DEFEND Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Crane, Elijah [R-AZ-2]
- Committees
- Homeland Security Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Dec 19, 2025
Bottom line
The DEFEND Act aims to enhance U.S. homeland security by systematically analyzing and preparing for evolving drone-based terrorism threats from foreign adversaries and terrorist groups.
What it actually does
This bill, the "Detecting and Evaluating Foreign Exploitation of Novel Drones Act" or "DEFEND Act," amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to mandate that the Secretary of Homeland Security conduct annual assessments for six years on terrorism threats to the United States posed by the malicious use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) by foreign adversaries and terrorist organizations. The assessments must cover various aspects, including attack methods, proliferation, emerging technologies, swarm tactics, and CBRN payload delivery. It also requires the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to develop training for law enforcement and collaborate with other agencies and the private sector.
Proponents argue
Supporters argue that this bill is crucial for national security, as it addresses a rapidly evolving and significant threat posed by the malicious use of drones by foreign adversaries and terrorist organizations. They contend that annual, comprehensive assessments, coupled with enhanced training and interagency collaboration, will ensure the U.S. remains proactive in detecting, evaluating, and responding to these sophisticated threats, protecting critical infrastructure and civilian populations.
Opponents contend
Critics might argue that while the intent is valid, the bill could lead to redundant reporting requirements or divert resources from more immediate, tangible threats if not properly integrated with existing intelligence and defense efforts. Some may also raise concerns about the scope of "covered foreign adversaries" and "covered unmanned aircraft systems," suggesting it could be overly broad or difficult to implement consistently without clear, dynamic threat intelligence.
The bill is concise and clearly structured, making it accessible for an informed reader to understand its core requirements within a short timeframe.
Section 2, adding new Section 324(a) and (b) to the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
Mandate for Annual Terrorism Threat Assessments on Malicious UAS
This provision requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to conduct and submit annual assessments to Congress for six years. These assessments must detail terrorism threats to the U.S. from the global spread and malicious use of specific types of drones by foreign adversaries and terrorist groups. The assessments must cover a wide range of topics, including attack methods, proliferation routes, emerging technologies like AI in drones, swarm tactics, and the potential for chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) payloads.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that these comprehensive assessments are vital for understanding and anticipating the rapidly evolving threat landscape of drone warfare and terrorism. They believe that a structured, annual review ensures that DHS and other agencies maintain focus on this critical area, adapt strategies, and allocate resources effectively to protect the homeland.
Critics contend
Critics might suggest that while threat assessments are necessary, an annual mandate for six years on such a specific topic could become overly bureaucratic or repetitive, potentially diverting resources from more agile, real-time intelligence analysis. They might also question the feasibility of consistently producing novel insights annually given the classified nature of some information.
Tradeoffs
The bill balances the need for systematic threat analysis with the potential for bureaucratic overhead. It aims to ensure consistent focus on a high-priority threat while requiring significant interagency coordination and resource allocation.
Section 2, adding new Section 324(c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) to the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
Enhanced Domestic Preparedness and Interagency/Private Sector Engagement
This provision requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop training modules and exercises for various law enforcement levels to recognize and respond to malicious UAS use, incorporating lessons from global conflicts. It also mandates consultation with other federal agencies (DoD, ODNI) for the assessments and collaboration with private sector counter-UAS experts. Finally, it requires a classified briefing to Congress after each assessment and a public unclassified annex.
Defines "covered unmanned aircraft system" broadly to include any UAS manufactured in, using components from, using ground control systems or operating software developed in, or using network connectivity or data storage located in a "covered foreign country" or by an entity domiciled there.
Section 2, adding new Section 324(h)(5) to the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to place definitions at the end of a section. However, its breadth is highly consequential for the bill's practical application.
Case for: Proponents argue this broad definition is necessary to capture the full spectrum of UAS threats, recognizing that adversaries may acquire or assemble drones from various sources linked to hostile nations. It aims to prevent circumvention by focusing on the origin of critical components and data infrastructure, not just the final assembly point.
Case against: Critics might contend that such a broad definition could be difficult to enforce or track, potentially encompassing a vast array of commercially available drones with components from various global supply chains, some of which may have indirect or minor links to "covered foreign countries." This could lead to overreach or administrative burdens.
Estimated impact: Significantly expands the scope of UAS that DHS must monitor and assess for terrorism threats, potentially including many commercially available drones with foreign-sourced components.
Defines "covered foreign country" as one identified by the intelligence community in its most recent Annual Threat Assessment, OR one identified by the Secretary of Homeland Security (in coordination with DNI) if not already included in the assessment.
Section 2, adding new Section 324(h)(4) to the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
Why it matters:Standard legislative practice for definitions, but the flexibility it grants DHS and DNI is a significant policy detail.
Case for: Proponents argue this dynamic definition is crucial for adaptability. It ensures that the assessments can respond to evolving geopolitical threats and include new adversaries that may emerge or become relevant between official intelligence community threat assessments, allowing for a more agile response to national security concerns.
Case against: Critics might express concern that the second clause grants significant discretionary power to the Secretary and DNI to unilaterally designate "foreign adversaries," potentially without the full public scrutiny or consensus that typically accompanies intelligence community assessments. This could lead to political rather than purely threat-based designations.
Estimated impact: Allows for the inclusion of additional countries beyond those explicitly named in public intelligence reports, potentially expanding the scope of threats to be assessed based on executive determination.