined public confidence. They emphasize the importance of proactive planning and federal support to ensure secure, accessible, and fair elections, especially for underserved communities disproportionately affected by such events, citing numerous past hurricane and wildfire impacts on elections.
Opponents contend
Critics might argue that mandating continuity of operations plans and providing federal grants for election resilience could be seen as an overreach of federal authority into state and local election administration, traditionally a state responsibility. Some may also contend that the funding authorized is insufficient to address the scale of the problem or that it diverts resources from other critical election security concerns, such as cybersecurity. Others might object to the explicit link to "climate change-driven disasters," viewing it as an ideological framing rather than a purely administrative concern.
The bill is relatively short and clearly structured, making it accessible for an informed reader to understand its core provisions within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 3, Title IX of the Help America Vote Act of 2002
State Continuity of Operations Plans for Elections
This section requires any state receiving federal election assistance to submit a continuity of operations plan to the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) by September 30, 2028. These plans must detail how the state will administer elections in the event of a major disaster, considering the disasters most likely to occur in its jurisdiction. States must update these plans every five years until 2043 and retain them for five years after submission. The EAC is mandated to disseminate these plans publicly, while protecting sensitive information.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that requiring states to develop and regularly update disaster preparedness plans is a common-sense measure to protect the integrity of elections, especially given the increasing frequency and intensity of natural disasters. They contend that proactive planning is essential to prevent voter disenfranchisement and maintain public trust when unforeseen events strike.
Critics contend
Some critics might argue that this mandate adds an unfunded or underfunded burden on state and local election offices, which already face significant resource constraints. They might also contend that states are already capable of developing such plans without a federal mandate, or that the federal government should not dictate specific planning requirements for state-run elections.
Tradeoffs
This provision balances the federal interest in ensuring robust election administration with concerns about state autonomy in managing elections. It aims to standardize a baseline of preparedness while allowing states flexibility in tailoring plans to local risks.
Section 4
GAO Report on Disaster Impact on Voter Registration and Federal Election Assistance
This section directs the Comptroller General of the United States (via the Government Accountability Office, GAO) to conduct an analysis and study. The GAO must analyze how natural disasters affect voter registration rates and identify ways the federal government can better assist states and local governments in administering elections during major disasters. It also requires a study on any necessary legislative authorizations for efficiently deploying emergency resources to support election infrastructure. A report on these findings is due to Congress by September 30, 2026.
Section 5
Election Assistance Commission Grants for Climate Resilient Elections
This section authorizes the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to award grants to states to enhance the resilience of their voting systems against "covered major disasters" (defined in Section 6 as major disasters declared by the President during a federal election voting period, including natural catastrophes, fires, floods, explosions, or acts of terrorism). States can use these funds for activities such as improving disaster preparedness, educating voters, training election officials, developing continuity plans, upgrading voting systems, and establishing disaster-specific voter hotlines. The bill authorizes $20 million annually for fiscal years 2026 through 2030, totaling $100 million.
Defines "covered major disaster" broadly to include not only natural catastrophes (such as hurricanes, fires, floods, extreme heat, and drought) but also "a fire, flood, or explosion, regardless of cause; or an act of terrorism."
Section 6(1)
Why it matters:While consolidating definitions in a dedicated section is standard legislative practice, the inclusion of "act of terrorism" significantly expands the scope of the grant program and planning requirements beyond what the bill's title and findings might immediately suggest, potentially broadening its application without explicit emphasis.
Case for: Proponents would argue that election infrastructure needs to be resilient against all major disruptions, not just natural ones. Including terrorism ensures a comprehensive approach to election security and continuity of operations, aligning with the Department of Homeland Security's designation of election infrastructure as critical infrastructure.
Case against: Critics might argue that by including "act of terrorism" under a "Climate Resilient Elections Act," the bill's focus becomes diluted, and funds intended for climate-specific resilience might be diverted to other security concerns. This could be seen as an attempt to broaden the bill's applicability without explicitly stating it in the main title.
Estimated impact: Expands the scope of eligible activities for grants and the types of disasters states must plan for under Sections 3 and 5, potentially increasing the demand for the authorized funds beyond climate-specific needs.