Marine Fisheries Habitat Protection Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Ezell, Mike [R-MS-4]
- Committees
- Natural Resources Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Sep 15, 2026
Bottom line
The bill creates a structured federal program to convert decommissioned offshore oil and gas infrastructure into marine habitats, shifting long-term liability to states in exchange for financial incentives derived from industry cost savings.
What it actually does
This bill amends the National Fishing Enhancement Act of 1984 and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to establish a formal process for converting inactive offshore oil and gas platforms and pipelines into artificial reefs. It outlines steps for assessment, eligibility determination, and approval for 'Reefing in Place,' including provisions for states to assume liability for these structures in exchange for a portion of the cost savings realized by the operators. The bill also prohibits federal agencies from issuing removal orders for inactive structures while they are undergoing the reefing evaluation process.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that this bill offers a 'win-win' solution, simultaneously promoting marine biodiversity and enhancing fishing opportunities by utilizing existing infrastructure, while also providing a more cost-effective decommissioning option for the energy industry. They contend that these structures already serve as de facto reefs, and formalizing their conversion will ensure their continued ecological benefit under state oversight.
Opponents contend
Opponents might contend that leaving industrial structures in the ocean, even as artificial reefs, poses long-term environmental risks and shifts the burden of maintenance and potential future liabilities from private companies to state taxpayers. They may argue that full removal is the most environmentally responsible approach to decommissioning, ensuring a return to the natural state of the seabed.
The bill is relatively short and clearly structured, making it accessible for an informed reader to evaluate its core provisions and implications within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 2(a)(1), amending 33 U.S.C. 2105
Revised Definitions for Artificial Reefs and Decommissioning
This section significantly expands and clarifies definitions within the National Fishing Enhancement Act of 1984. Key terms like 'Artificial reef,' 'Decommissioning,' 'Approved structure,' 'Eligible structure,' 'Inactive structure,' 'Partial removal,' and 'Reef in Place' are defined to establish the scope and procedures for converting offshore oil and gas infrastructure into marine habitats. It also defines 'Applicant' as the party responsible for decommissioning, and 'Reef Planning Area' as designated zones for reefing activities.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that clear and comprehensive definitions are essential for a functional 'Rigs-to-Reefs' program, reducing ambiguity for industry and regulators alike, and ensuring consistent application of the law to maximize environmental benefits.
Critics contend
No specific opposition is typically raised against definitional sections themselves, though critics of the overall policy may view these definitions as facilitating a problematic approach to decommissioning.
Tradeoffs
The definitions aim to balance regulatory clarity with operational flexibility for industry, while also setting the stage for environmental protection through habitat creation.
Section 2(a)(2), amending 33 U.S.C. 2106(a)
Process for Reefing in Place
This section outlines a multi-step process for an 'Applicant' (oil and gas operator) to convert an 'Inactive Structure' into an artificial reef. It begins with a 'Notice of Intent to Reef,' followed by an assessment of the structure's ecological value and economic benefits. The Director of BSEE, in consultation with NOAA, then determines if it's an 'Eligible Structure.' If eligible, a 'Reef Planning Area' is designated, and final approval for 'Reefing in Place' is granted by the Secretary of the Interior once specific conditions (e.g., wells plugged, hazardous liquids removed, liability transfer to a state) are met.
Section 2(a)(2), amending 33 U.S.C. 2106(c)
State Artificial Reef Programs and Liability Transfer
This provision allows states with artificial reef programs to enter into agreements with applicants to assume responsibility and liability for 'Approved Structures' (reefed platforms). In exchange, the state receives funds from the applicant, which cannot exceed 50% of the cost savings the applicant gains from reefing instead of full removal, unless the applicant agrees to a higher amount. Upon acceptance into a state program, the applicant is relieved of further responsibility or liability for the structure, with the state becoming solely responsible for its maintenance and any associated liabilities.
Section 2(d), amending 43 U.S.C. 1334(e)
Prohibition on Removal Orders During Reefing Process
This section amends the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to prohibit the Secretary of the Interior from issuing or enforcing a 'Removal Order' for an 'Inactive Structure' during various stages of the 'Reef in Place' process. This includes periods from the initial 'Notice of Intent to Reef,' through the assessment, eligibility determination, and for up to three years after an 'Eligible Structure' determination, as well as during any appeal period. An exception is made if the Secretary determines the inactive structure poses a 'substantial and imminent threat' to navigational safety or the marine environment.
A condition for final approval of 'Reef in Place' is that the Applicant must have transferred, or have an agreement to transfer, liability to a State agency upon completion of the reefing activity.
Section 2(a)(2), amending 33 U.S.C. 2106(a)(5)(A)(v)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice for outlining procedural requirements, but its placement within a longer list means its significance for liability transfer could be overlooked by a casual reader.
Case for: Supporters argue this ensures that the long-term stewardship and maintenance of the artificial reef are clearly assigned to a governmental entity (the State) that is equipped to manage such assets, relieving the original operator of perpetual liability.
Case against: Critics might argue that this provision, while seemingly procedural, is the ultimate mechanism for shifting significant, potentially indefinite, financial and environmental liability from private corporations to public entities, which may not be adequately resourced for the task.
Estimated impact: This provision has a high impact, as it fundamentally reallocates long-term financial and legal responsibility for hundreds of potential artificial reefs from the private sector to state governments.
The amount of funds a State receives from an Applicant for assuming responsibility and liability for an Approved Structure 'does not exceed 50 percent of the cost savings gained by the Applicant due to reefing as determined by the Applicant and approved by the State, unless the Applicant consents to a greater amount.'
Section 2(a)(2), amending 33 U.S.C. 2106(c)(1)(B)
Why it matters:This is a specific financial parameter within a broader programmatic description. While not intentionally evasive, the precise mechanism and limitation on state funding could be easily missed by a reader focusing on the general concept of state participation.
Case for: Proponents argue this provides a fair and transparent mechanism for states to receive compensation, directly tied to the economic benefit realized by the operator. The 'unless the Applicant consents to a greater amount' clause allows for flexibility and negotiation.
Case against: Critics might argue that allowing the Applicant to 'determine' the cost savings, even with state approval, creates a potential for underestimation. Furthermore, the 50% cap, unless voluntarily increased by the Applicant, might be insufficient to cover the true long-term costs and risks assumed by the state, effectively subsidizing industry decommissioning costs with state resources.
Estimated impact: This provision directly dictates the financial compensation states receive for assuming long-term liability, potentially involving hundreds of millions or billions of dollars in aggregate over decades, depending on the number of structures reefed and the actual cost savings.