No GOUGE Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. DeLauro, Rosa L. [D-CT-3]
- Committees
- Education and Workforce Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Nov 28, 2025
Bottom line
The No GOUGE Act aims to prevent businesses from using new or planned tariffs as a pretext to raise prices excessively on consumers and other businesses, enhancing regulatory oversight of pricing during periods of trade policy changes.
What it actually does
This bill prohibits price gouging on goods affected by tariffs, defining price gouging as raising prices by more than the direct cost of the tariff plus certain additional costs, explicitly excluding executive compensation or share repurchases. It establishes a presumption of violation for large entities with 'unfair leverage' during 'tariff-related shock dates' and grants enforcement powers to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and State attorneys general. It also mandates annual reports from federal agencies on pricing and enforcement.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that this bill protects consumers and businesses from opportunistic price increases following tariff impositions, ensuring that tariffs are not exploited for undue profit. They contend it promotes fair market practices and prevents economic instability during trade policy changes by holding large corporations accountable for their pricing decisions.
Opponents contend
Opponents might argue that the bill introduces undue regulatory burden and complexity, potentially stifling legitimate price adjustments due to broader market dynamics or increased operational costs not explicitly covered. They may also contend that it could deter investment or create disincentives for businesses to absorb tariff costs, ultimately harming consumers through reduced availability or quality.
The bill is relatively short, but its detailed definitions and enforcement mechanisms require careful reading to fully grasp its implications.
Section 3(a)
Prohibition on Price Gouging for Tariffed Goods
This provision makes it illegal for any person in a supply chain to sell or offer a 'tariffed good' at an 'unreasonably high price' for five years after a tariff or planned tariff takes effect. An 'unreasonably high price' is defined as raising the price by more than the direct costs generated by the tariff, plus certain additional costs (excluding executive compensation or share repurchases) that demonstrate the tariff wasn't a pretext for the increase.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this directly addresses concerns that tariffs are often used as an excuse for companies to inflate prices beyond actual cost increases, thereby protecting consumers from exploitation and ensuring market fairness.
Critics contend
Critics might argue that this provision is overly prescriptive and could hinder legitimate business operations, as calculating 'direct costs' and 'additional costs' (excluding certain items) might be complex and subject to interpretation, potentially leading to unintended consequences or legal challenges.
Tradeoffs
Balances consumer protection against business flexibility in pricing and cost recovery. It aims to prevent profiteering while allowing for legitimate cost pass-through.
Section 2(7)
Broad Definition of Goods Subject to Price Gouging Rules
This section broadly defines 'tariffed good' to include final goods, goods assembled in the U.S. with tariffed components, the components themselves, and any of these categories for which there is a 'planned tariff.' This means the prohibition applies not just to directly imported finished products but also to goods manufactured domestically using imported parts, and even before a tariff officially takes effect if it has been publicly announced.
Section 3(b)
Revenue-Based Exemption for Smaller Entities
The price gouging prohibition does not apply to businesses whose 'ultimate parent entity' earned less than $100,000,000 in gross revenue from goods sold in the U.S. during the preceding 12 months. This threshold will be adjusted annually for inflation by the Commission.
Section 3(c)
Presumption of Violation for Entities with Unfair Leverage
On a 'tariff-related shock date' (defined as significant tariff activity within 30 days), a person is presumed to be in violation if they have 'unfair leverage' (gross revenue over $1,000,000,000 or other Commission-defined characteristics) and raised prices above the 180-day average prior to the tariff. This presumption can be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that the price increase is fully attributable to direct tariff costs and legitimate additional costs (excluding executive compensation/share repurchases).
Sections 3(e) and 3(f)
Federal Trade Commission and State Enforcement Powers
Violations of this Act are treated as unfair or deceptive acts under the Federal Trade Commission Act, granting the FTC full enforcement powers, including investigations, penalties, and remedies. Additionally, State attorneys general or other officials can bring civil actions as parens patriae on behalf of their residents to enjoin violations, enforce compliance, or obtain damages and restitution, after notifying the FTC.
Section 3(h)
Consumer Reporting Mechanism and FTC Investigation Process
Within 180 days of enactment, the FTC must establish a mechanism (phone, mail, website) for consumers to report potential violations. The FTC must also promulgate regulations detailing how it will consider these reports and open investigations. The bill clarifies that the FTC can still initiate investigations unilaterally, independent of consumer reports.
Section 4
Annual Reports on Prices and Enforcement Activities
The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) are jointly required to submit annual public reports to Congress on prices of goods sold by large companies (over $1 billion in gross revenue), focusing on changes in tariffed good prices. The BLS must also assess and, if necessary, develop new surveys to collect sufficient data. Separately, the FTC must submit annual public reports on its enforcement activities under this Act, including an assessment of its impact on consumer prices for both tariffed and all goods.
When determining if a price is 'unreasonably high' or rebutting a presumption of violation, businesses can factor in 'additional costs' incurred in providing the good, but these explicitly exclude 'costs relating to increased executive compensation or share repurchase programs.'
Section 3(a)(2)(A)(ii)(bb), 3(a)(2)(A)(i)(bb), 3(a)(2)(A)(iii)(bb) and 3(c)(2)(B)(ii)
Why it matters:While defining specific cost exclusions is standard legislative practice, the explicit mention of executive compensation and share repurchases carries significant political weight and could be seen as a targeted measure that might be less prominent in a high-level summary.
Case for: Supporters would argue this prevents companies from using tariff-related price increases as an opportunity to enrich executives or boost stock prices through buybacks, ensuring that price increases genuinely reflect operational costs rather than corporate financial maneuvers.
Case against: Critics might argue that these exclusions are arbitrary and interfere with corporate governance, potentially limiting a company's ability to manage its capital structure or incentivize leadership, even if such activities are unrelated to the tariff impact itself.
Estimated impact: Prevents companies from justifying price increases by pointing to executive pay raises or share buybacks, potentially directing more funds to operational adjustments or consumer price stability.
Defines a 'tariff-related shock date' as any date where tariffs or planned tariffs on at least 5 tariff lines entered into force or were announced within the preceding 30 days, OR where a tariff rate change (including planned) increased an existing tariff by more than 25 percentage points within the preceding 30 days. This date triggers the presumption of violation for large entities.
Section 2(8)
Why it matters:While standard practice to define terms upfront, the specific numerical triggers are crucial for understanding when the 'presumption of violation' applies, making it a substantively important detail that could be overlooked.
Case for: Proponents would argue that this definition provides clear, objective triggers for when market conditions are volatile enough to warrant heightened scrutiny for price gouging, focusing enforcement efforts on periods of significant trade policy disruption.
Case against: Critics might argue that these thresholds are arbitrary and could capture legitimate market reactions to trade policy changes, or that they might not fully account for the diverse impacts of tariffs across different industries and goods.
Estimated impact: Establishes specific conditions under which large companies face a higher burden of proof for price increases, potentially leading to more investigations during periods of significant tariff activity.