Technical corrections only. The changes between v2 and v3 reflect the bill's procedural progression from the House to the Senate, including updated header information and the addition of the House Clerk's name. No substantive policy changes were made to the bill's text.
Tehran Incitement to Violence Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Self, Keith [R-TX-3]
- Committees
- Foreign Relations Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Jun 9, 2026
Bottom line
The bill aims to deter state-sponsored incitement to violence by mandating sanctions against specific Iranian individuals and entities deemed responsible for advocating attacks on U.S. and Israeli leaders.
What it actually does
This bill mandates the President to determine, within 180 days of enactment and biennially thereafter, whether specific Iranian individuals and organizations meet criteria for sanctions. These criteria are based on their role in issuing or amplifying fatwas and other statements advocating violence, particularly against U.S. President Donald J. Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. If designated, these foreign persons would face property blocking and visa ineligibility.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that this bill is a crucial step to protect U.S. and Israeli national security by directly confronting and penalizing those who incite terrorism and violence against their leaders. They contend it holds perpetrators accountable, sends a strong message to the Iranian regime, and reinforces the U.S. commitment to countering malign influence and state-sponsored threats.
Opponents contend
Critics might express concerns that mandating specific sanctions could limit executive flexibility in foreign policy, potentially complicating broader diplomatic efforts or negotiations with Iran. Some may also argue that such a prescriptive approach could be perceived as an act of aggression, potentially escalating tensions rather than de-escalating them, or that the effectiveness of these sanctions against individuals primarily operating within Iran may be limited.
The bill is concise and its core provisions are straightforward, allowing for a quick assessment of its primary intent and mechanisms.
Section 3(a)
Presidential Review and Sanctions Determination
This provision requires the President to submit a determination to Congress within 180 days of the bill's enactment, and every two years thereafter, on whether specific foreign persons meet the criteria for sanctions. This determination is based on their role in issuing and amplifying fatwas or other statements advocating violence, particularly those related to the deaths of U.S. President Donald J. Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and other political leaders.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this provision ensures accountability for those inciting violence against international leaders and provides a clear directive to the executive branch to act against such threats, reinforcing national security and demonstrating resolve.
Critics contend
Critics might argue that mandating specific sanctions determinations could limit executive flexibility in foreign policy, potentially complicating broader diplomatic strategies or negotiations with Iran by removing discretion.
Tradeoffs
This provision balances the legislative desire for strong, explicit action against incitement with the executive branch's traditional need for flexibility in conducting foreign policy and managing complex international relations.
Section 3(b)
Identification of Specific Individuals and Entities for Sanctions Review
This section explicitly lists 18 foreign persons, comprising prominent Iranian clerics, political figures, and state-linked organizations, who are to be reviewed by the President for potential sanctions. The list includes individuals such as Ayatollah Naser Makarem-Shirazi, Alireza Panahian, and Ahmad Khatami, as well as entities like the Qom Seminary, Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), and the Assembly of Experts.
Section 3(c)
Scope of Sanctions Imposed
This section details the specific sanctions to be imposed on foreign persons designated by the President. These include blocking all their property and interests in property within U.S. jurisdiction, exercising authorities granted under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). Additionally, designated aliens would be inadmissible to the United States, ineligible for visas, and any existing visas would be revoked, effectively imposing a travel ban.
This subsection grants the President the authority to waive the application of sanctions under this Act with respect to a foreign person if the President determines that such a waiver is in the national security interests of the United States. A written determination and justification must be submitted to the appropriate congressional committees within 15 days of the waiver taking effect.
Section 3(e)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to provide the executive branch with necessary flexibility in foreign policy implementation, allowing for adaptation to evolving geopolitical circumstances. Its placement is typical for such clauses, rather than being intentionally evasive.
Case for: Proponents argue this waiver is crucial for maintaining executive flexibility in foreign policy, allowing the President to make strategic decisions that prioritize broader national security interests, even if it means temporarily suspending sanctions to achieve other diplomatic goals.
Case against: Critics might contend that a broad waiver authority could undermine the bill's intent, potentially allowing the executive branch to avoid imposing sanctions without sufficient justification, thereby weakening the deterrent effect and legislative oversight.
Estimated impact: This provision could significantly alter the practical application and impact of the sanctions, depending on how frequently and under what circumstances it is exercised, potentially mitigating or suspending the bill's core effects.
This subsection specifies the conditions under which the sanctions imposed by the Act will terminate. The sanctions will cease to be effective 30 days after the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Government of Iran no longer repeatedly provides support for international terrorism, as determined by the Secretary of State pursuant to existing U.S. laws (e.g., Export Control Reform Act, Foreign Assistance Act, Arms Export Control Act).
Section 3(i)
Why it matters:This is a standard practice for sunset clauses or conditions for termination in sanctions legislation, providing a clear pathway for sanctions relief contingent on a change in behavior. Its placement is typical for such a forward-looking provision.
Case for: Supporters argue this provides a clear pathway for sanctions relief, incentivizing Iran to cease its support for terrorism and offering a diplomatic off-ramp, aligning the bill with broader U.S. foreign policy goals of encouraging behavioral change.
Case against: Critics might argue that linking termination to a broad determination of Iran's overall terrorism support, rather than specifically to the incitement of violence addressed by the bill, could make the sanctions difficult to lift even if the immediate threat subsides, potentially prolonging tensions.
Estimated impact: This provision defines the long-term duration and conditions for the end of the sanctions regime established by the bill, providing a framework for future U.S.-Iran relations concerning terrorism support.