Securing Energy Supply Chains Act
- Sponsor
- Rep. Fallon, Pat [R-TX-4]
- Committees
- Energy and Commerce Committee (primary)
- Last action
- Dec 18, 2025
Bottom line
The bill aims to bolster U.S. energy supply chain security by restricting DOE's engagement with entities linked to foreign adversaries, particularly in critical materials and battery sectors.
What it actually does
This bill mandates the Secretary of Energy to create and maintain an "Energy Non-Procurement List" of entities deemed detrimental to U.S. national, energy, economic security, public safety, or foreign policy. It then prohibits the Department of Energy (DOE) and its contractors from entering into or renewing contracts with these listed entities, or with any individual or entity that funds or procures from them, with limited exceptions. The bill also requires a study to harmonize existing federal lists of problematic entities.
Proponents argue
Proponents argue that this legislation is crucial for safeguarding U.S. national security and economic interests by reducing reliance on foreign entities that pose risks, especially those controlled by or influenced by foreign entities of concern. They contend it will strengthen domestic energy supply chains, promote U.S. manufacturing of critical materials and batteries, and protect sensitive energy projects from potential sabotage or espionage.
Opponents contend
Opponents might contend that the bill could lead to increased costs and delays for Department of Energy projects by limiting the pool of eligible contractors and subcontractors. They may also argue that the broad definition of "covered individual or entity," extending to those who fund or procure from listed entities, creates an overly complex compliance burden for businesses and could inadvertently disrupt legitimate supply chains without clear benefits.
The bill is relatively short and its core provisions are accessible, though understanding the full scope requires familiarity with referenced external definitions.
Section 3(a)
Establishment of Energy Non-Procurement List
This provision requires the Secretary of Energy to establish, within 90 days of enactment, a list of entities determined to be engaged in activities detrimental to U.S. national security, energy security, economic security, public safety, or foreign policy. The Secretary must prioritize identifying entities involved in critical materials or batteries. The list can include entities owned or influenced by a 'foreign entity of concern,' those on various existing U.S. government watchlists (e.g., DoD's Chinese Military Company List, Treasury's SDN list), and their subsidiaries or parent companies.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this list is a vital tool for proactively identifying and mitigating risks within the energy supply chain, ensuring that federal funds do not inadvertently support entities that undermine U.S. security interests. Prioritizing critical materials and batteries addresses key vulnerabilities.
Critics contend
Critics might argue that creating another federal watchlist adds to bureaucratic complexity and potential redundancy, especially given the existence of multiple other lists. They may also raise concerns about the criteria for inclusion and the potential for arbitrary or politically motivated designations.
Tradeoffs
The provision balances the need for national security against the potential for increased administrative burden and the risk of over-broad or inefficient restrictions on global supply chains.
Section 3(a)(4) and 3(b)
Annual Revisions and Reporting Requirements
This section mandates that the Secretary of Energy update the Energy Non-Procurement List at least annually, adding or removing entities as necessary. Furthermore, the Secretary must submit an annual report to specific Congressional committees, including the most up-to-date unclassified list and a classified annex justifying each inclusion or deletion. The unclassified portion of the report must also be published on the Department of Energy's website.
Section 4(a)(1)
Prohibition on DOE Contracts and Subcontracts
Starting one year after enactment, this provision prohibits the Department of Energy from entering into or renewing any contract with a "covered individual or entity." It also prohibits DOE contractors and their first-tier subcontractors from entering into or renewing subcontracts exceeding $250,000 with such covered entities. An exception exists if the Secretary determines that the required goods or services are not procurable from another source in the necessary manner, time frame, or quantity for the project's success.
Section 4(a)(2)-(3)
Certification and Contract Termination
This provision requires all bidders or offerors for DOE contracts to certify that they are not a "covered individual or entity" at the time of their bid. If the Secretary determines during the term of a DOE contract that a contractor (or a first or second-tier subcontractor) is a covered entity, the contract must be terminated. Exceptions to termination apply if the goods or services are not procurable from another source, or, for subcontractors, if the prime contractor acted in good faith when initially engaging the subcontractor.
Section 5
Federal List Overlap Study and Harmonization Recommendations
This section requires the Secretary of Energy, in coordination with multiple other federal agencies (Commerce, Defense, State, Treasury, DNI, etc.), to conduct a study within one year of enactment. The study's purpose is to identify and compare existing lists maintained by various federal departments and agencies that relate to foreign entities of concern, sanctioned entities, Chinese military companies, and entities prohibited from federal contracts. Following the study, the Secretary must submit a report to Congress with the study's results and recommendations on how to harmonize these disparate lists to provide clearer guidance on which entities the federal government should not contract with.
The term "foreign entity of concern" is defined by reference to section 40207(a) of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (42 U.S.C. 18741(a)). This external definition is critical to understanding the scope of entities that can be included on the Energy Non-Procurement List.
Section 2(2)
Why it matters:This is standard legislative practice to avoid reprinting lengthy definitions already established in law, ensuring consistency across statutes.
Case for: Supporters would argue that referencing existing law promotes consistency and avoids redundant text, streamlining the legislative process and ensuring that the bill's scope aligns with established federal policy regarding foreign entities of concern.
Case against: Critics might argue that defining a key term by external reference makes the bill less accessible to the average reader and requires additional research to understand its full impact, potentially obscuring the true breadth of the bill's application.
Estimated impact: The scope of entities potentially affected by the bill is directly tied to this external definition, which includes entities owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign adversary, as well as those involved in certain illicit activities.
The term "covered individual or entity" includes not only an entity on the Energy Non-Procurement List but also "an individual or entity that provides funding to, or procures goods or services from an entity on the Energy Non-Procurement List." This significantly expands the scope of the procurement prohibition beyond just the directly listed entities.
Section 4(c)(1)
Why it matters:While definitions are typically in their own section, the broad reach of this particular definition might be strategically placed to ensure comprehensive coverage without being a headline provision.
Case for: Proponents would argue that this broad definition is essential to prevent circumvention of the procurement prohibition. By including entities that indirectly support or are supported by listed entities, the bill closes potential loopholes and ensures a more robust security posture for the energy supply chain.
Case against: Critics might argue that this definition creates an extremely complex and potentially unmanageable compliance burden for DOE contractors and subcontractors, who would need to vet not only their direct partners but also their partners' financial and procurement relationships. This could lead to unintended disruptions and increased costs.
Estimated impact: This provision could significantly broaden the number of entities subject to procurement restrictions, potentially impacting a wide array of businesses that have indirect dealings with entities on the Energy Non-Procurement List, even if those dealings are otherwise legitimate.