SAFE LiDAR Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Krishnamoorthi, Raja [D-IL-8]
- Committees
- Transportation and Infrastructure Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Dec 10, 2025
Bottom line
The bill aims to bolster U.S. national security by eliminating reliance on LiDAR technology from designated foreign adversaries, primarily China, in critical sectors and general commerce.
What it actually does
This bill prohibits the use of LiDAR technology developed, distributed, or manufactured by foreign adversary countries in the United States, with a phased implementation over three to five years. It also restricts U.S. entities from forming new partnerships with foreign adversary LiDAR companies for use in the U.S. The Secretary of Commerce is granted waiver and extension authorities under specific conditions.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that the bill is essential for safeguarding national security by preventing espionage, technical compromise, and supply chain disruptions in critical emerging technologies like autonomous vehicles, defense systems, and infrastructure, which could be exploited by foreign adversaries like the Chinese Communist Party.
Opponents contend
Critics might contend that the bill could disrupt existing supply chains, increase costs for U.S. businesses, and potentially hinder innovation by limiting access to certain technologies, especially if domestic alternatives are not readily available or competitive. Concerns may also be raised about the broad definitions and potential for overreach.
The bill is moderately complex due to its detailed definitions, phased prohibitions, and various exceptions and waiver mechanisms, requiring careful reading to understand its full scope and implications for different sectors.
Section 3(a)(1)
General Prohibition on Future Foreign Adversary LiDAR Use
Beginning three years after the bill's enactment, most U.S. entities (defined as 'covered persons') are prohibited from engaging in transactions that result in the use of LiDAR technology from foreign adversary countries within the United States. This aims to prevent new reliance on potentially compromised technology.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this provision is crucial for national security, preventing future reliance on potentially compromised technology and fostering a secure domestic supply chain for critical components.
Critics contend
Critics might contend that this could create supply chain disruptions and increase costs for businesses that planned to use or are currently developing with foreign LiDAR, especially if domestic alternatives are not cost-competitive or readily available.
Tradeoffs
This provision balances the imperative of national security against potential economic disruption and market access limitations for U.S. industries.
Section 3(a)(2)
Enhanced Restrictions for Critical Infrastructure and Federal Government
Critical infrastructure operators and Federal Government entities are immediately prohibited from using new foreign adversary LiDAR technology. For existing systems, they must phase out the use of such technology within five years of the bill's enactment. This targets the highest-risk applications.
Section 3(b)
Secretary of Commerce Waiver Authority
The Secretary of Commerce can grant waivers for the prohibitions. For general transactions, waivers can be issued if in the national interest or to prevent undue hardship, are non-renewable, and last up to three years. For critical infrastructure/federal use, waivers require a national security interest or necessity to avoid cessation of critical functions, coupled with a mitigation agreement.
Section 3(c)
Specific Exemptions from Prohibition
The bill provides several exemptions, including U.S. government testing, academic or research purposes, integration into products manufactured for export outside the U.S., and use in international passenger or cargo transportation (e.g., airplanes, automobiles). Additionally, legacy products already in use before the prohibition's effective date are exempt from the general prohibition.
Section 4
Prohibition on New Partnerships with Foreign Adversary LiDAR Companies
Starting from the date of enactment, U.S. entities are prohibited from entering into new joint ventures, licensing agreements, or technology partnerships with companies that produce, design, or control foreign adversary LiDAR technology. This applies if the purpose is to manufacture, license, or facilitate LiDAR for use in the United States, but exempts partnerships for research or products intended solely for export.
Section 6(a)
Transition Mitigation Program and Expert Review
Within 90 days, the Secretary of Commerce must establish a program to assist stakeholders with compliance, issue guidance, and set up waiver procedures. The program also requires designating at least two experts (one in autonomous driving, one in robotics) to review petitions from companies dependent on prohibited technology and assess national interest waivers.
The definition of 'covered person' is broad, encompassing any entity engaging in commerce related to LiDAR, products containing it, or routinely using such technology. It explicitly excludes natural persons for personal use but includes any corporate structure established with the primary intent of circumventing the Act.
Section 7(b)
Why it matters:Defining terms comprehensively is standard legislative practice, but the breadth and anti-evasion language ensure wide applicability and prevent easy loopholes, which can be technically complex to articulate.
Case for: Supporters would argue that a broad and anti-circumvention definition is necessary to prevent evasion and ensure the comprehensive application of the prohibitions, thereby closing potential loopholes that could undermine national security objectives.
Case against: Critics might contend that the broad definition could inadvertently capture a wider range of entities than intended, leading to significant compliance burdens for businesses not directly involved in LiDAR manufacturing but merely using products containing it.
Estimated impact: Potentially impacts a vast array of businesses across multiple sectors, from technology developers and manufacturers to logistics companies and critical infrastructure operators, if they use products with foreign adversary LiDAR.
The definition of 'critical infrastructure operator' refers to an external statutory definition (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)) and requires the Secretary of Commerce to annually publish a document specifying covered sectors. It explicitly mandates the inclusion of water, wastewater, power, smart city systems, airports, seaports, and railways.
Section 7(d)
Why it matters:It is standard legislative practice to define terms and delegate the granular details of implementation to expert agencies, allowing for flexibility as threats and technologies evolve. The specific inclusions ensure a baseline level of protection.
Case for: Supporters would argue that this approach provides necessary flexibility for the Secretary of Commerce to adapt the definition to evolving threats and technologies while ensuring core critical sectors are always covered, maintaining relevance over time.
Case against: Critics might express concern that relying on an external definition and future administrative action could lead to uncertainty for operators about their compliance obligations or allow for politically motivated changes to the scope of critical infrastructure.
Estimated impact: Directly impacts a wide range of essential service providers and government functions, potentially requiring significant investment in replacing existing LiDAR systems across these vital sectors.
Defines an 'adversary affiliation termination event' as a transaction and agreement that results in a full and absolute divestment of any interest in a foreign adversary LiDAR technology, or full sale of a controlling company. This requires control by non-adversary persons, elimination of national security threats (including data transmission), and full intellectual property transfer to a U.S. or trusted partner entity, all approved by the Secretary of Commerce by clear and convincing evidence.
Section 7(a)
Why it matters:This detailed mechanism provides a precise legal pathway for companies to potentially convert prohibited technology into permissible technology, requiring strict conditions to ensure national security. Such precision is often placed in definitions.
Case for: Proponents would argue this provides a pragmatic pathway for companies to transition away from foreign adversary control, allowing valuable technology to remain in use under secure conditions, rather than being completely banned, thus preserving some economic value.
Case against: Critics might argue that the 'clear and convincing evidence' standard and the requirement for 'full control' and 'full transfer of IP' might be too stringent, making such termination events practically impossible to achieve and thus limiting its intended flexibility.
Estimated impact: Could enable certain foreign-developed LiDAR technologies to continue in the U.S. market if their ownership and control are completely de-risked, potentially preserving some existing investments and avoiding complete write-offs.