No Budget, No Pay Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Moore, Tim [R-NC-14]
- Committees
- Committee on House Administration (primary)
- Last action
- Oct 10, 2025
Bottom line
The 'No Budget, No Pay Act' aims to incentivize timely completion of the federal budget and appropriations process by withholding congressional salaries if deadlines are missed.
What it actually does
This bill prohibits Members of Congress from receiving their pay after October 1 of any fiscal year if Congress has not, by that date, approved a concurrent resolution on the budget and passed all regular appropriations bills for that fiscal year. It also specifies that any pay withheld during such a period cannot be received retroactively. The determination of non-compliance and the period of withheld pay would be made by the House and Senate Budget and Appropriations Chairs.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that this bill promotes fiscal responsibility and accountability by directly linking congressional pay to the timely execution of one of Congress's most fundamental duties: passing a budget and appropriations bills. They contend it would create a strong incentive for lawmakers to overcome partisan gridlock and avoid government shutdowns, ensuring that essential government functions are funded on time.
Opponents contend
Critics might argue that while well-intentioned, such a measure is largely symbolic and does not address the underlying political and policy disagreements that often cause budget impasses. They may also contend that it could disproportionately affect Members of Congress who rely solely on their congressional salary, potentially discouraging public service from a diverse range of economic backgrounds, or that it could lead to rushed, poorly considered legislation just to avoid a pay cut.
The bill is very short and clear, making it highly accessible for any reader to understand its core mechanism and implications.
Section 3
Timely Approval of Budget and Appropriations Bills
This section establishes the core requirement of the bill. It mandates that by October 1 of each fiscal year, both the House and Senate must have approved a concurrent resolution on the budget and passed all regular appropriations bills for that fiscal year. This sets the condition for whether Members of Congress will continue to receive their pay.
Supporters argue
Proponents argue that setting a clear, non-negotiable deadline for budget and appropriations passage is crucial for restoring fiscal discipline and predictability to government operations. They believe this provision directly addresses the chronic delays that often lead to continuing resolutions or government shutdowns.
Critics contend
Opponents might argue that while the intent is good, the legislative process is inherently complex, and rigid deadlines can sometimes force suboptimal compromises or exacerbate partisan tensions, rather than resolving them. They may also point out that external events or unforeseen circumstances can make adherence to such strict deadlines challenging.
Tradeoffs
This provision balances the desire for timely legislative action with the realities of complex political negotiations and the need for thorough consideration of spending priorities. It creates tension between speed and comprehensive deliberation.
Section 4
No Pay Without Compliance
This section outlines the direct consequence of failing to meet the requirements in Section 3. It states that no funds can be used to pay any Member of Congress for any period during which Congress is not in compliance. Crucially, it also prohibits retroactive pay, meaning that if pay is withheld, it cannot be recovered later, even after compliance is achieved.
Section 5
Determination Process for Compliance
This section details how compliance with the budget and appropriations deadlines will be determined. It assigns the responsibility to the House Budget and Appropriations Chairs and the Senate Budget and Appropriations Chairs. On October 1 of each fiscal year, these chairs are required to determine if Congress is in compliance with Section 3 and to certify the period during which Members may not be paid. This certification is provided to the Secretary of the Senate and the Chief Administrative Officer of the House.
The definition of 'Member of Congress' for the purposes of this Act explicitly excludes the Vice President.
Section 2(3)(B)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice for defining terms and their scope. It clarifies who is subject to the pay withholding provisions.
Case for: Excluding the Vice President clarifies that the bill's intent is to target the legislative branch's responsibility for the budget process, as the Vice President's primary role is executive, despite also serving as President of the Senate.
Case against: No specific case against this exclusion is typically raised, as the Vice President's role in the legislative process is distinct from that of a voting Member of Congress.
Estimated impact: Ensures the Vice President's salary is not affected by this bill's provisions.
The Act will take effect on September 29, 2027.
Section 6
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice for specifying effective dates. The delay allows for a transition period and for Congress to prepare for the new requirements.
Case for: A delayed effective date provides Congress with ample time to adjust its procedures and expectations, ensuring that the first application of the 'No Budget, No Pay' rule is not immediate and allows for a full legislative cycle to prepare.
Case against: Critics might argue that delaying the effective date diminishes the urgency and immediate impact of the bill, potentially allowing current members to avoid its consequences during their present term. They might prefer an immediate or much sooner effective date to demonstrate stronger commitment.
Estimated impact: Delays the implementation of the bill's pay withholding provisions for approximately two years from its introduction date.