A small clarification was made to the reporting requirements. Section 5(a) was modified to explicitly name the specific congressional committees that will receive the Government Accountability Office's report, rather than referring to 'appropriate committees of Congress'. The bill's overall policy direction remains unchanged.
Combatting Money Laundering in Cyber Crime Act of 2025
- Sponsor
- Rep. Fitzgerald, Scott [R-WI-5]
- Committees
- Judiciary Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Apr 15, 2026
Bottom line
The bill aims to modernize and strengthen federal law enforcement's capacity to combat cyber-enabled financial crimes and money laundering by broadening the Secret Service's jurisdiction and extending key anti-money laundering programs.
What it actually does
This bill expands the investigative authority of the United States Secret Service to include crimes related to unlicensed money transmitting businesses, money laundering, and structured transactions, particularly in the context of digital asset transactions. It also removes the 'federally insured' qualifier for financial institutions in fraud investigations, extends the authorization for the FinCEN Exchange program from 5 to 10 years, and extends certain international financial institution reporting requirements.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that this legislation is crucial for equipping the Secret Service with the necessary tools to keep pace with the evolving landscape of cyber criminal activity, especially those leveraging digital assets. They contend it closes critical jurisdictional gaps, enhances the integrity of the financial system, and reinforces national security by targeting transnational illicit finance.
Opponents contend
Opponents might raise concerns about potential mission creep for the Secret Service, suggesting that expanding its investigative powers could duplicate efforts of other federal agencies or divert resources from its primary protective duties. Some privacy advocates may also express apprehension regarding increased government surveillance of digital asset transactions.
The bill is concise and clearly structured, allowing for a quick yet thorough understanding of its provisions and implications.
Section 2
Expansion of Secret Service Investigative Authorities
This section significantly expands the investigative authority of the United States Secret Service. It adds crimes related to unlicensed money transmitting businesses (18 U.S.C. 1960), money laundering, and structured transactions to the list of offenses the Secret Service can investigate. Crucially, it also removes the 'federally insured' qualifier from financial institutions in the context of fraud investigations, broadening the Secret Service's reach to all financial institutions as defined in title 31.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this expansion is vital for the Secret Service to effectively combat modern financial crimes, especially those leveraging digital assets and complex money laundering schemes that often transcend traditional banking systems. It closes jurisdictional gaps and enhances national security by targeting illicit finance.
Critics contend
Critics might express concerns that expanding Secret Service jurisdiction could lead to mission creep, potentially duplicating efforts of other agencies or diverting resources from its primary protective mission. They might also argue it could infringe on privacy or lead to over-policing of emerging financial technologies.
Tradeoffs
The bill balances the need for enhanced law enforcement capabilities in a rapidly evolving digital financial landscape against potential concerns regarding federal agency scope, resource allocation, and individual privacy in digital transactions.
Section 3
Extension of FinCEN Exchange Program
This section extends the authorization for the FinCEN Exchange program from its current 5-year term to 10 years. The FinCEN Exchange is a public-private partnership designed to facilitate the sharing of information between financial institutions and law enforcement agencies to combat various financial crimes, including money laundering and terrorist financing.
Section 4
Extension of International Financial Institutions Reporting Requirements
This section extends the period for which the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, must submit a report to Congress. This report concerns the efforts of international financial institutions to implement policies aimed at preventing the financing of proliferation. The reporting period is extended from 6 years to 10 years under the Otto Warmbier North Korea Nuclear Sanctions and Enforcement Act of 2019.
Section 5
Government Accountability Office Study on Anti-Money Laundering Act Implementation
This section mandates the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to conduct a study and submit a report to the House Financial Services Committee and the Senate Banking Committee within one year of the bill's enactment. The study's primary focus will be to evaluate the implementation of Section 6102 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020, specifically assessing law enforcement's ability to identify and deter money laundering in cyber crimes.
This provision removes the phrase 'federally insured' from the description of financial institutions in 18 U.S.C. 3056(b)(3). This change broadens the Secret Service's investigative authority for fraud to encompass fraud against *any* financial institution, not just those that are federally insured.
Section 2(2)(B)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice for making precise amendments to existing statutes. While impactful, its brevity and location within a technical amendment make it easy to miss, though it is not necessarily intended to be evasive.
Case for: Proponents would argue this clarifies and broadens the Secret Service's ability to investigate fraud against all types of financial institutions, recognizing that fraud can occur against non-federally insured entities (e.g., certain digital asset exchanges or state-chartered institutions) that still pose a risk to the broader financial system and consumers.
Case against: Critics might argue this represents an unnecessary expansion of federal jurisdiction into areas traditionally handled by state authorities or other federal agencies, potentially leading to duplication of effort or overreach without clear justification for the Secret Service specifically.
Estimated impact: Significantly broadens the scope of financial institutions whose fraud cases can be investigated by the Secret Service, potentially increasing their caseload and reach into new segments of the financial industry.