LANDED Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Smith, Christopher H. [R-NJ-4]
- Committees
- Homeland Security Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Nov 13, 2025
Bottom line
The LANDED Act aims to enhance state and local law enforcement capabilities to counter dangerous drones by providing federal authorization, oversight, and funding mechanisms, while navigating complex airspace and legal considerations.
What it actually does
This bill establishes a framework for state and local law enforcement agencies to acquire, deploy, and operate counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) mitigation technologies to detect and stop drones involved in unlawful activities. It mandates a federal application and approval process, requires coordination with federal agencies like DHS, FAA, and the Attorney General, and includes provisions for deconfliction reporting and a grant program to support these efforts. The bill also grants state law enforcement specific authorities to act against threatening drones, overriding certain federal statutes.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that the proliferation of drones poses significant threats to public safety, national security installations, and critical infrastructure, necessitating expanded capabilities for state and local law enforcement. They contend that this bill provides a crucial, coordinated framework to address these evolving threats, ensuring that local authorities have the tools and training to respond effectively to nefarious drone activities while maintaining necessary federal oversight to prevent airspace conflicts and ensure safe operation.
Opponents contend
Opponents might express concerns about the potential for misuse of counter-UAS technologies, including interference with legitimate drone operations, civilian communications, and privacy. They may argue that granting broad authorities to state and local agencies, even with federal oversight, could lead to inconsistent application, legal challenges, and unintended consequences, potentially infringing on civil liberties or creating a patchwork of regulations that complicate national airspace management.
The bill is relatively short and accessible, allowing an informed reader to understand its core provisions and implications within a reasonable timeframe.
Section 3
Counter-UAS Mitigation Law Enforcement Cooperation
This section directs the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Attorney General and FAA Administrator, to establish policies and procedures allowing state law enforcement agencies to acquire, deploy, operate, and train with approved counter-UAS mitigation systems. It outlines a mandatory application and agreement process, specifying the types of systems, authorized responses to threats, operational terms, and post-event reporting requirements. This is the core mechanism for empowering state and local authorities.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this provision is essential for closing critical security gaps, allowing local authorities to quickly respond to drone threats that federal agencies may not be able to address in a timely manner. They emphasize the robust federal oversight mechanisms built into the process to ensure responsible deployment and minimize risks.
Critics contend
Critics may contend that granting such broad powers to state and local law enforcement could lead to inconsistent application, potential for misuse, and interference with legitimate drone operations or civilian communications. They might argue that the complex federal oversight could be cumbersome, hindering rapid response rather than enabling it.
Tradeoffs
The provision balances the need for enhanced local security capabilities against the risks of fragmented authority and potential interference with the national airspace and civilian communications. It seeks to deconflict federal and state authorities while empowering local response.
Section 3(d)
Waiver of Federal Laws for Counter-UAS Operations
This subsection explicitly states that state law enforcement agencies, once approved, may take actions to detect, identify, monitor, track, or mitigate credible drone threats 'Notwithstanding section 46502 of title 49, United States Code, or sections 32, 1030, and 1367 and chapters 119 and 206 of title 18, United States Code.' These federal laws generally prohibit interference with aircraft, computer fraud, destruction of aircraft, and wiretapping, meaning the bill grants state law enforcement immunity from these specific federal prohibitions when conducting authorized counter-UAS activities.
Section 4
Mandatory Drone Deconfliction Reporting
This section requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the FAA Administrator, to establish policies for mandatory non-emergency reporting of drone operations by federal, state, and local agencies. It mandates a database containing transponder IDs, dates, and times of drone usage, along with a method for agencies to check if a drone's transponder is currently in use within the database. The goal is to prevent accidental interference between authorized government drone operations and counter-UAS activities.
Section 6
Counter-UAS Security Grant Program
This section establishes the 'Counter-UAS Security Grant Program' within the Department of Homeland Security. Under this program, the Secretary, acting through the Administrator, will make grants available to eligible state law enforcement and emergency management agencies. These grants can be used for the acquisition of approved counter-UAS systems, fees for training approved personnel, and other appropriate administrative activities, with funds available for at least 24 months.
This subsection grants state law enforcement agencies, once approved, the authority to detect, identify, monitor, track, or mitigate credible drone threats, explicitly stating that these actions are permissible 'Notwithstanding section 46502 of title 49, United States Code, or sections 32, 1030, and 1367 and chapters 119 and 206 of title 18, United States Code.' These federal statutes relate to interference with aircraft, computer fraud, destruction of aircraft, and wiretapping, effectively providing a legal shield for state actions that would otherwise be prohibited.
Section 3(d)
Why it matters:The use of 'notwithstanding' clauses and statutory references is standard legislative practice for modifying existing law. However, in this context, it serves to grant significant new powers while sidestepping direct discussion of the federal prohibitions being overridden, which could be seen as a way to avoid drawing immediate attention to the scope of the legal immunity being granted.
Case for: Supporters argue that this legal immunity is absolutely essential for state law enforcement to operate effectively against drone threats without facing legal challenges under existing laws that were not designed for counter-UAS operations. They contend it removes legal ambiguity and empowers decisive action.
Case against: Critics might argue that explicitly overriding multiple federal statutes, including those related to wiretapping and property destruction, without more detailed justification or safeguards, could lead to potential abuses of power or unintended consequences regarding civil liberties and property rights. They might prefer a more transparent and narrowly tailored approach.
Estimated impact: The impact is significant, as it fundamentally alters the legal landscape for state law enforcement regarding drone interdiction, potentially affecting numerous future incidents and legal interpretations.
This subsection mandates that the Administrator (FAA) consider criteria from the Chair of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to determine if counter-UAS systems can be safely operated without disrupting civilian communications and information technology networks. It also requires the Secretary (DHS), Attorney General, and FAA Administrator to consult with the FCC Chair or NTIA Administrator to ensure approved counter-UAS systems do not adversely impact civilian telecommunications, communications spectrum, internet technology, or radio communications networks or systems.
Section 3(e)
Why it matters:This is a standard legislative approach to address technical and regulatory complexities by mandating inter-agency consultation. It's not necessarily evasive but reflects the highly technical nature of spectrum management and the need for expert input in deploying radio-frequency-based counter-UAS systems.
Case for: Proponents argue this consultation is absolutely critical to prevent unintended and potentially catastrophic interference with essential civilian communication systems, including emergency services, air traffic control, and internet connectivity. It ensures that security measures do not inadvertently create new public safety hazards.
Case against: No direct case against this provision is likely, as ensuring spectrum compatibility is a universally accepted goal. However, some might argue that the consultation process could be overly bureaucratic and slow down the deployment of urgently needed counter-UAS capabilities.
Estimated impact: The impact is potentially very large, as it aims to prevent widespread disruption of civilian communications, which could affect millions of people and critical services.